

~~SECRET~~

~~S E C R E T~~
Auth: C.O. 20th Tac Rcn Sqdn
10 May 44 (Date) (Initials)

HEADQUARTERS
20TH TACTICAL RECONNAISSANCE SQUADRON
APO 487

May 1944

SQ - RCN - 20 - HI

SQUADRON HISTORICAL DATA
For the month of April 1944

APR 1944

a. Original Unit: As reported previously.

b. Changes in Organization: 20th Tact. Rcn. Sqdn. assigned to 8th Photo Reconnaissance Group without change of station. (Per G.O. 38, par 1, dtd 25 April 1944, Hq. 10th AF). The Squadron continues operations under the 5320th Air Defense Wing (Prov).

CLASSIFICATION CHANGED TO C.

c. Strength:

April 1 1944 - 42 Commissioned
194 Enlisted

April 30 1944 - 46 Commissioned
193 Enlisted

d. Station: Kisselbari, Assam, India.

e. Changes in Personnel: On April 2, 1944 we saw 1st Lt. David W. Yahn, O-378066 Supply Officer of the Squadron, for the first time since 17 November 1943; when we left him in California at the POE to insure the shipment of equipment. His welcome return to the squadron terminated rumors that he had been drafted to a defense plant, and had suffered accordingly.

Strength was increased by the addition of the following: 2nd Lt's John W. Dunlap, O-754083, Harvey L. Philpotts Jr., O-798165 and Richard G. Mueller, O-810400 per SO 53, par 10, Hq. 10th AF. 2nd Lt's Fletcher T. Bender, O-725661 and John J. Kendrick, O-686755, per SO 62 par 4 dtd 25 April 1944, Hq. 10th AF.

On the 25 April 1944, 1st Lt. John D. Reid O-24773, was assigned the job of piloting Brigadier General Frank Merrill on his numerous trips. (Per VOCG 5320th Air Defence Wing (Prov) DS to Galahad Hqs.) This should afford Lt. Reid an opportunity to study operations in Burma. With his West Point background and flying experience, we are confident that this opportunity will not be wasted.

2nd Lt. Leslie W. Sachs, O-650595 was transferred to 1st Commando Group, per SO 62 par 13 dtd 20 April 1944 Hq. 10th AF. Here his activities as a Statistical Officer will be afforded wider scope. He has contributed some new ideas on charts and graphs that are applicable to the functions of a Squadron. His short stay with us has been pleasant and helpful.

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5926-478

20TH SPECIAL OPERATIONS SQUADRON

The Twentieth Special Operations Squadron (20 SOS) was originally activated as the 20th Observation Squadron at Savannah Air Base, Georgia on March 2, 1942. The unit moved to Pope Field, North Carolina on March 28, 1942, thence to Vichy, Missouri on December 14, 1942. The squadron flew numerous aircraft including the A-20, B-25, DB-7, L-1, L-4, L-5, P-40, and P-43. At Vichy the unit trained in aerial reconnaissance and air support techniques.

The unit was designated the 20th Reconnaissance Squadron (Fighter) on April 2, 1943 and moved to Morris Field, North Carolina. On August 11, 1943 the unit was named the 20th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron and moved to Key Field, Mississippi, to prepare for overseas movement. On January 5, 1944 the 20th reached Guskhara, India and commenced combat on the January 31st. Among the early tasks for the 20th, were 21 special missions in support of the 1st Air Commando Group to photograph possible airborne landing sites. The 20th redeployed on November 4, 1945 to Camp Kilmer, New Jersey and was deactivated on November 27, 1945.

The 20th Helicopter Squadron was activated on July 9, 1956 at Sewart Air Force Base (AFB), Tennessee, and equipped with H-21s. The unit was deactivated March 8, 1960.

The 20th Helicopter Squadron was reactivated October 8, 1965 at Tan Son Nhut Air Base, Republic of Vietnam, flying CH-3s. The unit began flying unconventional warfare/special operations missions as the Pony Express. In February 1967 UH-1F/Ps were assigned and the squadron began flying helicopter gunship missions. The unit was designated as the 20 SOS August 1, 1968. The "Green Hornets" continued to perform unconventional warfare missions until unit deactivation March 30, 1972. The 20th had disposed of its CH-3s in July 1969 and flew only gunship missions thereafter.

The 20 SOS was reactivated January 1, 1976 at Hurlburt Field, Florida. The mission remained unconventional warfare/special operations using UH-1N gunships and CH-3s. The HH-53H Pave Low replaced the CH-3 in May 1980 to provide a long range, heavy lift helicopter capability.

In 1983 the UH-1Ns began two years of outstanding support as part of Vice President Bush's South Florida Drug Enforcement Task Force, participating in Operation Bahamas, Antilles, and Turks (OP BAT). The OP BAT Hueys flew hundreds of daring over-water missions from the Bahamas supporting the capture of countless illegal drugs. The UH-1Ns were transferred to Homestead AFB, Florida, in August 1985.

In 1986 the 20th received the specially equipped and highly capable redesignated MH-53J Pave Low III. They provided daring support to Operation Just Cause in Panama during December 1989. The 20 SOS answered the call once again in August 1990, when they were one of the first special operations elements deployed to the Middle East in support of Operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm.

20 SO Sq - 4

OPERATIONS. From Jul 1956 to Mar 1960 trained to perform aeromedical evacuation, airlift support of assault operations, and specialized airlift. Participated in numerous exercises and maneuvers, and flew logistical support missions throughout North America, including the Arctic, until inactivated. Organized in a non-operational status in Vietnam in Oct 1965. Personnel and equipment reached Tan Son Nhut on c. 10 Dec 1965, at which point activity of the 20th HS resumes.* At various times from then until late Mar 1972, operated from Tan Son Nhut, Nha Trang, Tuy Hoa, Cam Ranh Bay, Vien Hoa, Da Nang, Ban Me Thuot, Kontum, Duc Lap, Ban Do, Tieu Atar, Quan Loa, and Loc Ninh, all in the Republic of Vietnam, and from Nakom Phanom and Udorn, Thailand. Using CH-3s, provided forward airlift, counterinsurgency support, search and rescue, medical evacuation, and airlift of mail and VIPs. After assignment of UH-1s in 1967 began flying helicopter gunship missions, initially of a local nature (i.e., base defense and patrols), but soon expanded into full combat operations. Missions by this time included unconventional, special air, and psychological warfare, reconnaissance, film courier, base defense, search and destroy, medical evacuation, rescue, logistical support and VIP courier missions, plus support of civic actions. Disposed of CH-3s in Jul 1969 and flew only helicopter gunships thereafter. Stood down from all missions on 15 Mar 1972 and transferred all aircraft by 30 Mar 1972.

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*Unit's history will not include activities of the Helicopter Squadron Provisional, 20, organized at Eglin AFB, Fla, on 11 Oct 1965, assigned to TAC and attached to Ninth Air Force, which formed a nucleus of personnel and equipment for dispatching to SEA for the 20th HS. This provisional unit deployed from Eglin AFB on 5 Dec 1965 and was discontinued the following day.

USAF UNIT LINEAGE AND HONORS HISTORY

PREPARED BY: CAR — HEADQUARTERS USAF HISTORICAL RESEARCH CENTER

DATE PREPARED	SUPERSEDES STATEMENT PREPARED	APPROVED BY
5 Nov 1985	30 Oct 1975	R. CARGILL HALL Chief, Research Division

DATA THROUGH — HISTORY: 31 Dec 1983 — ORDERS: DAF/MPM 662q, 19 Sep 1985

UNIT DESIGNATION: 20th Special Operations Squadron

STATUS	COMPONENT OF	ASSIGNED TO
XX ACTIVE [ ] INACTIVE [ ] DISBANDED [ ] DISCONTINUED	XX REGULAR AIR FORCE [ ] AIR FORCE RESERVE [ ] AIR NATIONAL GUARD [ ] UNALLOTTED	1st Special Operations Wing (MAC)

LINEAGE

Constituted 20th Observation Squadron (Light) on 5 Feb 1942. Activated on 2 Mar 1942. Redesignated: 20th Observation Squadron on 4 Jul 1942; 20th Reconnaissance Squadron (Fighter) on 2 Apr 1943; 20th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron on 11 Aug 1943. Inactivated on 27 Nov 1945. Consolidated (19 Sep 1985) with 20th Special Operations Squadron (constituted 20th Helicopter Squadron on 24 Feb 1956; activated on 9 Jul 1956; discontinued, and inactivated, on 8 Mar 1960; activated on 24 Sep 1965; organized on 8 Oct 1965; redesignated 20th Special Operations Squadron on 1 Aug 1968; inactivated on 1 Apr 1972; and activated on 1 Jan 1976).

HONORS

One service streamer, nineteen campaign streamers, and fifteen decorations. (See page 2.)

HONORS

SERVICE STREAMERS			
	Theater of Operations (WWI)		
X	American Theater (WWII)		
	EAME Theater (WWII)		
	Asiatic-Pacific Theater (WWII)		
	Korean Theater (Korean War)		
	Vietnam		
CAMPAIGN STREAMERS			
	World War I		
	Somme Defensive		
	Lys		
	Champagne-Marne		
	Aisne-Marne		
	Somme Offensive		
	Oise-Aisne		
	St Mihiel		
	Meuse-Argonne		
	World War II, American Theater		
	Antisubmarine		
	World War II, EAME Theater		
	Egypt-Libya		
	Algeria-French Morocco		
	Tunisia	X	
	Sicily	X	
	Naples-Foggia	X	
	Anzio		
	Rome-Arno		
	Southern France		
	North Apennines		
	Po Valley		
	Air Offensive, Europe		
	Normandy		
	Northern France		
	Rhineland		
	Ardennes-Alsace		
	Central Europe		
	Air Combat		
	Antisubmarine		
	World War II, Asiatic-Pacific Theater		
	Philippine Islands		
	East Indies		
	Papua		
	Guadalcanal		
	Northern Solomons		
	Bismarck Archipelago		
	New Guinea		
	Leyte		
	Luzon		
	Southern Philippines		
	Central Pacific		
	Eastern Mandates		
	Western Pacific		
	Ryukyus		
	Air Offensive, Japan		
	Burma		
	India-Burma		
	Central Burma		
	China Defensive		
	China Offensive		
	Aleutian Islands		
	Air Combat		
	Antisubmarine		
	Korean War		
	UN Defensive		
	UN Offensive		
	CCF Intervention		
	First UN Counteroffensive		
	CCF Spring Offensive		
	UN Summer-Fall Offensive		
	Second Korean Winter		
	Korea Summer-Fall, 1952		
	Third Korean Winter		
	Korea Summer-Fall, 1953		
	Vietnam		
	Vietnam Advisory		
	Vietnam Defense	X	
	Vietnam Air	X	
	Vietnam Air Offensive	X	
	VN Air Off, Phase II	X	
	VN Air Off, Phase III	X	
	Vietnam Air/Ground	X	
	VN Air Off, Phase IV	X	
	TET 69/Counteroffensive	X	
	VN Summer-Fall, 1969	X	
	VN Winter-Spring, 1970	X	
	Sanctuary Counteroffensive	X	
	Southwest Monsoon	X	
	Commando Hunt V	X	
	Commando Hunt VI	X	
	Commando Hunt VII	X	
	Vietnam Ceasefire	X	

ARROWHEADS

DECORATIONS

DISTINGUISHED/PRESIDENTIAL UNIT CITATION (AF)

PUC (Southeast Asia): 8 Mar 1966-
7 Mar 1967.
PUC (Southeast Asia): 21 Jun 1968-
30 Jun 1969.

AF OUTSTANDING UNIT AWARDS WITH COMBAT "V" DEVICE

10 Jan 1966-12 Mar 1966;
1 Nov 1966-1 Apr 1967;
16 Jun 1967-20 Jun 1968;
1 Jul 1967-30 Jun 1968;
1 Jul 1970-30 Jun 1971;
1 Sep 1971-31 Dec 1971;
1 May 1982-30 Apr 1984.

FOREIGN

Republic of Vietnam Gallantry Crosses
with Palm: 1 Jan-30 Aug 1968;
16 Jun 1967-1 Apr 1972.

AF OUTSTANDING UNIT AWARDS

1 Jan 1976-31 Mar 1977;
6 Nov 1978-2 Mar 1979;
15 Jul 1979-15 May 1980;
16 May 1980-30 Apr 1982.

OTHER

ASSIGNMENTS. Air Force Combat Command, 2 Mar 1942; Army Air Forces, 9 Mar 1942; 76th Observation (later, 76th Reconnaissance; 76th Tactical Reconnaissance) Group, 12 Mar 1942; III Reconnaissance Command, 23 Aug 1943; Army Air Forces, India-Burma Sector, 26 Dec 1943 (attached to 5306th Photographic and Reconnaissance Group [Provisional], 26 Dec 1943-17 Jan 1944, and to Tenth Air Force, 17 Jan-7 Mar 1944); Tenth Air Force, 7 Mar 1944 (attached to 5320th Air Defense Wing [Provisional], Mar-May 1944); 8th Photographic (later, 8th Reconnaissance) Group, 25 Apr 1944; Army Air Forces, India-Burma Theater, Oct-27 Nov 1945. Eighteenth Air Force, 9 Jul 1956 (attached to 314th Troop Carrier Wing, 9 Jul 1956-); Ninth Air Force, 1 Sep 1957-8 Mar 1960 (remained attached to 314th Troop Carrier Wing to 16 Jul 1959; attached to 354th Tactical Fighter Wing, 16 Jul 1959-8 Mar 1960). Pacific Air Forces, 24 Sep 1965; 2d Air Division, 8 Oct 1965 (attached to 6250th Combat Support Group, c. 10 Dec 1965-8 Mar 1966); 14th Air Commando (later, 14th Special Operations) Wing, 8 Mar 1966; 483d Tactical Airlift Wing, 1 Sep 1971-1 Apr 1972. 1st Special Operations Wing, 1 Jan 1976-.

DETACHMENTS.

Det 1, 20th Helicopter Squadron, Myrtle Beach AFB, SC: 1 Mar-25 Jul 1959.

Det 1, 20th Special Operations Squadron, Udorn Airfield, Thailand: 1 Jun 1969-1 Dec 1969.

STATIONS. Savannah AB, Ga, 2 Mar 1942; Pope Field, NC, 28 Mar 1942; AAB Vichy, Mo, 14 Dec 1942; Morris Field, NC, 8 May 1943; Key Field, Miss, 31 Aug-8 Nov 1943; Camp Anza, Calif, 11-c. 17 Nov 1943; Bombay, India, 26 Dec 1943; Camp Deolali, India, 28 Dec 1943; Guskhara, India, 5 Jan 1944 (flight operated from Kisselbari, India, 6-25 Mar 1944); Kisselbari, India, 26 Mar 1944 (operated from Dinjan, India, 1 May-20 Jun 1944; detachment at

Tingkawk Sakan, Burma, 21 May-20 Jun 1944; operated from Tingkawk Sakan, Burma, 21 Jun-c. 10 Nov 1944; detachment at Myitkyina, Burma, 10 Jul-c. 25 Aug 1944); Myitkyina, Burma, c. 9 Nov 1944 (flight operated from Akyab, Burma, 12 Apr-22 May 1945); Nagaghuli, India, c. 20 Apr 1945; Dergaon, India, 6 Jul 1945; Piardoba, India, Sep-4 Nov 1945; Camp Kilmer, NJ, 26-27 Nov 1945. Sewart AFB, Tenn, 9 Jul 1956; Myrtle Beach AFB, SC, 16 Jul 1959-8 Mar 1960. Tan Son Nhut Airfield, South Vietnam, 8 Oct 1965; Nha Trang AB, South Vietnam, 15 Jun 1966; Tuy Hoa AB, South Vietnam, 5 Sep 1969; Cam Ranh Bay AB, South Vietnam, 25 Sep 1970-1 Apr 1972. Eglin AF Auxiliary Field No. 9 (Hurlburt Field), Fla, 1 Jan 1976-.

AIRCRAFT. A-20, B-25, DB-7, L-1, L-4, L-5, P-40 and P-43, 1942-1943; P-40, Jan 1944-c. Feb 1945; L-5, 1944-1945; B-25, May 1944-1945; P-51/F-6, Jan-Nov 1945. H-21, Jul 1956-c. Mar 1960. CH-3, Dec 1965-Jul 1969; UH-1, Feb 1967-Mar 1972. UH-1, Mar 1976-; CH-3, c. Jul 1976-Sep 1980; HH-53, Jun 1980-.

OPERATIONS. Activated at Savannah Air Base, Ga, on 2 Mar 1942, receiving a small cadre from a detachment of the 109th Observation Squadron. Trained in a variety of aircraft, 1942-1943, moving to Pope Field, NC, in March 1942, thence to Vichy, Mo, in December 1942. At this base the 20th Observation Squadron was trained in aerial reconnaissance and in air support techniques. A detachment assisted ski troopers of the 2d Infantry Division during maneuvers in March 1943, operating from Duluth Municipal Airport, Minn. The squadron was designated 20th Reconnaissance Squadron (Fighter) in April 1943 and moved to Morris Field, NC, in May. A detachment provided reconnaissance in support of airborne forces in Nebraska in May. Effective 23 Aug 1943 the squadron was assigned directly to the III Reconnaissance Command, and on 31 August it moved to Key Field,

Miss, to prepare for overseas movement. Final maneuvers were completed at Demopolis, Ala, where the unit became proficient in camouflage. Departed Key Field on 8 Nov 1943, processed through Camp Anza, Calif, and boarded the US Army Transport Uruguay on 17 November, bound for India. After stop at Hobart, Tasmania, the ship reached Bombay on 26 December. The 20th Squadron processed through a British transient facility and reached Guskhara on 5 Jan 1944. P-40s arrived late in January and the 20th commenced combat on the 31st. L-5s joined the squadron at an unknown date, and in May 1944 the squadron gained B-25C and D aircraft.

When the 20th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron (as it was named in August 1943) entered combat, allied efforts were directed toward reopening surface routes to China by reconquering Burma from the Japanese. Among the early tasks of the 20th Squadron were 21 special missions for the 1st Air Commando Group, operating from Hailakandi, to photograph possible sites for airborne landings. From March to May the 20th was attached to the 5320th Air Defense Wing, Provisional, and participated in escort missions, a limited reconnaissance program, and considerable dive-bombing of enemy positions. The 20th joined the 8th Photographic (later, 8th Reconnaissance) Group on 25 Apr 1944 after moving to Kisselbari, India. It recieved two B-25 photo aircraft and more P-40s and slowly expanded its aerial coverage of Burma. Monsoon rains forced a move to Dinjan airfield on 1 May for most squadron operations.

On 9 July the 20th moved a photographic laboratory and three P-40s to the airstrip at Myitkyina, Burma, and in early November the entire squadron moved to Myitkyina. Missions continued to include visual reconnaissance, dive bombing, leaflet dropping, patrols, escort, and other tasks. With the reconquest of northern Burma and the reopening of the Burma-Ledo Road early

in 1945, the 20th TRS traded its war-weary P-40s for P-51/F-6Cs, thereby increasing its capabilities. The squadron continued combat missions in support of Tenth Air Force and General Joseph W. Stilwell's combined British-Chinese-American ground commands, fighting southward in Burma. Combat missions continued through 5 May 1945, by which time the 20th had moved to Nagaghuli, India. It was at Dergaon, India, at the end of the war, and moved to Piardoba as a step homeward, finally departing India on 4 November. A day after reaching Camp Kilmer, NJ, the 20th TRS inactivated. Although it had received no unit decorations, its members were highly praised for their many combat accomplishments.

The 20th Helicopter Squadron activated in July 1956 at Sewart AFB, Tenn, and was equipped with H-21 helicopters to perform specialized airlift, support of assault operations, and aeromedical evacuation. Although assigned directly to Eighteenth Air Force, the 20th was controlled by the 314th Troop Carrier Wing. Later, it transferred to Ninth Air Force and was controlled by the 354th Tactical Fighter Wing. From 1956 until inactivated in 1960, the 20th particiapted in many exercises and flew logistical and support missions throughout North America, including the Arctic.

The 20th Helicopter Squadron was organized in October 1965 at Tan Son Nhut Airfield, South Vietnam, in a nonoperational status. Personnel and equipment destined for the squadron reached Tan Son Nhut Airfield c. 10 December.

At various times from December 1965 until late March 1972, the 20th Helicopter Squadron (redesignated 20th Special Operations Squadron in August 1968) operated from Tan Son Nhut, Nha Trang, Tuy Hoa, Cam Ranh Bay, Bien Hoa, Danang, Ban Me Thout, Kontum, Duc Lap, Ban Do, Tien Atar, Quan Loa, and Loc Ninh, all in the Republic of Vietnam, and from Nakom Phanom

and Udorn, Thailand. The squadron provided forward airlift, counterinsurgency support, search and rescue, medical evacuation, and airlift of mail and personnel with its CH-3E helicopters. After assignment of UH-1s in February 1967, it began flying helicopter gunship missions, initially of a local nature (i.e., base defense and patrols), but soon expanding into full combat operations. Missions by this time included unconventional, special air, and psychological warfare, reconnaissance, film courier, base defense, search and destroy, medical evacuation, rescue, logistical support, and VIP courier mission, plus civic actions. The 20th disposed of its CH-3s in July 1969 and flew only gunships thereafter. It stood down from all missions on 15 Mar 1972 and transferred all aircraft by 30 Mar 1972.

Activated as 20th Special Operations Squadron on 1 Jan 1976 at Hurlburt Field, Fla, as a component of the 1st SOW. Although authorized six UH-IN and four CH-3E helicopters, the 20th had only one UH-1 assigned by 31 March. It was charged with infiltration, exfiltration, and reenforcement and resupply in hostile or enemy-held territory, using airdrop or airland techniques, day and night, over land or water, as well as psychological operations by means of leaflet drops.

By 30 Sep 1976 the 20th had four UH-1N and two CH-3E helicopters on hand and had begun participating in an unending stream of tactical exercises, static displays, self-evaluations, operational readiness inspections, shipboard landing practice, search and rescue missions, medical evacuations, and special training with U.S. Army Special Forces and U.S. Navy SEAL teams. By 1977 the 20th had its full complement of helicopters. Its flying operations centered around local area training and support of the 1st Special Operations Wing's combat control team. In 1978 and early

1979 the 20th SOS supported testing of Joint Countering Attack Helicopter (J-CATCH) tactics evaluations. The squadron received an Air Force Outstanding Unit Award (AFOUA) for this work, and over 70 officers and enlisted men received individual Air Force Commendation Medals for their contributions.

The 20th SOS gained nine HH-53H heavy helicopters from the 1550th Aircrew Training and Test Wing of Military Airlift Command on 17 Jun 1980 (the first on 1 June), and on 11 Sep 1980 the squadron transferred its CH-3E helicopters to other organizations. Plans existed by mid-1980 to replace the 20th's UH-1N gunship helicopters with H-60 Blackhawks, a machine specifically designed to survive in combat, but no positive action had occurred by the end of 1983.

One of the 20th SOS's unusual missions of an unclassified nature involved operations on the night of 21 Nov 1980, when personnel and helicopters of the 20th engaged in an exercise at Nellis AFB, Nev, assisted in rescuing people from a disastrous fire at the MGM Grand Hotel in Las Vegas. Shuttling from a nearby parking lot to the hotel's roof, the 20th airlifted firemen, paramedics, and supplies to the hotel and evacuated people. By 1982 the 20th also became involved in a national program to reduce the flow of drugs into the United States. Squadron aircraft proved invaluable in several "drug busts."


EMBLEM. Description. On a sky blue disc, edged white, with red edge partly superimposed over white edge on the dexter (right) side of disc; off center to the sinister (left) of disc a three-bladed red propeller, one blade to base; the propeller superimposed over a swirling concentric circular white line pattern; between the propeller's blades and over the line pattern, three silhouetted symbols, clockwise: a sling load; a litter; and

a dog's head with keg, all white, details of the first. Motto. On a sky blue scroll, edged and inscribed in white: SEMPER PARATUS, Always Prepared. Significance. The litter symbolizes the aeromedical evacuation mission of helicopters in conjunction with troop carrier paradrop missions or military assistance in evacuation of any disaster area. The sling load represents the capability of the helicopter to carry cargo or equipment on a sling and hook located beneath its fuselage. These missions involve providing airlift for initial establishment and resupply of Air Force activities at isolated non-airfield areas. The dog's head and keg portray the search and rescue mission of any helicopter unit. Blue designates the sky in which the aircraft operates; red is used on the blades to signify the designated unit color of the 20th Helicopter Squadron. It is also symbolic of activity and is used on the border to signify "active flying." White, a neutral hue, indicates the passive alert and the latent ability of the helicopter to do many things. Approved on 22 May 1957. Negative Number: 9304-AC.



9304-A.C.

20TH HELICOPTER SQUADRON



20TH TACTICAL RECONNAISSANCE SQUADRON

HEADQUARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES

AAF 421 (20th Obs. Sqdn.)
(10-31-42) DOP

October 31, 1942.

Aircraft Marking for the
20th Observation Squadron.

The Commanding Officer, 20th Observation Squadron.

By authority contained in AR 850-5, C1, August 24, 1942, the following insignia for the marking of aircraft for the 20th Observation Squadron, Army Air Forces, is approved:

AIRCRAFT MARKING: On a disc white, bordure light magenta, a blue cloud formation in chief, emitting a stroke of lightning orange to sinister base; a caricatured figure wearing work clothes brown, boxing gloves tan, aviator's helmet red, and goggles white, black binoculars on string around neck, flowing to rear, astride a large aerial bomb blue, banded light green, falling diagonally across base to dexter.

The design will face toward the front of the aircraft.

SIGNIFICANCE: The design is composed of the blue and golden orange of the Air Forces. The many and varied functions of the 20th Observation Squadron are aptly portrayed by the binoculars, bomb, caricatured figure, and lightning stroke.

By command of Lieutenant General ARNOLD:

J. M. BEVANS,
Colonel, Air Corps,
Director of Personnel.

ROBERT C. JONES,
Colonel, Air Corps,
Chief, Special Service Division.

AFPMP-12-C-3/E. J. Casey/ml/662/21 May 57

Basic Ltr to 314th Trp Carr Wg (M), Sewart AFB, Tenn., subj, Organizational Emblem, dtd 28 Dec 56

AFPMP-12-C-3 4th Ind MAY 22 1957

Dept of the Air Force, Hq USAF, Washington 25, D. C.

TO: Commander, Tactical Air Command, Langley AFB, Virginia

1. In accordance with AFR 900-3, 14 September 1955, the following emblem is approved for the 20th Helicopter Squadron:

SQUADRON EMBLEM: On a sky blue disc, edged white with red edge partly superimposed over white edge on the dexter (right) side of disc; off center to the sinister (left) on disc, a three bladed red propeller, one blade to base; the propeller superimposed over a swirling concentric circular white line pattern; between the propeller's blades and over the line pattern, three silhouetted symbols; i.e. clockwise, a sling load; a litter; and a dog's head with keg, all white, details of the first.

MOTTO: On a sky blue scroll, edged and inscribed in white - SEMPER PARATUS, Always Prepared.

SIGNIFICANCE: The specific significance of the symbols and colors of our emblem is as follows: the litter symbolizes the Aeromedical Evacuation Mission of helicopters in conjunction with troop carrier para drop missions or military assistance in evacuation of any disaster area; the sling load represents the capability of the helicopter to carry cargo or equipment on a sling and hook located underneath the fuselage. These missions involve providing airlift for initial establishment and resupply of Air Force activities at isolated non-airfield areas; the dog's head and keg portray the search and rescue mission of any helicopter unit; the blue color designates the sky in which the aircraft operates; the red color is used on the blades to signify the designated organizational color of the 20th Helicopter Squadron. It is also symbolic of activity and is used on the band to signify "active flying"; the white color is of a neutral hue and indicates the passive alert and the latent ability of the helicopter to do many things.

2. Inclosed is the official painting of the emblem described above, to be forwarded to the unit for file and guidance in reproduction.

BY ORDER OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

2 Incls
1. Cy w/d
Added 1 incl
2. Official painting

J. R. BALICA
Major, USAF
Asst Chief, Awards Branch
Personnel Services Division
Directorate of Military Personnel

AFPMP-12-C-3

E. J. Casey



9304-A.C.

20TH HELICOPTER SQUADRON

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS AIR FORCE SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND

FROM: HQ AFSOC/HO
301 Cody Ave
Hurlburt Fld FL 32544-5273

17 Aug 1993

SUBJ: 20th Special Operations Squadron Emblem Request

TO: HQ AFHRA/RS
600 Chennault Circle
Maxwell AFB AL 36112-6424

1. The attached request for approval of the 20 SOS emblem is approved by this office. Per guidance from Mr. Godwin, three proposals are submitted in the priority order of preference.

2. Recommend package be forwarded to CSAF for final approval. The original DD Fm 448, Military Interdepartmental Purchase Request, is on file in your office.

Herbert A. Mason Jr.

HERBERT A. MASON, JR.
Command Historian

3 Atch
1. AF HQ Fm 160
2. AFHRA/CC Ltr, 16 Jul 93
3. 20 SOS Emblem Binder

cc: 20SOS/cc

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE REFERRAL SLIP

1. DATE (Day, Month Year): **13 Jul 93**

2. SAF OFFICE	INFO	3. AF OFFICE	INFO
OS		CC	X
OSX		CV	
OSE		CVA	X
		CVAE	
US		CCX	X
AA		CMS	
		CVAI	
AG		CVAM	
		CVAP	
AQ		CVS	
FM		CE	
		DP	
GC		HC	
		HO	
		IN	
IA		JA	
		LG	
IG			
		MW	
		NGB/CF	
LL			
		PE	
MI			
		HE	
PA			
		[illegible]	
SB		SC	
		SE	
SN		SG	
		SP	
		ST	
		TE	
		XO	
		7CG	
		1100NCR	
		AFDW	
		FILE	X

4. ACTION TO: **AF/HO**

5. TYPE OF ACTION

	APPROPRIATE ACTION
	INFORMATION AND/OR FILE
	PREPARE REPLY FOR SIGNATURE OF
	PREPARE OSD EXECUTIVE SUMMARY/COVER BRIEF
	PREPARE [ ] EXECUTIVE SUMMARY [ ] EVENT BRIEF
	COMMENTS/RECOMMENDATIONS
	DIRECT REPLY WITH COPY TO
	DIRECT REPLY BY PHONE OR PERSONAL CONTACT
	PREPARE VISIT/TRIP BOOK
	PREPARE [ ] POINT [ ] TALKING [ ] BACKGROUND PAPERS [ ] MEMO
	REQUEST FOR BRIEFING
X	RETURN FOR [X] REWRITE [ ] DISCUSSION [ ] NOTE [ ] QUESTION
	[ ] HAS SEEN [ ] HAS NOT SEEN
	COORDINATE WITH
	CLOSE ACTION WITH AFHQ 13
	SEND INTERIM RESPONSE
	SUPERSEDES PREVIOUS TASKER #
	CANCELS PREVIOUS TASKER #
	OTHER

6. REMARKS AND SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS *(Return this form and incoming document with reply)*

AF/CV note reads: "HO, please inform the Captain that signed for the Squadron Commander (which USAF regs do not permit) to provide an alternate design as requested... my telephone # is DSN 225-7911 if he wishes to discuss further.

General Carns"

7. REQUESTER INFORMATION

NAME: **GREGORY H. POWER, Col, USAF**
Exec to the Vice Chief of Staff

8. BUILT-IN SUSPENSE

OFFICE SYMBOL	PHONE NUMBER	AF/CC	SAF	OTHER
CVE	**57911**	**16 Aug 93**		

SIGNATURE: Greg Power

9. AF/CVAE SUSPENSE: 16 Aug 93

10. AF/CVAE CASE NUMBER: **9302426**

AFHQ Form 160, MAY 93 *(EF-V1)* *(PerFORM PRO)* PREVIOUS EDITIONS ARE OBSOLETE.

07/26/93 14:54 [illegible] AF HE AFSOC 001/001

FROM: HQ AFHRA/CC
600 Chennault Circle
Maxwell AFB AL 36112-6424

16 July 1993

SUBJ: Return of Proposed Emblem

TO: AFSOC/HO

1. The enclosed emblem proposal of 20th SOS has been returned from the Vice Chief of Staff for revision in accordance with the following directions:

Provide an alternate redesign as originally requested. The reclama, in effect, has been emphatically denied.

2. Please note that the Air Force Historical Research Agency's (AFHRA) suspense is 2 Aug 1993. This suspense date is established to meet a CSAF suspense set for AFHRA. Since AFHRA has been taking some heat over missed suspenses and continued extension requests, the following rule must apply. No more than one extension can be granted. The unit must return its revision by the extended deadline.

3. If the unit needs an extension, it should contact the MAJCOM/HO, who will request the extension from Mr Jay Godwin, DSN 493-5963. Mr Godwin will arrange the extension through HQ USAF/HO.

FREDERICK J. SHAW
Chief, Research Division

1 Atch
Proposed Emblem

P.S.

Herb,

Please have squadron Commander signs correspondence.

JJ

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
1ST SPECIAL OPERATIONS WING (AFSOC)

FROM: Lt Col Rakip
20 SOS/CC
210 Bennett Ave.
Hurlburt Field, Fl 32544-5730

9 Aug 93

SUBJ: Squadron Patch

TO: AFSOC/HO (Mr. Mason)

1. Attached is the 20th Special Operations Squadron primary resubmission (along with two alternates) for the official heraldry we wish to represent us. We request that our primary submission be approved. We have been wearing our current, yet disapproved design for 17 years and would like to save as much of our unit's history as possible.

2. Please forward this package for approval. Capt Michael Moncrief (DSN 579-3445) is authorized to approve minor changes if required.

RUSSELL E. RAKIP, JR., Lt Col, USAF
Commander

MILITARY INTERDEPARTMENTAL PURCHASE REQUEST

1. PAGE 1 OF PAGES

2. FSC	3. CONTROL SYMBOL NO.	4. DATE PREPARED	5. MIPR NUMBER	6. AMEND NO.
		5 JAN 93	N-SOC 93-18	

7. TO:
ARMY Institute of Heraldry
Cameron Station
Alexandria, Virginia 22304

8. FROM: (Agency, name, telephone number of originator)
20th SOS
HURLBURT FIELD FL. 32

9. ITEMS ☐ ARE ☐ ARE NOT INCLUDED IN THE INTERSERVICE SUPPLY SUPPORT PROGRAM AND REQUIRED INTERSERVICE SCREENING ☐ HAS ☐ HAS NOT BEEN ACCOMPLISHED.

ITEM NO. a	DESCRIPTION (Federal stock number, nomenclature, specification and/or drawing No., etc.) b	QTY c	UNIT d	ESTIMATED UNIT PRICE e	ESTIMATED TOTAL PRICE f
	UNIT PATCH				335 00

10. SEE ATTACHED PAGES FOR DELIVERY SCHEDULES, PRESERVATION AND PACKAGING INSTRUCTIONS, SHIPPING INSTRUCTIONS AND INSTRUCTIONS FOR DISTRIBUTION OF CONTRACTS AND RELATED DOCUMENTS.

11. GRAND TOTAL $335.00

12. TRANSPORTATION ALLOTMENT (Used if FOB Contractor's plant)

13. MAIL INVOICES TO (Payment will be made by)
834 AEG / FMFC
HURLBURT FLD. FL 32544
ATTN: 734 SINGLE FORM
PAY OFFICE DODAAD

14. FUNDS FOR PROCUREMENT ARE PROPERLY CHARGEABLE TO THE ALLOTMENTS SET FORTH BELOW, THE AVAILABLE BALANCES OF WHICH ARE SUFFICIENT TO COVER THE ESTIMATED TOTAL PRICE.

ACRN	APPROPRIATION	LIMIT/SUBHEAD	SUPPLEMENTAL ACCOUNTING CLASSIFICATION	ACCTG STA DODAAD	AMOUNT
	9732100.5602		C13 3021 B63040 11 59290	664600	$335.00

K. L. SINGLETARY, 1st Lt, USAF
Certifying Officer

15. AUTHORIZING OFFICER (Type name and title)	16. SIGNATURE	17. DATE
NORMAN WILLIAMS Jr. Resource Adv	Norman R. Williams Jr.	29 Dec 92

DD FORM 1 JUN 72 448


20TH SOS
GREEN HORNETS

20 SOS "Green Hornet" Patch

SIGNIFICANCE OF THE DESIGN

NAME: In June 1967 Huey gunships became part of the 20th Helicopter Squadron using the call sign "Green Hornets". The Huey's continued using the "Green Hornets" call sign until the 20th's closure in 1972. We were reactivated as The 20th Special Operations Squadron in January 1976 and chose to identify ourselves as the Green Hornets.

SASH: The blue sash is symbolic of the red, white, and blue sash that had been a part of our unit patch from 1976 until 1993. It signified the unit's triservice support in unconventional warfare and the squadron's reactivation in 1976, our nation's bicentennial.

GREEN HORNET: The green color symbolizes the tactical low-level environment we operate in, while the hornet is symbolic of the hovering capability of rotary-wing aircraft and the "sting" of the gunship. The green hornet symbol was used by the UH-1 gunships in the 20th Helicopter Squadron. In Vietnam the unit displayed the symbol on aircraft, decals and patches. The 20 SOS continues the tradition by displaying the Green Hornet proudly on our patch.

STARS: Officially the eight five point stars represent the eight primary missions of the squadron as well as eight employment principles of war applicable to aerospace operations. Those principles are outlined here:

MISSION	PRINCIPLE
DAY/NIGHT COVERT INFIL/EXFILTRATIONS	OFFENSIVE
REINFORCEMENT/RESUPPLY OF FORCES	RECONSTITUTION
PERSONNEL RECOVERY	SECURITY
SHIPBOARD OPERATIONS	SURPRISE
AERIAL GUNNERY	MASS AND MANEUVER
MEDICAL EVACUATION	SIMPLICITY
PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS	ECONOMY OF FORCE
COMMAND AND CONTROL	UNITY OF COMMAND

Unofficially the stars commemorate active duty losses within the 20th. The white stars represent 1 active member death.

RED STAR: Officially the red star is indicative of the squadron's primary participant role in Operation J-CATCH. This four phase test, development, and evaluation project produced procedures utilized military-wide for defense against attack helicopters. The 20 SOS is extremely proud of it's role and performance during this historical project. Unofficially the red star commemorates the loss of 10 active duty members of the 20th.

BLACK BACKGROUND: Signifies the night sky which is our domain. The personnel of the 20 SOS train to operate in blacked out environments and do what no one else can; with pride and vigor.

20th SPECIAL OPERATIONS SQUADRON

BLAZON

Sable, a bend sinister Azure, charged on the sinister with nine mullets in bend sinister, eight Or above one Gules, debruised by a hornet Vert; each segment fimbriated of the third; all within a diminished bordure of the first.

Attached above the disc, a black scroll edged with a narrow black border and inscribed "20TH SOS" in green letters. Attached below the disc, a black scroll edged with a narrow black border and inscribed "GREEN HORNETS" in green letters.

SIGNIFICANCE

Blue and yellow are the Air Force colors. Blue alludes to the sky, the primary theater of Air Force operations. Yellow refers to the sun and the excellence required of Air Force personnel. The black disc denotes the night sky which is the theater of operations of the Special Operations units. The blue bend sinister represents the unit's heritage when it organized in 1976 in tri-service support of an unconventional warfare mission. The stars reflect the nine primary functions of the unit and the nine aerospace employment principles of war. The red star signifies the squadron's participation in Operation J-CATCH. The green hornet symbolizes the hovering capabilities of the rotary wing aircraft that the unit utilizes in a low level environment. The hornet's "stinger" denotes the gunship weaponry.

COLOR CONVERSION

FULL COLOR	CABLE NO.	PMS NO.	SUBDUED COLOR	CABLE NO.
Air Force Yellow	67103	116	Olive Drab	67133
Ultramarine Blue	67118	Reflex Blue	Flag Blue	67124
Black	67138		Black	67138
Scarlet	67111	200	Garnet	67158
Irish Green	67189	348	Spruce Green	67130

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
AIR FORCE HISTORICAL RESEARCH AGENCY
MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE, ALABAMA

9 December 1993

FROM: HQ AFHRA/RSO
600 Chennault Circle
Maxwell AFB AL 36112-6424

SUBJ: Approval of Organizational Emblem

TO: 20th Special Operations Squadron

1. Effective the date of this letter, the attached emblem is approved in accordance with AFR 900-3.

2. This correspondence and attachments are permanent records and will be retained by the unit commander and, where applicable, by the parent unit historian, until the unit prepares for inactivation. Instructions for disposition of the file are printed on the emblem folder. If requesting unit is unable to obtain local reproduction for additional prints, contact the wing, command, or this headquarters.

3. Unit designations are not placed on the scrolls of emblem paintings or photographs because unit designations are subject to change. You may place your current unit designation on the scroll of all emblem reproductions.

4. Units will use local supply procedures to obtain decals, uniform patches, and other emblem facsimiles and reproductions. See AFM 67-1, Vol I, for procuring patches.

A. TIMOTHY WARNOCK
Chief
Organizational History Branch

3 Atch
1. Color Negative(s)
2. 8x10 Color Print(s)
3. Significance & Description Statement

cc: Command HO
Parent Unit HO



20TH SPECIAL OPERATIONS SQUADRON

25 MAR 1993

UNITED STATES AIR FORCE


CH/HH-3's

THE BIOGRAPHICS OF AND A

TRIBUTE TO A FORGOTTEN WORKHORSE

BY R. CHRISTOPHER AND J. G. A. SMITH

01 SEPTEMBER 1992



DECALS OR PATCHES OF UNITS WHO
ARE FLYING OR HAVE FLOWN H-3's













































MDS	TAIL #	AIRTIME AGE	LOCATION	YEARS
CH-3B	62-12571		551 EWCW OTIS AFB MA	62 - 63
			TYNDALL AFB FL	
			6594 TEST GP HICKAM AFB HA	69 - 71
			MASDC DM AFB AZ	
CH-3B	62-12572		551 EWCW OTIS AFB MA	62 - 63
			TYNDALL AFB FL	
			6594 TEST GP HICKAM AFB HA	69 - 71
			MASDC DM AFB AZ	
CH-3B	62-12573		551 EWCW OTIS AFB MA	62 - 63
			TYNDALL AFB FL	
			6594 TEST GP HICKAM AFB HA	69 - 71
			MASDC DM AFB AZ	
CH-3B	62-12574		551 EWCW OTIS AFB MA	62 - 63
			FLEW TRANS ATLANTIC TO PARIS	
			AIR SHOW 1963 "OTIS FALCON"	
			C/C SSGT THRUMAN McDONALD	
			TYNDALL AFB FL	
			6594 TEST GP HICKAM AFB HA	69 - 71
			MASDC DM AFB AZ	
CH-3B	62-12575		551 EWCW OTIS AFB MA	62 - 63
			TYNDALL AFB FL	
			6594 TEST GP HICKAM AFB HA	69 - 71
			BAILED BACK TO THE U.S. NAVY	
			AND CONVERTED TO A SH-3H,	
			SERVED WITH HS-10, THE PACIFIC	
			COAST RAG	
CH-3B	62-12576		551 EWCW OTIS AFB MA	62 - 63
			TYNDALL AFB FL	
			6594 TEST GP HICKAM AFB HA	69 - 71
			MASDC DM AFB AZ	
CH-3C	62-12577			
CH-3C	62-12578		1 HELO SQ ANDREWS AFB MD	82 - 19-04-84
		7729.1	AMARC DM AFB AZ	

MDS	TAIL #	AIRTIME	AGE	LOCATION	YEARS
CH-3C	62-12579			DESTROYED S.E.A.	06-10-69
CH-3C	62-12580			4950 TW WPAFB OH	08-10-75 - 15-01-79
CH-3E	62-12581			1550 ATTW HILL AFB UT	73 - 74
		5774.0	24.9	6514 TES HILL AFB UT	87
CH-3E	62-12582			DESTROYED S.E.A.	17-01-69
CH-3E	63-09676	8099.2	28.0	SEE APPENDIX # 1	
CH-3C	63-09677	200.0		3750 CMS SHEPPARD AFB TX	62 - 93
CH-3E	63-09678			DESTROYED S.E.A.	30-12-67
CH-3C	63-09679	5393.1		1550 ATTWG HILL AFB UT	71 - 77
		7069.1		703 SOS SHAW AFB SC	19-10-77 - 86
				AMARC DM AFB AZ	
CH-3C	63-09680			341 SMW MALMSTROM AFB MT (SAC) DESTROYED AT MISSLE SITE	1965
CH-3E	63-09681			DESTROYED S.E.A.	13-07-70
CH-3E	63-09682			40 ARRS DET 5 TAWC EGLAN AFB FL 38 ARRS DET 1 NAKHON PHANOM ROYAL THAI AFB	06-07-65
				3rd ARRG, 38 ARS TAN SON NHUT VIETNAM DESTROYED S.E.A.	20-02-69
CH-3E	63-09683	3728.6		44 ARRS HOMESTEAD AFB FL	04-72 - 09-76
		3920.1		39 ARRW DET 5 TYNDALL AFB FL	04-02-77 - 17-05-77
		9074.2	24.4	33 ARRS OSAN KOREA, PAINTED SILVER UNTIL 1978.	01-03-78 - 27-03-90
CH-3E	63-09684			341 SMW MALMSTROM AFB MT (SAC) DESTROYED ON GROUND	1965
CH-3E	63-09685			DESTROYED S.E.A.	06-11-65

MDS	TAIL #	AIRTIME	AGE	LOCATION	YEARS
CH-3E	63-09686			1370th OMRON TURNER AFB GA	67
		1663.0		1st OMS FORBES AFB KA	69 - 70
		3453.7		1 SOW HULBERT FLD FL	05-12-77
		3723.3		41 ARRS PATRICK AFB FL	14-09-78
		7355.0	24.3	33 ARRS OSAN KOREA	84 - 89
				USAAVNTTC, FT RUCKER AL	1989
CH-3E	63-09687			100 SRW, 432 TDG, 11 TDS	
				DM AFB AZ	03-73 - 79
				OIL COOLER FIRE	09 - 73
				33 ARRS OSAN KOREA	
		6451.7	24.3	33 ARRS APO SF 96239	89 - 90
				AMARC DM AFB AZ	16-03-91
CH-3E	63-09688	1899.6		BARRC DET 15 PATRICK AFB FL	05-06-68 - 18-04-69
		3910.7		39 ARRW DET 5 TYNDALL AFB FL	11-09-74 - 03-02-77
				AMARC DM AFB AZ	
CH-3E	63-09689			USAAVNTTC, FT RUCKER AL	
CH-3E	63-09690	553.4		4080 SW DM AFB AZ	07-64 03-66
				20 HS TAN SON NHUT VIETNAM	66 - 67
		3749.2	8.0	100 SRW, 432 TDG, 22 TDS	
				DM AFB AZ	71 - 79
		5108.9		71 ARRS ELMENDORF AK	29-09-83 - 88
		7052.6	24.1	USAAVNTTC, FT RUCKER AL	
CH-3C	63-09691	5701.0		1st HELI SQ ANDREWS AFB MD	17-08-76 - 03-10-78
CH-3E	64-14221	9414.8		1st HEL SQ ANDREWS AFB MD	30-07-89
		9548.1	24.0	1550 CCTW KIRTLAND AFB NM	
				USAAVNTTC, FT RUCKER AL	07-93
CH-3C	64-14222				
CH-3E	64-14223	3091.0		3750 CMS SHEPPARD AFB TX	70
		3595.7		44 ARRS DET 5 TYNDALL AFB FL	72
				100 SRW, 432 TDS, 11 TDS	
				DM AFB AZ	03-73 - 79
		6798.5		39 ARRW DET 5 TYNDALL AFB FL	27-04-80 - 19-04-83
		7896.6	23.9	305 ARRS SELFRIDGE ANGB MI	87 - 89

MDS	TAIL #	AIRTIME	AGE	LOCATION	YEARS
CH-3C	64-14224	3984.9		GOLBAL ASSOCIATES APO 96401	04-75
				AMARC DM AFB AZ	05-01-76
CH-3E	64-14225	6539.1		33 ARRS DET 13 APO 96570	18-11-75 - 81
		10291.9		33 ARRS OSAN KOREA	81 - 17-07-90
		10710.0	23.6	AMARC DM AFB AZ	
CH-3E	64-14226	6117.9		SEE APPENDIX # 2	
CH-3C	64-14227				
CH-3E	64-14228	7435.0	23.4	100 SRW, 432 TDG, 22 TDS	
				DM AFB AZ	03-73 - 79
		7435.0	23.4	71 ARRS ELMENDORF AK	17-10-84 - 10-10-86
CH-3C	64-14229				
HH-3E	64-14230	5805.3		301 ARRS HOMESTEAD AFB FL	06-02-80 - 24-03-87
		6889.6		304 ARRS PORTLAND IAP OR	19-06-87 - 20-04-89
		7270.2	23.3	71 SOS DM AFB AZ	
				AMARC DM AFB AZ	
				USAAVNTTC FT RUCKER AL	
CH-3E	64-14231				
HH-3E	64-14232	2335.1		40 ARRS DET 1 NAKHON PHANOM	
				ROYAL THAI AFB THAILAND	24-03-69 - 29-04-70
		3922.9		129 ARRS HOWARD ANGB CA	18-07-74 - 16-11-76
		6719.3	23.2	129 ARG NAS MOFFETT FIELD CA	01-02-80 - 30-11-90
				AMARC DM AFB AZ	12-90
HH-3E	64-14233			DESTROYED S.E.A.	15-01-68
CH-3C	64-14234	5962.6		703 SOS SHAW AFB SC	02-08-70 - 01-01-86

MDS	TAIL #	AIRTIME	AGE	LOCATION	YEARS
CH-3C	64-14235				
CH-3E	64-14236			DESTROYED S.E.A.	23-06-67
CH-3E	64-14237			DESTROYED S.E.A.	26-02-69
HH-3E	65-12777	4041.6		129 ARRS HOWARD ANGB CA	17-01-80
		5404.4		39 ARRS DET 11 MB AFB SC	06-08-83 -01-10-85
				41 RWRW DET 15 PATRICK AFB FL	07-06-88 - 13-12-88
		7760.5		NADEP PNCLA FL	02-02-89
		8252.4		41 ARRS PATRICK AFB FL	16-05-89 - 19-07-90
			22.5	1550 CTWW KIRTLAND AFB NM	
				USAAVNTTC, FT RUCKER AL	
HH-3E	65-12778			DESTROYED S.E.A.	20-10-66
HH-3E	65-12779			DESTROYED S.E.A.	06-02-67
HH-3E	65-12780	3198.9		39 ARRWG DET 2 APO 09020	02-10-73 - 18-07-74
		3661.7		129 ARRS HOWARD ANGB CA	16-11-76 - 24-11-78
		4776.6		129 ARG NAS MOFFETT FIELD CA	23-12-80 - 90
		6914.8		304 ARRS PORTLAND IAP OR	19-08-90 - 02-91
		6982.8	22.4	71 SOS DM AFB AZ	25-03-91 - 09-07-92
				AMARC DM AFB AZ	09-07-92
HH-3E	65-12781	6824.0	22.4	129 ARG NAS MOFFETT FIELD CA	03-10-80 - 01-05-86
HH-3E	65-12782			DESTROYED S.E.A.	05-10-68
HH-3E	65-12783	306.5		3rd ARRG, 37 ARRS DA DANG VIETNAM APO 96337	66 - 02-67
		6001.7		106 ARG SUFFOLK ANGB NY	10-04-77 - 10-04-89
				304 ARRS PORTLAND IAP OR	09-90
				AMARC DM AFB AZ	03-91
				USAAVNTTC, FT RUCKER AL	93

MDS	TAIL #	AIRTIME	AGE	LOCATION	YEARS
HH-3E	65-12784			106 ARG SUFFOLK ANGB NY	03-84 - 11-84
				301 ARRS HOMESTEAD AFB FL	09-90
		4950.9	22.3	71 SOS DM AFB AZ	
				AMARC DM AFB AZ	09-91
HH-3E	65-12785			20 HELO SQ UDORN ROYAL THAI AFB "BANANA 1" PILOTED BY MAJ DONAHUE CRASHED ONTO THE COMPOUND AT SON TAY PRISON CAMP, NORTH VIETNAM	21-11-70
CH-3E	65-12786			3rd ARRG, 37 ARRS DA NANG VIETNAM DESTROYED S.E.A	1968
HH-3E	65-12787	5738.1		305 ARRS SELFRIDGE ANGB MI	30-05-77 - 04-03-87
		6705.3	22.1	304 ARRS PORTLAND IAP OR	08-11-88
				AMARC DM AFB AZ	
				USAAVNTTC, FT RUCKER AL	93
CH-3E	65-12788	2624.5		100 SRW OL-RC APO SF 96570	09-71
		4511.4		100 SRW, 432 TDG, 22 TDS DM AFB AZ	03-73 - 07-84
		5298.7		39 ARRW DET 15 PATRICK AFB FL	23-07-84 -15-09-86
		5821.5		1550 CCTW KIRTLAND AFB NM	05-01-88
				AMARC DM AFB AZ	
CH-3E	65-12789			1550 ATTW HILL AFB UT	72
		4673.1		1550 ATTW KIRTLAND AFB NM	24-01-79
		7364.6		1550 CTTW KIRTLAND AFB NM	82 - 03-86
				AMARC DM AFB AZ	
CH-3E	65-12790	2396.1		100 SRW OL-DA DA NANG VIETNAM	04-08-72
				100 SRW, 432 TDG, 22 TDS DM AFB AZ	03-73 - 77
		4352.8		6514 TES WG HILL AFB UT	77 - 01-88
		6509.3	22.0	6510 TES WG EDWARDS AFB CA	
				AIR MUSEUM HILL AFB UT	
CH-3E	65-12791			6514 TES HILL AFB UT	72
		7736.6		1550 ATTW KIRTLAND AFB NM	10-10-78 - 30-04-85
		8446.2		1550 CCTW KIRTLAND AFB NM	30-04-85 - 24-10-86

MDS	TAIL #	AIRTIME	AGE	LOCATION	YEARS
CH-3E	65-12792	6255.6		1550 ATTW KIRTLAND AFB NM	01-83 08-83
		8346.8		1550 CCTW KIRTLAND AFB NM	03-87 - 21-11-88
				USAAVNTTC, FT RUCKER AL	07-90 - 93
CH-3E	65-12793	1287.0		1st OMS FORBES AFB KAN	69 - 70
				1st HEL SQ ANDREWS AFB MD	
				31 ARRS CLARK AFB R P A/C	
				CONDEMNED FOR CORROSION	85 - 87
CH-3E	65-12794	1983.0		3750 CMS SHEPPARD AFB TX	70
		6049.7		55 ARRS DET 15 PATRICK AFB FL	
				CRASHED INTO THE ATLANTIC OCEAN	
				NEVER RECOVERED	10-07-78 - 88
CH-3E	65-12795	4950.0		1550 ATTW HILL AFB UT	72 - 02-09-80
		6328.6		302 SOS LUKE AFB AZ	06-02-84
		8827.7		1550 CCTW KIRTLAND AFB NM	80 - 04-89
				USAAVNTTC FT RUCKER AL	07-90 - 93
CH-3E	65-12796	1649.0		100 SRW 432 TDG	28-01-71
		1649.4		100 SRW DA NANG VIETNAM	22-10-71
		3764.4		99 SRS OL-NB APO SF 96310	08-08-74 - 15-12-76
				100 SRW DET 10 DA NANG VIETNAM	
				100 SRW 432 TDG DM AFB AZ	79
		5899.3		6514 TES WG HILL AFB UT	20-03-86 - 07-04-87
		6604.7	21.9	6510 TES WG EDWARDS AFB CA	
				USAAVNTTC, FT RUCKER AL	93
CH-3E	65-12797	5222.0	21.7	SEE APPENDIX # 3	
CH-3E	65-12798			33 ARRS DET 1 APO 96274	10-03-78 - 27-09-78
		3844.0		102 ARRS NYANG SCANGB	01-84 - 01-84
		9100.0	21.7	31 ARRS CLARK AFB R P	
				NICKNAMED THE "THIRSTY TURTLE"	15-02-84 - 11-90
CH-3E	65-12799			51 ABWG APO 96570	73
		5543.4		31 ARRS CLARK AFB R P	81
		6984.1		33 ARRS OSAN KOREA	02-84 - 01-85
				USAAVNTTC, FT RUCKER AL	86 - 90
		7889.7		71 SOS DM AFB CAME IN ON FLAT BED	
				TRUCK, REPAIRED, REPAINTED AND PUT	
				IN HERITAGE PARK AS A/C 65-15692	1992

MDS	TAIL #	AIRTIME	AGE	LOCATION	YEARS
CH-3E	65-12800			20 HELO SQ UDORN ROYAL THAI AFB	66 - 67
		4145.6		39 ARRS DET 5 TYNDALL AFB FL	10-80 - 87
		4746.9	21.6	304 ARRS PORTLAND IAP OR	09-88 03-89
				USAAVNTTC, FT RUCKER AL	09-90 - 93
CH-3E	65-15690			56 SPOPS WG APO 96310	70
		2889.4		100 SRW, 432 TDG, 11 TDS	
				DM AFB AZ	03-73 - 79
		5827.7	22.9	129 ARRS NAS MOFFETT FIELD CA	
					15-05-82 - 25-08-90
		7115.2		MC CELLAN AFB MUSEUM	
CH-3E	65-15691			DESTROYED S.E.A.	27-06-69
CH-3E	65-15692			20 HS TAN SON NHUT VIETNAM	66 - 67
		4809.1		703 SOS SHAW AFB SC	14-01-76 - 79
		7146.0		302 SOS LUKE AFB AZ	10-02-82 21-03-84
		8098.5	22.9	71 SOS DM AFB AZ	
				CRASHED	12-03-89
CH-3E	65-15693			20 HS TAN SON NHUT VIETNAM	66 - 67
		2678.0		3750 CMS SHEPPARD AFB TX	
					05-09-69 - 06-07-70
				6514 TES HILL AFB UT	72
		7442.5		31 ARRS CLARK AFB R P	81 - 12-84
		8692.5	22.9	71 SOS DM AFB AZ	
				AMARC DM AFB AZ	18-03-87
CH-3E	65-15694				
CH-3E	65-15695	2291.0		3750 CMS SHEPPARD AFB TX	
					10-03-70 - 05-02-71
CH-3E	65-15696	659.0		1370th OMS TURNER AFB GA	15-08-67 - 69
		4224.0		100 SRW, 432 TDG, 22 TDS	
				DM AFB AZ	03-73 - 79
		4427.6	22.8	71 SOS DM AFB AZ	
				AMARC DM AFB AZ	02-02-79

MDS	TAIL #	AIRTIME	AGE	LOCATION	YEARS
CH-3E	65-15697			100 SRW, 432 TDG, 11 TDS	
				DM AFB AZ	03-73 - 74
				302 SOS LUKE AFB AZ	74 - 76
				C/C MSGT JOHN R CAMPBELL	
		8361.4		703 SOS SHAW AFB SC	76 - 10-01-86
				C/C SGT TIM HUDSON	
				HURLBURT FLD FL	
				AMARC DM AFB AZ	
CH-3E	65-15698			3750 CMS SHEPPARD AFG TX	69 - 70
				100 SRW, 432 TDG, 11 TDS	
				DM AFB AZ	03-73 - 79
		4715.4		305 ARRS SELFRIDGE ANGB MI	79
				HULBURT FLD FL	
		7545.7		71 ARRS ELMENDORF AFB AK	87
				USAAVNTTC, FT RUCKER AL	03-91 - 93
CH-3E	65-15699	3025.0		1550 ATTW HILL AFB UT	14-02-72
				MASDC DM AFB AZ	30-10-72 - 08-11-76
				100 SRW, 432 TDG, 11 TDS	
				DM AFB AZ	
		7727.7		39 ARRS DET 15 PATRICK AFB FL	
					26-05-77 - 10-87
		8098.2	22.6	71 SOS DM AFB AZ	11-87 - 07-90
				USAAVNTTC, FT RUCKER AL	08-90
				PRANGED FT RUCKER AL	08-91
CH-3E	65-15700	8357.6		4507 CAMS SHAW AFB SC	20-11-77 - 07-87
		9101.3	22.6	301 ARRS HOMESTEAD AFB FL	
				305 ARS SELFRIDGE ANGB MI	01-91
				USAAVNTTC, FT RUCKER AL	
HH-3E	66-13278				
HH-3E	66-13279			DESTROYED S.E.A.	09-11-67
HH-3E	66-13280	846.5		3rd ARRG, 37 ARRS DA NANG	
				VIETNAM C/C SSGT DOUG LESHO	
				C/C SSGT SONNY WESTPHAL	
					01-03-68 - 15-04-70
				DESTROYED S.E.A.	15-04-70
HH-3E	66-13281			DESTROYED S.E.A.	24-10-69
HH-3E	66-13282			DESTROYED S.E.A.	20-10-68

MDS	TAIL #	AIRTIME	AGE	LOCATION	YEARS
HH-3E	66-13283			DESTROYED S.E.A.	27-08-67
HH-3E	66-13284	2284.4		604 MASS CLARK AFB R P	18-08-72
		3314.9		11 CAMS McCLELLAN AFB CA	12-09-75 - 24-03-76
		3603.8		129 ARRS HWD ANGB CA	28-01-77
		7000.1		129 ARG NAS MOFFETT FIELD CA	10-01-89 - 07-08-90
		7081.5		304 ARRS PORTLAND IAP OR	11-90
		7115.2	21.3	71 SOS DM AFB AZ	01-05-92
				AMARC DM AFB AZ	09-07-92
HH-3E	66-13285			67 ARRS DET 14 FPO NY 09571-2055	85 - 89
				6514 TES HILL AFB UT	72
		8223.0	21.3	56 ARRS KEFLAVIK ICELAND	
				USAAVNTTC, FT RUCKER AL	93
CH-3E	66-13286	2282.0		1550 ATTW HILL AFB UT	05-06-72
		2445.2		39 ARRWG DET 6 LORING AFB MA	20-02-73
		6243.3	21.3	301 ARRS HOMESTEAD AFB FL	87
				USAAVNTTC, FT RUCKER AL	93
CH-3E	66-13287				
CH-3E	66-13288			DESTROYED S.E.A.	03-02-69
CH-3E	66-13289				
HH-3E	66-13290	5741.7		1 SOW HULBERT FLD FL 31-10-79	29-11-83
				38 ARRS OSAN KOREA CRASHED BETWEEN 2 BUILDING ROOF TO ROOF	09-84
		7144.2		38 ARRS KADENA AFB OKINAWA	05-05-89
		7739.6	21.1	AMARC DM AFB AZ	16-03-91
				GOING TO SMITHSONIAN MUSEUM MAYBE IN 5 YRS OR WHEN THE NEW BUILDING IS COMPLETED	
HH-3E	66-13291	4251.4		301 ARRS HOMESTEAD AFB FL	77 - 09-06-80
		5949.7	21.1	71 SOS DM AFB AZ	
				AMARC DM AFB AZ	
HH-3E	66-13292	5461.8		302 SOS LUKE AFB AZ 23-01-81	07-02-86
		6578.8	21.1	304 ARRS PORTLAND IAP OR	22-07-88
		6623.0		NADEP PNCLA FL	03-03-90
				AMARC DM AFB AZ	11-07-92

MDS	TAIL #	AIRTIME	AGE	LOCATION	YEARS
CH-3E	66-13293				
CH-3E	66-13294			DESTROYED S.E.A.	30-03-68
CH-3E	66-13295			DESTROYED S.E.A.	23-05-68
HH-3E	66-13296	5746.6	21.0	301 ARRS HOMESTEAD AFB FL	77
				USAAVNTTC, FT RUCKER AL	93
CH-3E	67-14702			DESTROYED S.E.A.	15-01-69
HH-3E	67-14703	6894.0	25.0	SEE APPENDIX # 4	
HH-3E	67-14704	849.3		37 ARRS DA NANG VIETNAM	19-12-69
				1550 ATTW HILL AFB UT	
		2349.0		51st ABWg KADENA AFB OKINAWA	23-08-73
		3351.1		41 RWRW KADENA AFB OKINAWA	17-08-76
		3832.0		NARF PNCLA FL	28-09-77
		5634.4		33 ARRS OSAN KOREA 12-81 -	25-04-89
		8758.4	20.9	38 ARRS KADENA AFB OKINAWA	90 - 92
				AMARC DM AFB AZ	12-93
HH-3E	67-14705	1704.9		1st OMS FORBES AFB KA	
				23-07-69 -	13-11-72
				1550 ATTW HILL AFB UT	72 - 74
		4472.1		1 SOW HULBERT FIELD FL	22-02-80
		4765.7		55 ARRS EGLIN AFB FL	27-08-81
		4683.0		39 ARRW DET 15 PATRICK AFB FL	81 - 89
				ARRIVED AS A SUPER CH-3E (NO PROBE)	
				& SPORTED "POLKA-DOT" WATER CAMMY	
		8015.4	20.9	38 ARRS KADENA AFB OKINAWA	89 - 91
				AMARC DM AFB AZ	15-06-91
HH-3E	67-14706	196.6		40 ARRS DET 1 APO 96310	68
		1784.0		3 ARRGP DET 14 APO 96307	07-07-72
		2007.1		604 MASS CLARK AFB R P	22-03-73
		3503.4		31 ARRS CLARK AFB R P 10-75 -	06-77
		8365.8	20.9	31 ARRS CLARK AFB R P 24-04-85 -	01-90
HH-3E	67-14707	6622.6	25.0	SEE APPENDIX # 5	
HH-3E	67-14708				
HH-3E	67-14709	1910.5		33 ARRS DET 13 APO 96570	
				14-12-71 -	30-09-82
		8042.0		33 ARRS OSAN KOREA	82 - 04-90
		8641.3	20.8	31 ARRS CLARK AFB R P	22-07-90
				AMARC DM AFB AZ	19-02-91

MDS	TAIL #	AIRTIME	AGE	LOCATION	YEARS
HH-3E	67-14710			DESTROYED S.E.A.	06-06-68
HH-3E	67-14711	2000.9		54 ARRS DET 2 LORING AFB ME	02-01-73
		3841.9		55 ARRS DET 15 PATRICK AFB FL	02-08-78
		4091.5		55 ARRS DET 5 TYNDALL AFB FL	05-04-79
		5283.2		39 ARRW DET 11 MB AFB SC	07-01-80 - 88
		9320.7	20.6	41 ARRS PATRICK AFB FL	
				C/C SSGT MIKE WILLIAMS	13-10-88 - 16-05-89
				AMARC DM AFB AZ	03-93
HH-3E	67-14712	2579.9		1550 ATTW HILL AFB UT	72 - 02-11-81
		2695.7		CRASH DAMAGE NARF PNCLA FL	24-01-78
		6160.1	20.5	1550 TW KIRTLAND AFB NM	02-11-81 - 13-06-88
HH-3E	67-14713	1504.6		ARRTC EGLIN AFB FL	30-03-71
				41 ARRS PATRICK AFB FL	
		8996.4	20.5	1550 ATTW KIRTLAND AFB NM	15-03-72
				41 ARRS PATRICK AFB FL	
				AMARC DM AFB AZ	06-93
HH-3E	67-14714			1550 ATTW HILL AFB UT	75
				6514 TES HILL AFB UT	72 - 11-02-80
		5378.5		1550 ATTW KIRTLAND AFB NM	02-08-80 - 13-08-81
		9100.3	20.4	1550 CCTW KIRTLAND AFB NM	81 - 90
				AMARC DM AFB AZ	06-93
HH-3E	67-14715	389.9		57 ARRS WHEELUS FIELD LIBYA	68
		6126.4		67 ARRS RAF WOODBRIDGE ENGLAND	01-10-73 - 20-11-88
				39 ARRS DET 14 FPO NY 09571	
		6476.2	20.4	56 ARRS KEFLAVIK ICELAND APO 09673	
				MINOR CRASH ON GLACIER 1990	88 - 90
				USAAVNTTC, FT RUCKER AL	93
HH-3E	67-14716			57 ARRS WHEELUS FIELD LIBYA	68
				67 ARRS RAF WOODBRIDGE ENGLAND	
		2018.2		40 ARRWG DET 14 APO NY 09571	06-72 - 31-01-73
				56 ARRS KEFLAVIK ICELAND	
			13.0	DESTROYED HARD LANDING	80

MDS	TAIL #	AIRTIME	AGE	LOCATION	YEARS
HH-3E	67-14717			57 ARRS WHEELUS FIELD LIBYA	68
				40 ARRWG DET 14 FPO NY 09571	11-72
				39 ARRS DET 14 FPO NY 09571	76
		4326.9		67 ARRS DET 14 RAF WOODBRIDGE ENGLAND APO 09571 17-09-81 - 08-07-82	
				56 ARRS KEFLAVIK ICELAND LEFT LATE 1990 FOR PENSACOLA FL (CRACKED TAIL BOOM) FROM HARD LANDING	
		7016.1	20.3	38 ARRS KADENA AFB OKINAWA	
				AMARC DM AFB AZ	12-93
HH-3E	67-14718	7389.4	25	SEE APPENDIX # 6	
HH-3E	67-14719			1550 ATTW HILL AFB UT	72 - 74
		5143.7		55 ARRS EGLIN AFB FL	82
		7346.4	20.1	38 ARRS KADENA AFB OKINAWA	86 - 03-89
				CRASHED IN 800 FT WATER BROUGH TO SURFACE BUT JUNKED	
HH-3E	67-14720	1776.7		703 SOS SHAW AFB SC	08-01-69 - 05-06-72
		2119.1		1 SOWG EGLAND AFB FL	20-08-73 - 22-03-75
		3006.0		302 SOS LUKE AFB AZ	75-79
		6406.4	20.2	305 ARRS SELFRIDGE ANGB MI	15-01-86 - 31-08-91
				AMARC DM AFB AZ	02-09-92
HH-3E	67-14721	777.4		20 SOS APO 96237	
HH-3E	67-14722	8924.8	20.0	SEE APPENDIX # 7	
HH-3E	67-14723	3962.1		1550 ATTW HILL AFB UT	72 - 74
		9647.4	20.0	1550 CCTW KIRTLAND AFB NM	84 - 05-90
				AMARC DM AFB AZ	06-93
HH-3E	67-14724	8580.0	20.0	SEE APPENDIX # 8	
HH-3E	67-14725	1704.1		38 ARRSQ KADENA AFB OKINAWA	13-09-71 - 09-04-73
		3048.8		129 ARRS HOWARD ANGB CA	18-04-77 - 30-08-78
		5330.0		129 ARRS NAS MOFFETT FLD CA	05-02-80 - 30-11-85

MDS	TAIL #	AIRTIME	AGE	LOCATION	YEARS
HH-3E	68-18282	3986.9		33 ARRS DET 13 APO 96570	14-10-80
		4130.7		33 ARRS APO 96570	81
				CRASHED & ROLLED DOWN HILL	
HH-3E	69-05798	5490.4	23.0	SEE APPENDIX # 9	
HH-3E	69-05799	1394.9		39 ARRW DET 4 APO 09023	
				22-05-74 - 29-03-75	
		4753.7	18.4	106 ARG SUFFOLK ANGB NY	
				10-12-86 - 10-05-87	
				AMARC DM AFB AZ	
				USAAVNTTC, FT RUCKER AL	93
HH-3E	69-05800				
HH-3E	69-05801	3156.3		ADWC TYNDALL AFB FL	13-06-79
		5842.7		39 ARRW DET 11 MB AFB SC	
				24-09-82 - 03-06-85	
		6811.0	18.4	56 ARRS KELAVIK ICELAND	02-89 - 91
				USAAVNTTC, FT RUCKER AL	93
HH-3E	69-05802	4584.2		71 ARRS ELMONDORF AFB AK	79 - 86
		10106.6	18.3	41 ARRS PATRICK AFB FL	
				AMARC DM AFB AZ	06-93
HH-3E	69-05803	1091.3		21 COMP WG APO 98742	71 - 04-12-72
		6826.3		71 ARRS ELMONDORF AFB AK	
				03-09-81 - 06-01-86	
		9599.2	18.3	41 ARRS PATRICK AFB FL	
				AMARC DM AFB AZ	06-93
HH-3E	69-05804			71 ARRS ELMONDORF AFB AK	78
		6032.1	18.3	305 ARRS SELFRIDGE ANGB MI	
				AMARC DM AFB AZ	02-09-92
HH-3E	69-05805			21 COMP WG APO 98742	74 - 75
		4192.9		71 ARRS ELMONDORF AFB AK	01-03-79
		6809.2		106 ARG SUFFOLK ANGB NY	85 - 89
		7123.4	18.2	305 ARRS SELFRIDGE ANGB MI	
				USAAVNTTC, FT RUCKER AL	93
HH-3E	69-05806	6046.9		71 ARRS ELMONDORF AFB AK	
				16-04-79 - 19-02-86	
		9553.0	18.2	1550 CCTW KIRTLAND AFB NM	
				AMARC DM AFB AZ	06-93

MDS	TAIL #	AIRTIME	AGE	LOCATION	YEARS
HH-3E	69-05807				
HH-3E	69-05808	3242.0		71 ARRS ELMONDORF AFB AK 11-78	03-79
		6459.1	18.0	305 ARRS SELFRIDGE ANGB MI 14-11-84	- 15-04-87
				AMARC DM AFB AZ	02-09-92
HH-3E	69-05809			21 COMP WG APO 98724	72 - 76
		7327.9		71 ARRS ELMENDORF AFB AK	77 - 88
		9018.1	18.0	38 ARRS KADENA AFB OKINAWA	
				AMARC DM AFB AZ	12-92
HH-3E	69-05810	1685.2		21 COMP WG APO 98742 10-07-73	07-10-74
		6707.9		38 ARRS KADENA AFB OKINAWA 30-10-87	19-02-88
				71 ARRS ELMENDORF AFB AK	
		8118.9	18.0	31 ARRS CLARK AFB R P	89 - 90
				AMARC DM AFB AZ	12-93
HH-3E	69-05811	1920.9		21 COMP WG APO 98742	26-09-75
		2494.5		1 SOW HULBERT FLD FL	05-12-77
		7368.0	17.9	41 ARRS PATRICK AFB FL 12-09-88	- 07-02-90
				AMARC DM AFB AZ	03-93
HH-3E	69-05812	6076.8		71 ARRS ELMENDORF AFB AK 21-04-79	- 17-04-89
		7010.2	17.8	AMARC DM AFB AZ	
				USAAVNTTC, FT RUCKER AL	93

TOTAL A/C BUILT	TOTAL A/C HOURS	AVERAGE A/C HOURS	AVERAGE AGE
139			

MODEL	HOSTILE LOSS	OPERATIONAL LOSS
CH-3	14	3
HH-3	10	4

COPIES OF THE AFTO FORM 95 HISTORICAL RECORD ON SOME OF THE HELICOPTERS ARE LISTED BELOW, AVAILABLE UPON REQUEST;

CH-3E 63-09676

CH-3E 64-14226

CH-3E 65-12797

HH-3E 67-14703

HH-3E 67-14707

HH-3E 67-14718

HH-3E 67-14722

HH-3E 67-14724

HH-3E 69-05798

APPENDIX # 1

CH-3E 63-09676 SIKORSKY A/C, STRATFORD CONN. DELIVERED 31-12-63

DATE	REMARKS	ORGANIZATION
-09-64	GROUP "A" WIRING FOR AN-ARC-54 VHF FM RADIO SYSTEM INSTALLED	COLLINS RADIO FAC. DALLAS TX
15-06-66	ACFT RECEIVED THIS STATION (PRIOR TRANSFERS NOT KNOWN)	20th HELI SQ UDORN ROYAL THAI AFB APO 96237
07-11-67	ACFT EXPERIENCED A HARD LANDING	20th HELI SQ UDORN ROYAL THAI AFB APO 96237
14-10-68	ACFT RECEIVED FROM IRAN LAS DON MUANG BANGKOK, THAILAND	20 SOS UDORN ROYAL THAI AFB APO 96237
19-06-69	INSTALLED MGB AT 2538.1 A/C HRS.	20 SOS UDORN ROYAL THIA AFB APO 96237
01-10-69	REMOVED MGB AT 2802.9 A/C HRS.	21 SOS NAKHON PHANOM ROYAL THIA AFB APO 96310
02-08-70	TCTO 1H-3-520 ("A" KIT ONLY)	56 SPOPSW NAKHON PHANOM ROYAL THIA AFB APO 96310
27-09-70	TCTO 1H-3-629 C/W	56 SPOPSW NAKHON PHANOM ROYAL THAI AFB APO 96310
02-08-71	TCTO 1H-3-636 C/W	6200 ABW CLARK AFB R P
26-03-74	AIRCRAFT ARRIVED THIS STATION AND PLACED IN WORK ON PROJECT # A-4-8120-WR FOR ACI I A W T.O. 00-25-4 AT 4724.9 HOURS	WARNER ROBINS ALC ROBINS AFB GA
29-06-74	ACFT RECEIVED THIS STATION AT 4726.7 HRS	405 FW CLARK AFB R P

APPENDIX # 1

CH-3E 63-09676 SIKORSKY A/C, STRATFORD CONN. DELIVERED 31-12-63

DATE	REMARKS	ORGANIZATION
16-09-74	405 FW REDESIGNATED TO 3 TFW	3 TFW CLARK AFB R P
31-03-76	ACFT RECEIVED THIS DATE AT 5126 A/C HRS	302 SPS LUKE AFB AZ
25-06-76	ACFT TRANSFERED TO THIS STATION FOR MAJOR STRUCTURAL REPAIR. FUNGUS CLEANED AND STRUCTURE TREATED. FWD APU MOUNT BRACKETS REPLACED AND MOUNTED PROPERLY. TAIL PYLON REMOVED AND REPLACED (IMPORTANT NOTE) TAIL PYLON INSTALLED WITH STANDARD SIZE BOLTS. INTERIOR AND EXTERIOR PAINTED. CAMOUFLAGE CONFIGURATION. TOTAL ACFT HOURS 5141.5	OGDEN ALC HILL AFB UT
09-12-76	AIRCRAFT RECEIVED FROM OGDEN ALC HILL AFB UT AT 5149.9 A/C HOURS	302 SOS LUKE AFB AZ
21-11-77	MRB 61M 495-868 INSTALLED AT 5252.0 ACFT HOURS	302 SOS LUKE AFB AZ
15-02-78	MRB INSTALLED 61M 676-1062 INSTALLED AT 5137 A/C HOURS	302 SOS LUKE AFB AZ
19-09-78	CRACK NOTED ON LEFT CAP ANGLE FS 541.5 AT 5499 A/C HOURS	302 SOS LUKE AFB AZ
05-12-78	CRACK NOTED IN WEB AFT LEFT SIDE, STATION 290, AT 5559 A/C HOURS	302 SOS LUKE AFB AZ
11-01-79	MRB 61M 495-868 REMOVED AT 5576.0 ACFT HOURS.	302 SOS LUKE AFB AZ
05-07-79	MODIFICATION OF AIRCRAFT WIRING AIC-18 SYSTEM IAW T.O. 1H-3(C)E-2-3, FOR LOCAL CONFIGURATION OPTION, COMPLIED WITH.	302 SOS LUKE AFB AZ
05-07-79	MODIFICATION OF AIRCRAFT WIRING AIC-18 SYSTEM I A W 1H-3(C)E-2-3 C/W	302 SOS LUKE AFB AZ
30-08-79	36 MONTH INSPECTION X-RAY PORTION BELOW STATION 106 (FLOOR LEVEL) LEFT & RIGHT SIDE SPONSON ATTACH FITTINGS AND SUPPORT STRUCTURES NCW, TO BE C/W AT ACI OR NEXT FUEL CELL REMOVAL.	302 SOS LUKE AFB AZ

APPENDIX # 1

CH-3E 63-09676 SIKORSKY A/C, STRATFORD CONN. DELIVERED 31-12-63

DATE	REMARKS	ORGANIZATION
21-01-80	TAIL PYLON ATTACH BRACKETS ELONGATED. NEW OVERSIZED BOLTS INSTALLED I A W AFRES MSG R171300Z AUG 79	302 SOS LUKE AFB AZ
03-04-80	A/C ARRIVED THIS STATION FOR DMISA NAVAIR76 26BFTG WITH 5911.1 ACFT HOURS. ACI WITH WR/H-3/79/1 WAS COMPLIED WITH ON 05-02-81	NARF PNCLA FL
17-12-80	MRB SN 61M 117-512 INSTALLED AT 5911.1 HOURS.	NARF PNCLA FL
22-02-81	AIRCRAFT RECEIVED AT THIS STATION AT 5923.3 A/C HOURS.	302 SOS LUKE AFB AZ
23-10-81	MRB SN 61M 117-512 REMOVED TO FOM AT 6185.3 A/C HOURS.	302 SOS LUKE AFB AZ
02-03-82	DURING PHASE INSPECTION CRACK APPROX TWO INCHES LONG FOUND IN WEB AREA, PHOTOS TAKEN AND SENT TO WR-ALC/MMSRCC FOR ENGINEEING EVAL. (SEE WR MSG R 291645Z MAR 82).	302 SOS LUKE AFB AZ
01-08-82	50 HR CRACK INSP, STA 541 LHS, REVEALED WEB CRACK HAS PROGRESSED UPWARD UNDER DOUBLER, PHOTOS TAKEN AND SENT TO WR-ALC /MMSRCC FOR FURTHER ENGINEERING EVAL. 50 HR INSP WILL CONTINUE IN FORCE UNTIL REPAIR INSTRUCTION ARE RECIEVED	302 SOS LUKE AFB AZ
07-08-83	ALL HYDRALIC SYSTEMS EXCEPT LANDING GEAR STRUTS CONVERTED TO MIL-H-83282 IAW DIR MAT MGT ROBINS AFB GA/MMSR MSG R131245Z MAY 83 AT 6535.8 ACFT HRS	302 SOS LUKE AFB AZ
09-09-83	STATION 541 LHS HAS BEEN CLEARED, PER ENGINEERING EVALUATION AT 6447.0 ACFT HRS	302 SOS LUKE AFB AZ
26-01-84	MOD RADAR WARNING RCVR T.C.T.O. 1H-3-748	302 SOS LUKE AFB AZ
09-05-84	CLASS 1B MOD. H003053 HAS BEEN COMPLIED WITH. (NVG LIGHTING)	302 SOS LUKE AFB AZ

APPENDIX # 1

CH-3E 63-09676 SIKORSKY A/C, STRATFORD CONN. DELIVERED 31-12-63

DATE	REMARKS	ORGANIZATION
24-06-85	T.C.T.O. 1X-INSP-4AF-5004 DATA CODE W505004 OTI OF H-3 EXT JETTISON SYS	302 SOS LUKE AFB AZ
28-07-85	T.C.T.O. 1H-3-750 DATA CODE 0161716 C/W 02 JULY 85 INST OF SHOULDER HARNESS FOR FLIGHT MECH SEAT	302 SOS LUKE AFB AZ
23-01-86	T.C.T.O. 1H-3-776 OTI OF ALL MRH BLADE ATTACH BOLTS C/W DATA CODE 0168071	302 SOS LUKE AFB AZ
07-11-86	T.C.T.O. 1H-3-780 C/W 05 NOV 1986 ONE TIME INSPECTION OF CIRCUIT BREAKERS	302 SOS LUKE AFB AZ
30-12-86	AIRCRAFT 63-9676 ARRIVED 304 ARRS PIA WITH 7329.6 ACFT HRS	304 ARRS PIA OR
20-02-87	URGANT ACTION ONE-TIME SAFETY INSPECTION AFR-702002, DATED 10 FEB 87, DATA CODE A702002, INSPECT FOR AIR CHARGING VALVE P/N AN6287-1. C/W 18 FEB 87.	304 ARRS PIA OR
26-02-87	T.C.T.O. 1H-3-781 DATA CODE 0169526, DATED 13 NOV 86, INSP OF RESCUE HOIST SUPPORT STRUCTURE. C/W 04 DEC 86	302 SOS LUKE AFB AZ
10-87	ACFT TRANSFERED THIS STATION	71 SOS DM AFB AZ
11-11-87	TSGT HENRY SHAW CREW CHIEF	71 SOS DM AFB AZ
13-04-88	C/W T.C.T.O. 1H-3-785, REMOVE AND VISUALLY INSPECT PRIMARY SERVO SUPPORT BRACKETS FOR WEAR, CRUSHING, CRACKING, AND OR PAINT CHIPPING	71 SOS DM AFB AZ
08-04-89	C/W T.C.T.O. 1H-3-797, DC: 0173390, DATED 07 APR 89, MAIN ROTOR BLADE CORROSION INSPECTION.	71 SOS DM AFB AZ
31-10-89	C/W T.C.T.O. 1H-3-741, DC: 0159401, DATED 24 OCT 89, REPLACEMENT OF APN-171 RADAR ALTIMITER WITH ALTIMITER SET, ELECTRONIC AN/APN	71 SOS DM AFB AZ

APPENDIX # 1

CH-3E 63-09676 SIKORSKY A/C, STRATFORD CONN, DELIVERED 31-12-63

DATE	REMARKS	ORGANIZATION
26-02-90	AUTOMATED HISTORY RECORDS ESTABLISHED ACFT HOURS 7816.2	71 SOS DM AFB AZ
27-02-90	TSGT DOUG LESHO LAST CREW CHIEF	71 SOS DM AFB AZ
15-02-91	ACFT LEFT DM AFB FOR TRANSFER TO USAF MUSEUM	71 SOS DM AFB AZ
19-02-91	ACFT TURNED OVER TO USAF MUSEUM AT 8099.2 HOURS	WP AFB OH

APPENDIX # 2

CH-3C 64-14226 SIKORSKY A/C, STRATFORD CONN. DELIVERED 26-02-65

DATE	REMARKS	ORGANIZATION
30-03-64	EXTENSIVE INSPECTIONS, MODIFICATIONS, INSTALLATION AND REPLACEMENT OF HELICOPTER SYSTEMS AND PARTS. SEE AFTO FORM 95 PAGE 1 FOR DETAILS. COMPLETED 30-06-65	SIKORSKY A/C STRATFORD CONN.
01-07-65	T.C.T.O. 1H-3(C)C-539 INSPECTION OF APU FUEL SUPPLY LINE	MCMX (AFLC)
01-10-65	T.C.T.O. 1H-3(C)C-545 SEALING OF MOTOR COVER APU PRIMER FUEL PUMP	MCMX (AFLC)
03-11-65	AS A RESULT OF GROUND ACCIDENT THE FOLLOWING SHEET METAL REPAIRS WERE MADE TO A/C AS PER SIKORSKY STANDARDS AND APPROVED BY SIKORSKY STRESS ENGINEERING DEPARTMENT. SEE AFTO FORM 95 PAGE 2 FOR DETAILS, NO COMPLETION DATE.	SIKORSKY A/C STRATFORD CONN.
27-03-67	LTM (CH-3)5-501 INSTALLATION OF AN/APW -25 SYSTEM IN CH-3	100 SRW DET 10 APO 96337
01-03-66	1H-3(C)C-522 MODIFICATION OF MAIN GEAR BOX SYSTEM	DET 10 LOCKHEED CORP APO 96337
26-07-67	1H-3-561 INSP OF BENDIX FLEX COUPLING DE-COMPLIED WITH (COUPLING CANNED FOR ACFT 65-12790)	DET 10 LOCKHEED CORP APO 96337
01-09-67	REPLACEMENT OF TROUGH TO WINCH SHIELD ASSY	100 SRW DM AFB AZ
06-10-67	CLASS 1 MOD DTD 07 MAR 67 INSTALLATION OF DBM CAMERA AND ANN 6 GUN CAMERA CH3 ACFT COMPLIED WITH 29-09-67	100 SRW DM AFB AZ
24-06-68	CRASH DAMAGE REPAIRED I/A/W CONTRACT (FO 9603-67-A-0350-0109) AT 509.4 A/C HOURS	O & R SIKORSKY A/C STRATFORD CONN.
24-06-68	AIRCRAFT MODIFIED TO MARS 2 CONFIGURATION I/A/W CONTRACT # F33657-67-C-0330-P002.	O & R SIKORSKY A/C STRATFORD CONN.
17-07-68	ACFT RECEIVED THIS BASE AT 515.4 A/C HOURS.	AFMDC HOLLOMAN AFB NM

APPENDIX # 2

CH-3C 64-14226 SIKORSKY A/C, STRATFORD CONN. DELIVERED 26-02-65

DATE	REMARKS	ORGANIZATION
01-08-68	HELICOPTER 64-14226 REDESIGNATED CH-3E I/A/W MSSG # R 011955Z AUG 68 ACFT IS EQUIPT WITH T-58-5 ENGINES.	AFMDC HOLLOMAN AFB NM
25-11-68	ACFT PREPARED FOR TRANSFER TO DM AFB AT 603.4 HOURS.	AFMDC HOLLOMAN AFB NM
27-11-68	ACFT ARRIVED THIS STATION THIS DATE A/C HOURS 605.9	100 SRW DM AFB AZ
24-01-69	REF: WRAMA WRNDT MSG 212320Z JAN 69 ON -2 PYLON FOR 226. QUOTE- THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE S6122 86210-1 & -2 HAS PROVSIONS FOR FM622 WHIP ANTENNA AND THE -1 ASSY DOES NOT. USE OF THE -2 ASSY IS PERMISSIBLE BUT MAY REQUIRE LOCAL MANUFACTURE AND INSTALLATION OF PLATE TO COVER THE ANTENNA OPENING -UNQUOTE.	100 SRW DM AFB AZ
03-02-69	ACFT ARRIVED THIS FACILITY AT 623.6 A/C HRS. ACCOMPLISHED INSTALLATION OF "SECURE VOICE CAPABILITY" - INTENT OF T.O. SUPPLEMENT 1H-3-557D COMPIED WITH I/A/W CONTRACT AF33657-68-A-0051, MCMSW-0051-RB-46(1)-1.	LAS CO ONTARIO, CA
14-02-69	ACFT DEPARTED THIS FACILITY AT 623.6 A/C HRS.	LAS CO ONTARIO, CA
02-04-69	LTM (CH3)5-501 DTD 15 JAN 67 INSTALLATION OF AN/APW-25 SYS.	100 SRW DM AFB AZ
16-04-69	ACFT ARRIVED THIS STATION ACFT HRS 688.2 A/C HRS	100 SRW DET 10 APO 96337
08-07-70	1H-3-626 INSPECTION OF TAIL ROTOR PITCH BEAM	100 SRW DET 10 APO 96337
13-08-71	12R5-2ARN65-505 MODIFICATION OF VIDEO MODULE RT-471/ARN65 TACAN UNITS	100 SRW DET 10 APO 96337
18-08-73	1H-3-651 INSPECTION FOR AND REPLACEMENT OF RELAY REVERSE CURRENT	100 SRW OL-OA APO 96570

APPENDIX # 2

CH-3C 64-14226 SIKORSKY A/C, STRATFORD CONN. DELIVERED 26-02-65

DATE	REMARKS	ORGANIZATION
20-06-75	1H-3-665 INSP OF TAIL PYLON TO FUSELAGE ATTACH BOLTS	100 SRW 432 TDG DM AFB AZ
19-11-76	ANALYTICAL CONDITION INSPECTION COMPLIED WITH- NARF PENSACOLA, FLA. WARNER ROBBINS WORK SPECIFICATION WR/H-3/76/0	NARF PNCLA FL
01-10-76	A/C ARRIVED THIS STATION 432 TDG	100 SRW 432 TDG DM AFB AZ
05-01-78	13D2-4-510 REPLACEMENT OF WINCH PRINTED CIRCUIT BOARD	100 SRW 432 TDG DM AFB AZ
26-09-78	1H-3-709 INSP OF MAIN ROTOR HUB SPINDLES FORNICILLE SULFARATE PLATING.	100 SRW 432 TDG DM AFB AZ
15-02-79	ACFT ARRIVED THIS STATION	39 ARRW DET 5 TYNDALL AFB FL
30-06-80	COMPLIED WITH CORROSION PREVENTION OF UNDER FLOOR WORK SPECIFICATION ON WR/H-3/80-1-2 TAB C.	NARF PNCLA FL
08-08-80	TCTO 1H-3-732C COMPLIED WITH.	NARF PNCLA FL
11-08-80	ACFT RETURNED FROM DEPOT AC HRS 3830.3	39 ARRW DET 5 TYNDALL AFB FL
03-06-81	TCTO 1H-3-734 C/W	39 ARRW DET 5 TYNDALL AFB FL
23-03-83	ALL FUEL LINES REMOVED AND REPLACED (10 YEAR TIME CHANGE)	39 ARRW DET 5 TYNDALL AFB FL
09-07-84	TCTO 1H-3-754 C/W	39 ARRW DET 5 TYNDALL AFB FL
03-07-85	TCTO 1H-3-750 COMPLETED	39 ARRW DET 5 TYNDALL AFB FL
23-04-86	A/C CH-3E 64-14226 ARRIVED AT NARF PNCLA ON 22-10-85 FOR DMISA NAVAIR 76 26BFTG WITH 5437.7 ACFT HRS. AIC WR/H-3/85/1 WAS COMPLETED ON 23-04-86	NARF PNCLA FL

APPENDIX # 2

CH-3E 64-14226 SIKORSKY A/C, STRATFORD CONN. DELIVERED 26-02-65

DATE	REMARKS	ORGANIZATION
25-04-86	AIRCRAFT DE-PAINTED & REPAINTED EUROPEAN I CAMOUFLAGE	NARF PNCLA FL
15-11-86	TCTO 1H-3-780 C/W INSPECTION OF ALL C/B	39 SRRW DET 5 TYNDALL AFB FL
13-10-87	AIRCRAFT GAINED AT 6041.8 ACFT HRS	301 ARRS HOMESTEAD AFB FL

APPENDIX # 3

CH-3E 65-12797 SIKORSKY A/C, STRATFORD CONN. DELIVERED 30-12-66

DATE	REMARKS	ORGANIZATION
30-12-66	TOTAL OPERATING TIME AT DELIVERY 11.1 HOURS	SIKORSKY STRATFORD CONN.
15-08-67	THIS AIRCRAFT HAS BEEN REWORKED TO M.A.R.S. CONFIGURATION I A W SIKORSKY AIRCRAFT DRAWING NUMBER S6107-95118	NAV PLANT REP SIK STFD
20-09-67	1st PHASE INSPECTION T.O. 1H-3(C)C-6WC-1 PH AT 22.3 A/C HOURS	SIKORSKY A/C EL CENTRO CA
23-05-68	2nd PHASE INSPECTION T.O. 1H-3(C)C-6WC-1 PH AT 78.2 A/C HOURS	SIKORSKY A/C EL CENTRO CA
28-05-68	TOTAL OPERATING TIME AT DELIVERY 78.2 HRS	SIKORSKY A/C EL CENTRO CA
03-06-68	ACFT RECORDS RECEIVED THIS DATE	AFMDC HOLLOMAN AFB NM
10-01-69	T.O. 1H-3-536 DTD 26 JUN 68 REPLACEMENT OF PERSONNEL DOOR LADDER LOCKING DEVICE RESCISSION DATE 26 JUN 69 GROUND 26 JUN 69. INTENT OF T.C.T.O. 1H-3-536 HAS BEEN ACCOMPLISHED. T.C.T.O. DEVEATIONS ARE AS FOLLOWS: ALL BUT BULKHEAD STORAGE FOR LADDER DUE TO EXPERAMENTAL EQUIPMENT CAN NOT INSTALL. WILL INSTALL AT LATER DATE.	AFMDC HOLLOMAN AFB NM
27-02-69	T.O. 1H-3-577D DTD 01 DEC 68 INSTALLATION OF SECURE VOICE CAPABILITY. INTENT OF T.C. T.O. C/W I A W CONTRACT F33657-68-A-0051, MCMSW-0051-RB-L46(1)-1 DTD 11/04/68. C/W BY LAS FIELD TEAM AT HOLLOMAN AFB N MEX 25/02/69	AFMDC HOLLOMAN AFB NM
29-06-70	ACFT PREPARED FOR TRANSFER I A W AFSC MSG #202117Z MAY 70, AND 111952Z JUN 70, PROJECT FTCOZ-703 AT 456.7 A/C HRS.	AFMDC HOLLOMAN AFB NM
01-07-70	ACFT ARRIVED THIS STATION THIS DATE AT 456.7 ACFT HRS.	6515 OMS EDWARDS AFB CA
22-04-72	T.O. 1H-3-520 INCORP OF EXT. PUB ADDRESS SYSTEM N/A EQUIP NOT INSTALLED	6515 OMS EDWARDS AFB CA

APPENDIX # 3

CH-3E 65-12797 SIKORSKY A/C, STRATFORD CONN. DELIVERED 30-12-66

DATE	REMARKS	ORGANIZATION
09-07-73	SPECIAL INSP. 73-36, INSPECT ROTOR HEAD HINGE, PN: S6110-23032 SERIES FOR CRACKS IN LOCK PIN BORES, N/A TO THIS AIRCRAFT.	6515 OMS EDWARDS AFB CA
17-07-73	ACFT DEPARTING/ED AFTTC AFSC EDWARDS AFB CA 93523	6515 OMS EDWARDS AFB CA
26-10-73	ACFT ARRIVED THIS STATION ON 18 JUL 73 ACFT HOURS 1147.2	6514 T S HILL AFB UT
29-03-74	T.C.T.O. 1H-3-513 INSTALLATION OF 80H WINCH SYSTEM C/W 20 MAR 74 M/N R7415	6514 T S HILL AFB UT
04-10-75	ACFT ARRIVED THIS STATION ACFT HRS 1650.5	39 ARRW DET 5 TYNDALL AFB FL
25-11-75	TGB A-4-096 REMOVED AT 1684.3 ACFT HOURS	39 ARRW DET 5 TYNDALL AFB FL
14-03-78	ANLYTICAL CONDITION INSPECTION COMPLETED WITH NARF PNCLA FL I A W WARNER ROBINS SPECIFICATION WR/H-3/77/1 AS OF 20-09-76	NARF PNCLA FL
25-09-78	T.C.T.O. 1H-3-707 & 709 COMPLIED WITH	39 ARRW DET 5 TYNDALL AFB FL
15-12-78	ONE TIME INSP C/W ON UPPER & LOWER PERSONNEL DOOR TRACK & EMERGANCY RELEASE MECHANISM	39 ARRW DET 5 TYNDALL AFB FL
09-01-79	T.C.T.O. 1H-3-701 COMPLIED WITH	39 ARRW DET 5 TYNDALL AFB FL
26-11-80	T.C.T.O. 1H-3-732D HAS BEEN COMPLIED WITH COMPLIED WITH CORROSION PREVENTION OF UNDER FLOOR WORK SPECIFICATION WR/H-3/80-5	NARF PNCLA FL
20-05-81	A/C DEPARTED TYNDALL AFB AT 2767.1 A/C TIME	39 ARRW DET 5 TYNDALL AFB FL
20-05-81	A/C ARRIVED THIS STATION AT TIME 2774.2	39 ARRW DET 11 MRYTLE BEACH SC
02-09-81	MAIN GEAR BOX SUPPORT AREA & WEB INSP C/W I A W 1H-3(C)E-36 ACFT TIME 2821.4	39 ARRW DET 11 MRYTLE BEACH SC

APPENDIX # 3

CH-3E 65-12797 SIKORSKY A/C, STRATFORD CONN. DELIVERED 30-12-66

DATE	REMARKS	ORGANIZATION
24-07-82	ACFT ARRIVED THIS STATION	39 ARRW DET 15 PATRICK AFB FL
03-06-83	ACFT COMPLETELY PAINTED	39 ARRW DET 15 PATRICK AFB FL
06-06-83	MGB REMOVED AT ACFT HRS. 3510.2	39 ARRW DET 15 PATRICK AFB FL
01-06-84	TITLE: MOD OF INTER GEAR BOX ACCESS PANEL (DET 15 AIRCRAFT ONLY) LOSS OF TORQUE ON TAIL PYLON A2797 AT A/C HRS 3853.4 BOLTS RETORQUED	39 ARRW DET 15 PATRICK AFB FL
31-07-85	T.C.T.O. 1H-3-768 COMPLIED WITH	39 ARRW DET 15 PATRICK AFB FL
28-04-86	A/C ARRIVED AT NARF PNCLA FOR DMISA NAVAIR 76 26BFTG WITH 4600.3 ACFT HRS. ACI WR/H-3/86/1 WAS COMPLETED ON 15-09-86 T.C.T.O. 1H-3-776 INSPECTION OF M/R ROTOR BLADE BOLTS WAS COMPLIED WITH. T.C.T.O. 1H-3-778 PARTIALLY COMPLIED WITH- REF WR MSG 231525Z JUL 86. (MATERIAL NOT AVAILABLE). ACI COMPLIED WITH I A W: WR-H-3/86-1 ON 09-09-86. 36 MO INSPECTION COMPLIED WITH ON 09-09-86. AIRCRAFT DE-PAINTED & REPAINTED EUROPEAN 1 CAMOUFLAGE WITH MAC MARKINGS.	NARF PNCLA FL
18-09-86	AIRCRAFT RECEIVED THIS STATION	39 ARRW DET 15 PATRICK AFB FL

APPENDIX # 4

CH-3E 67-14703 SIKORSKY A/C, STRATFORD CONN. DELIVERED 29-09-67

DATE	REMARKS	ORGANIZATION
30-11-67	TOTAL OPERATING TIME ON HELICOPTER 10.0 HOURS AT TIME OF DELIVERY	SIKORSKY A/C
15-12-67	A\C RECEIVED THIS STATION 11.3 HOURS	56 ACW APO 96310
22-03-70	MGB INSTALLED AT 1568.0 A/C HOURS	56 SPOPS WG APO 96310
25-04-70	MGB REMOVED AT 1628.0 A/C HOURS	56 SPOPS WG APO 96310
27-11-70	A/C IRAN & #7 PHASE INSP. ACCOMPLISHED AT A/C TIME 1773.5	THAI AM CO LTD APO 96303
08-12-70	A/C ARRIVED THIS STATION AT 1779.1 HOURS	56 SPOPS WG APO 96310
25-05-72	MGB REMOVED AT A/C TIME 1985.7	355 TFW DM AFB AZ
06-03-73	A/C ARRIVED THIS STATION 2126.2 HOURS	1 SOWG HURLBERT FLD FL
22-04-74	A/C PROCESSED THIS STATION 2494.4 HOURS	302 SOS LUKE AFB AZ
05-12-78	CRACK IN WEB AFT LEFT SIDE STATION 290, 3676.0 HOURS	302 SOS LUKE AFB AZ
06-01-79	STRINGER HAS TWO CRACKS AT STATION 290, APPROXIMATELY ONE INCH LONG AT ELEVEN O'CLOCK POSITION, A/C HOURS 3696.0	302 SOS LUKE AFB AZ
10-04-79	ACFT RECEIVED NAVAIREWORKFAC PENSICOLA FL. ACFT HOURS 3768.4	NARF PNCLA
13-01-80	ACFT RECEIVED THIS STATION	302 SOS LUKE AFB AZ
18-03-80	MRH A9-209 INSTALLED AT 3820 HOURS	302 SOS LUKE AFB AZ
18-08-80	MRH A9-209 REMOVED AT 3921 A/C HOURS. REASON HORIZONTAL HINGE SEAL LEAKING.	302 SOS LUKE AFB AZ

APPENDIX # 4

HH-3E 67-14703 SIKORSKY A/C, STRATFORD CONN. DELIVERED 29-09-67

DATE	REMARKS	ORGANIZATION
24-09-81	ENGINE INSTALLED ON POS. #1 AT 4254.3 A/C HOURS	302 SOS LUKE AFB AZ
14-04-82	AIRCRAFT RELEASED TO 305 ARRS SELFRIDGE ANG BASE MI FOR UNDER FLOOR CORROSION CONTROL	302 SOS LUKE AFB AZ
11-06-82	ACFT RECEIVED FROM 305 ARRS SELFRIDGE ANG BASE AFTER COMPLETION OF UNDER FLOOR CORRISION INSPECTION 4475.4 HOURS	302 SOS LUKE AFB AZ
08-08-83	ALL HYD SYSTEMS EXCEPT LANDING GEAR STRUTS CONVERTED TO MIL-H-83282 4772.1 HOURS	302 SOS LUKE AFB AZ
29-07-84	TCTO 1H-3-744 C/W CHANGED A/C TO HH-3E	302 SOS LUKE AFB AZ
01-11-86	A/C TRANSFERRED	310 ARRS HOMESTEAD AFB FL
09-03-87	A/C HH-3E 67-014703 ARRIVED THIS STATION FOR DMISE NAVAIR 86, 5697.7 HOURS	NADEP PNCLA
08-10-87	A/C AT STATION	939 CAMS PIA OR
23-08-88	A/C AT STATION	71 SOS DM AFB AZ
13-04-89	BLADE SN 61M 179-623 REMOVED AT 6061.7 A/C HOURS.	71 SOS DM AFB AZ
16-02-90	A/C LOANED TO 304 ARRS PORTLAND IAP OR UNTIL 30 MAR 90	71 SOS DM AFB AZ
05-04-90	AUTO HISTORY ESTABLISHED 6300.1 HOURS	71 SOS DM AFB AZ
12-09-92	HELICOPTERS LAST FLIGHT WITH THIS OUTFIT 6901.9 HOURS	71 SOS DM AFB AZ

APPENDIX # 5

CH-3E 67-14707 SIKORSKY A/C, STRATFORD CONN. DELIVERED 30-11-67

DATE	REMARKS	ORGANIZATION
12-01-68	TOTAL OPERATING TIME ON HELICOPTER AT TIME OF DELIVERY 13.0 HOURS	SIKORSKY A/C
31-05-68	TOTAL OPERATING TIME ON HELICOPTER AT TIME OF DELIVERY 26.7 HOURS	SIKORSKY A/C
05-05-68	TOTAL OPERATING TIME ON HELICOPTER AT TIME OF DELIVERY 29.0 HOURS	SIKORSKY A/C
13-05-68	RECEIVED AIRCRAFT FROM SIKORSKY WITH 29.0 HOURS	703 TASS SHAW AFB SC
31-07-72	ACFT TRANSFERRED TO POINT MUGU NAVY AIR STATION AT 1900.5 ACFT HOURS	NAS POINT MUGU CA.
14-03-74	ACFT REASSIGNED TO THIS UNIT WITH 2077.7 AIRCRAFT HOURS	703 TASS SHAW AFB SC
24-07-73	ACFT ARRIVED THIS STATION AT 2192.9 HRS.	1 SOW HURLBERT FLD FL
01-04-74	AIRCRAFT POSSESSED THIS STATION AT 2333.3 AIRCRAFT HOURS	302 SOS LUKE AFB AZ
20-09-76	ACI C/W	NARF PNCLA
23-02-78	ACFT ARRIVED THIS STATION	302 SOS LUKE AFB AZ
16-05-78	AIRCRAFT MADE HARD LANDING, ALL 1H-3(C)E-6 INSPECTIONS COMPLIED WITH, NO DISCREPENCIES NOTED. (INSPECTION COMPLETED 19-05-78) 3327.8 A/C HOURS 2331 A/C LANDINGS	302 SOS LUKE AFB AZ
05-12-78	CRACK IN WEB AFT LEFT SIDE STATION 290, AT 3451.0 A/C HOURS. 09-12-78 CRACK IS MINOR NO REPAIR REQUIRED STEEL STRAP IS INSTALLED.	302 SOS LUKE AFB AZ
18-11-79	MRH A-2-121 INSTALLED AT 3738 A/C HOURS	302 SOS LUKE AFB AZ
30-04-80	MRH A-2-121 REMOVED AT 3821 A/C HOURS	302 SOS LUKE AFB AZ

APPENDIX # 5

CH-3E 67-14707 SIKORSKY A/C, STRATFORD CONN. DELIVERED 30-11-67

DATE	REMARKS	ORGANIZATION
30-09-80	MRH A-9-209 INSTALLED AT 3888 A/C HOURS	302 SOS LUKE AFB AZ
08-01-81	ACFT CH-3E 67-014707 ARRIVED THIS STATION WITH 4010.3 HOURS.	NARF PNCLA
22-05-81	KEEL BEAM REPLACED FROM F.S. 181-346.5	NARF PNCLA
24-05-81	ACFT RETURNED TO THIS STATION	302 SOS LUKE AFB AZ
14-10-81	MRH A9-209 REMOVED AT 4130.5 A/C HOURS. REASON EXCESSIVE LEAKAGE OUT OF CONVERTED UPPER HINGE SEALS AND EXCESSIVE WEAR OF SWASHPLATE GUIDE	302 SOS LUKE AFB AZ
07-08-83	ALL HYDRALIC SYSTEMS EXCEPT LANDING GEAR STRUTS CONVERTED TO MIL-H-83282 WITH 4665.1 ACFT HOURS	302 SOS LUKE AFB AZ
12-12-83	M R H INSTALLED ACFT HRS 4201.5	302 SOS LUKE AFB AZ
17-01-84	ENGINE T58-GE-5 GE285226 INSTALLED #1 POS. AT 4779.9 HOURS	302 SOS LUKE AFB AZ
05-06-84	TAIL ROTOR HEAD ASSY INSTALLED AT 4872.6 HOURS	302 SOS LUKE AFB AZ
04-10-84	M G B ASSY INSTALLED AT 4950.7 HRS	302 SOS LUKE AFB AZ
07-10-84	ENGINE T58-GE-5 GE285049 INSTALLED #2 POS. AT 4950.7 A/C HOURS	302 SOS LUKE AFB AZ
23-10-84	TRB 61VR 4263-4162 INSTALLED AT 4962.2 A/C HRS.	302 SOS LUKE AFB AZ
11-04-85	EXCESSIVE RIGHT PEDAL REQUIRED TO MAINTAIN STRAIGHT FLIGHT WITH AUX. SERVO OFF. CHECKED NFG SPRING (AUX OFF-HOVER) AND A/C TURNED RIGHT INSTEAD OF LEFT. ALSO NOTICED 5 TO 1 VIBRATION IN TAIL ROTOR PEDALS IN FWD FLIGHT AT (70-90 KIAS) WITH AUX. OFF (P. DAVIS MAJOR)	302 SOS LUKE AFB AZ

APPENDIX # 5

CH-3E 67-14707 SIKORSKY A/C, STRATFORD CONN. DELIVERED 30-11-67

DATE	REMARKS	ORGANIZATION
13-08-85	A/C 67-014707 CH-3E ARRIVED THIS STATION WITH 5230.1 ACFT HOURS	NARF PNCLA FL
13-08-85	TRB 61RV 4263-4162 REMOVED AT 5230.1 A/C HOURS.	NARF PNCLA FL
02-01-85	TCTO 1H-3-744 C/W CHANGED A/C TO HH-3E	NARF PNCLA FL
11-02-86	AIRCRAFT 67-014707 RETURNED TO THIS STATION WITH 5247.6 A/C HOURS	302 SOS LUKE AFB AZ
30-12-86	AIRCRAFT 67-014707 ARRIVED THIS STATION WITH 5452.0 ACFT HOURS	304 ARRS PIA OR
01-01-88	AIRCRAFT ARRIVED THIS STATION WITH 5701.1 ACFT HOURS	71 SOS DM AFB AZ
06-10-88	AIRCRAFT ARRIVED THIS STATION WITH 5856.9 A/C HOURS	NAVAVNDEPOT PNCLA FL
18-06-89	A/C ON STATION FOR TCTO 1H-3-800	71 SOS DM AFB AZ
07-03-90	AUTO HISTORY ESTABLISHED AT 5999.8 A/C HOURS	71 SOS DM AFB AZ
24-01-92	APU CLUTCH PN 8612280-30, SN 313A-B INSTALLED AT A/C TIME 6528.5	71 SOS DM AFB AZ
12-09-92	HELICOPTERS LAST FLIGHT WITH THIS UNIT AT 6623.8 HOURS	71 SOS DM AFB AZ

APPENDIX # 6

CH-3E 67-14718 SIKORSKY A/C, STRATFORD CONN. DELIVERED 31-05-68

DATE	REMARKS	ORGANIZATION
05-06-68	TOTAL OPERATING TIME ON HELICOPTER AT TIME OF DELIVERY 9.9 HOURS	SIKORSKY A/C
02-01-70	ACFT INPUT FIR IRAN INSPECTION AT ACFT TIME 1320.5 HRS PHASE INSP # 2 MAIN GEAR BOX REPLACED, MAIN ROTOR HEAD REPLACED	THAI AM CO LTD APO 96303
30-04-70	ACFT ARRIVED THIS STATION AT 1326.6 A/C HOURS	56 SPOP WG APO 96310
09-07-70	ACFT DELIVERED WITH PYLON ATTACHMENT FITTINGS WITH OVERSIZED BOLT HOLES REF AFCMC MSG 070843Z JUL 70	56 SPOP WG APO 96310
17-04-72	ACFT ARRIVED THIS STATION WITH 2276.6 HOURS	703 TASS SHAW AFB SC
16-10-72	TCTO 1H-3-631 C/W AT 2420.3 ACFT HOURS	703 TASS SHAW AFB SC
12-07-73	ACFT ARRIVED THIS STATION	FLD # 9 HURLBERT FLD FL
11-04-74	ACFT ARRIVED THIS STATION WITH 2834.1 AIRCRAFT HOURS	302 SOS LUKE AFB AZ
26-02-76	OVERSIZED BOLTS INSTALLED IAW AFRES & WRAMA MSG DATED 04-12-75. TORQUE 345 IN LBS ON NUT, 405 IN LBS ON BOLTS. ALL HOLES OVERSIZED TO .390. 3200 A/C HOURS	302 SOS LUKE AFB AZ
12-08-76	AIRCRAFT ARRIVED AT THIS FACILITY. ACFT TIME 3322.1 HOURS	NARF PNCLA FL
03-12-76	ACI C/W NARF PNCLA FL IAW WARNER ROBINS WORK SPECIFICATION WR/H-3/76/0	NARF PNCLA FL
05-12-78	ON STATION-CRACK IN WEB AFT LEFT SIDE STATION 290 AT 3903 A/C HOURS	302 SOS LUKE AFB AZ
23-05-82	ACFT RELEASED TO THIS STATION FOR UNDER FLOOR CORROSION CONTROL	305 ARRS SELFRIDGE ANG BASE MI

APPENDIX # 6

CH-3E 67-14718 SIKORSKY A/C, STRATFORD CONN. DELIVERED 31-05-68

DATE	REMARKS	ORGANIZATION
11-07-82	ACFT ACCEPTED FROM 305 ARRS SELFRIDGE ANG BASE MI AFTER COMPLETION OF UNDER FLOOR CORROSION CONTROL INSP. 4829.9 HRS	302 SOS LUKE AFB AZ
07-02-83	MAJ. RICK DAVIS, MAJ. RICHARD DULL, MSGT RODNEY HARALSON, AND RESERVE TSGT ROBERT ORTEGA, THE 302nd ASSISTED THE ARIZONIA DEPT. OF PUBLIC SAFETY WITH RESCUING A DOWNED PILOT FROM A LEDGE AT 4000 FT IN THE HARQUAHALA MNT'S. MAJ. DAVIS HAD TO EXECUTE A 180 DEGREE TURNS WITHIN THE NARROW CONFINES OF A BOX CANYON TO POSITION THE HELICOPTER. AS HE HOVERED OVER THE SITE AND THE MAIN-ROTOR BLADES PASSED WITHIN A FEW FEET OF THE MOUNTAINSIDE, MSGT HARALSON LOWERED THE STOKES LITTER TO RETRIEVE THE CRASH VICTIM, HELPLESS WITH A BROKEN BACK. THEN UNABLE TO CLIMB DUE TO SWIRLING SNOW, 100 FOOT VISIBILITY, AND ICING CONDITIONS, MAJ. DAVIS HAD TO MANEUVER THE HELICOPTER ON A REVERSE PATTERN DOWN THE CANYON.	302 SOS LUKE AFB AZ
07-08-83	ALL HYDRALIC SYSTEMS EXCEPT LANDING GEAR STRUTS CONVERTED TO MIL-L-83282 IAW DIR MAT MGT ROBINS AFB GA/MMSR MSG R131245Z MAY 83 AT 5191.0 ACFT HOURS	302 SOS LUKE AFB AZ
29-06-84	A/C CH-3E 67014718 ARRIVED THIS STATION FOR DMISE NAVAIR 76 268FTG WITH 5479.2 ACFT HRS ACI WR/H-3/84/1 WAS COMPLETED ON 21-12-84	NARF PNCLA FL
08-01-85	AIRCRAFT CH-3E 67014718 RELEASED FROM ACI TO 302 SOS FLIGHT CREW IAW AFR 65-110 AT 5479.2 HOURS	302 SOS LUKE AFB AZ
31-01-85	TCTO 1H-3-744 INSTALLATION OF INFLIGHT REFUELING PROBES AND OIL TANKS AT AIRCRAFT TIME 5494.6 HR	302 SOS LUKE AFB AZ
03-01-86	PER CONVERSATION WITH WR-ALC THE FOLLOWING TCTO'S HAVE BEEN COMPLIED WITH 1H-3-761, 1H-3-760, 1H-3-756	305 ARRS SANGB MI

APPENDIX # 6

HH-3E 67-14718 SIKORSKY A/C, STRATFORD CONN. DELIVERED 31-05-68

DATE	REMARKS	ORGANIZATION
03-02-86	AIRCRAFT RETURNED TO 302 POSS 01-02-86 A/C HRS. 5772.1	302 SOS LUKE AFB AZ
30-05-86	GAINED 76-14718 FOR SUPPORT MISSIONS	305 ARRS SANGB MI
08-08-88	ON STATION TCTO 1H-3-785	71 SOS DM AFB AZ
06-10-88	REMOVED AND REPLACED 32 TAILCONE PYLON FITTINGS REAMED TO STD 5/16	NADEP PNCLA FL
12-03-90	AUTO HISTORY ESTABLISHED AT 6599.7	71 SOS DM AFB AZ
15-03-90	MRB 61M1003-1339 INSTALLED ON ROTOR HEAD AT 6599.7 A/C HOURS.	71 SOS DMAFB AZ
12-09-92	HELICOPTERS LAST FLIGHT THIS STATION AT 7394.8 HOURS	71 SOS DMAFB AZ

APPENDIX # 7

CH-3E 67-14722 SIKORSKY A/C, STRATFORD CONN. DELIVERED 31-07-68

DATE	REMARKS	ORGANIZATION
27-08-68	TOTAL OPERATING TIME ON HELICOPTER 10.3 HOURS AT TIME OF DELIVERY	SIKORSKY A/C
10-09-68	TOTAL OPERATING TIME ON HELICOPTER 12.0 HOURS AT TIME OF RECEIPT	37 ARRS APO 96303
03-10-70	A/C IRAN & #11 PHASE INSP. ACCOMPLISHED AT A/C TIME 1102.9	THAI AM CO LTD APO 96303
26-11-70	HELICOPTER RECEIVED FROM 37 ARRS A/C TIME 1133.8	31 ARRS CLARK AFB R P
11-05-71	THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION CONSTITUTES IN PART THE CRASH REPAIRS THAT WERE DONE. REPLACED DOG HOUSE & MANUFACTURED SKIN & RIBS, REPAIRED AND OR REPLACED FUSELAGE STA. 340-400	6200 ABW CLARK AFB R P
23-02-72	MRB 61M 676-1062 INSTALLED AT 1431.7 HRS	1600 SPT GP CLARK AFB R P
01-07-75	A/C TRANS.41 RWRWG DET 1 A/C HRS 2617.0	374 TAW CLARK AFB R P
05-06-78	NEW PYLON INSTALLED	NARF PNCLA
20-06-78	A/C RETURNED TO CLARK AFB RP FROM ACI AT 3678.1 HOURS	374 TAW CLARK AFB R P
12-08-82	A/C RETURNED TO THIS STATION FRON OSAN AFB R.O.K. AT 5077.8 A/C HOURS	374 TAW CLARK AFB R P
09-11-82	SLEEVE AND SPINDLE INSTALLED AT 5377.0 ACFT HOURS.	374 TAW CLARK AFB R P
21-07-83	TAILGEAR BOX SMS 13 INSTALLED ON A/C AT 5779.7 ACFT HOURS	374 TAW CLARK AFB R P
24-01-84	SLEEVE AND SPINDLE REMOVED AT 5981.2 ACFT HOURS.	374 TAW CLARK AFB R P
20-12-85	HH-3E 67-014722 ARRIVED NARF PNCLA FOR DMISA NAVAIR 76 26BFTG WITH 6797.9 HRS	NARF PNCLA

APPENDIX # 7

HH-3E 67-14722 SIKORSKY A/C, STRATFORD CONN. DELIVERED 31-07-68

DATE	REMARKS	ORGANIZATION
29-07-86	PREPARED A/C SHIPMENT IAW 1H-1-39	NARF PNCLA
02-08-86	A/C ARRIVED THIS STATION ABOARD C5A A/C FROM ACI 6798.2 HOURS	31 SOS CLARK AFB R P
30-03-89	SLEEVE AND SPINDLE INSTALLED AT 8140.7 ACFT HOURS.	31 SOS CLARK AFB R P
24-09-89	MRB 61M 743-985 INSTALLED AT 8386.4 A/C HOURS	353 SOMS CLARK AFB R P
06-04-90	MRB 61M 743-985 CANNED AT 8590.7 HRS INSTALLED ON A/C 67-14724	353 SOMS CLARK AFB R P
07-01-91	ARRIVED FOR OCM EVAL.	NADEP PNCLA
12-03-92	A/C DELIVERED THIS STATION	71 SOS DM AFB AZ
13-03-92	AUTOMATED HISTORY ESTABLISHED	71 SOS DM AFB AZ
10-09-92	HELCOPTERS LAST FLIGHT WITH THIS OUTFIT 8924.8 HOURS	71 SOS DM AFB AZ

APPENDIX # 8

HH-3E 67-14724 SIKORSKY A/C, STRATFORD CONN. DELIVERED 30-09-68

DATE	REMARKS	ORGANIZATION
30-09-68	TOTAL OPERATING TIME ON HELICOPTER 13.3 HOURS AT TIME OF DELIVERY	SIKORSKY A/C
17-10-68	HELICOPTER HH-3E 67-014724 RECEIVED THIS SQUADRON WITH 15.1 AIRCRAFT HOURS	31 ARRS CLARK AFB R P
01-11-75	AIRCRAFT TRANSFERRED TO DET 1, 41 RWRWG WITH 2584.0 HOURS	374 TAW CLARK AFB R P
21-04-77	MRH REMOVED AT A/C HOURS 3468.7	374 TAW CLARK AFB R P
22-12-78	AIRCRAFT TRANSFERRED TO NARF PNCLA FOR ANLYTICAL CONDITION INSPECTION	NARF PNCLA
05-01-79	AIRCRAFT RETURNED FROM PDM WITH 3876.9 HOURS	374 TAW CLARK AFB R P
12-08-82	HELICOPTER ARRIVED THIS STATION FROM OSAN KOREA APO 96750	374 TAW CLARK AFB R P
24-04-84	CLASS ONE B MOD. 5772.2 HOURS	374 TAW CLARK AFB R P
20-12-85	AIRCRAFT REFERB. 6395.5 HOURS	374 TAW CLARK AFB R P
28-04-86	HELICOPTER LEFT THIS STATION	374 TAW CLARK AFB R P
21-05-86	HELICOPTER ARRIVED THIS STATION WITH 6621.6 HOURS	NAD PNCLA
30-04-87	HELICOPTER ARRIVED THIS STATION FROM ACI WITH 6623.8 HOURS	374 TAW CLARK AFB R P
28-12-87	HELICOPTER REFERB. 6936.9 HOURS	374 TAW CLARK AFB R P
01-05-89	SLEEVE AND SPINDLE INSTALLED AT 7545.1 ACFT HOURS.	31 SOS CLARK AFB R P
02-01-90	HELICOPTER REFERB. AT 7783.0 HOURS	353 SOMS CLARK AFB R P

APPENDIX # 8

HH-3E 67-14724 SIKORSKY A/C, STRATFORD CONN. DELIVERED 30-09-68

DATE	REMARKS	ORGANIZATION
16-01-90	TRH 048-89 INSTALLED AT ACFT TIME 7805.1 ACFT HOURS.	353 SOMS CLARK AFB PI
09-02-90	TRB 61RV 4263-4162 INSTALLED AT 7853.2 ACFT HOURS.	353 SOMS CLARK AFB PI
12-12-90	HELICOPTER DELIVERED THIS STATION 8059.8 ACFT HOURS.	71 SOS DM AFB AZ
17-12-90	DAMPENER INSTALLED ON MRH A-9-209 AT ACFT HRS 8059.8	71 SOS DM AFB AZ
01-05-91	TSGT DOUG LESHO LAST CREW CHIEF	71 SOS DM AFB AZ
11-08-91	MRB 61M983-1332 INSTALLED ON ROTOR HEAD A9209 AT A/C 8184.1 HOURS	71 SOS DM AFB AZ
27-08-92	HELICOPTER LAST FLIGHT WITH THIS OUTFIT 8580.0 HOURS	71 SOS DM AFB AZ

APPENDIX # 9

HH-3E 69-05798 SIKORSKY A/C, STRATFORD CONN. DELIVERED 30-01-70

DATE	REMARKS	ORGANIZATION
01-04-70	TOTAL OPERATING TIME ON HELICOPTER AT TIME OF DELIVERY 17.0 HOURS	NAV PLANT REP SIK STFD FL
02-05-70	AIRCRAFT ARRIVED THIS STATION THIS DATE ACFT HRS 42.5	39 ARRWG DET 4 APO 09023
23-03-73	MRH A-2-153 INSTALLED AT 860.0 ACFT HRS	39 ARRWG DET 4 APO 09023
17-12-74	MRH A-2-153 REMOVED AT 1311.2 ACFT HRS	39 ARRWG DET 4 APO 09023
16-07-75	AIRCRAFT TRANSFERED TO SUFFOLK CO APRT WESTHAMPTON BEACH, N Y AT AIRCRAFT TIME 1493.2 HRS	102 ARRSQ NYANG SCAPNY
07-01-77	TCTO 1H-3-676 DATED 03-01-77 INSPECTION OF COUPLING ASSY MULTIPLE DISC ACFT HRS 1687.3 C/W	102 ARRSQ NYANG SCAPNY
07-07-77	TCTO 1H-3-678 DATED 01-06-77 INSPECTION FOR ADEQUATE DRAIN HOLES IN RADAR NAV. COMPARTMENT FUSELAGE STATION 346.5 TO 379.6 C/W	102 ARRSQ NYANG SCAPNY
07-03-78	TCTO 1H-3-668 INSTALLATION OF IMPROVED MAIN GEAR BOX OIL FILTER BOWLS	102 ARRSQ NYANG SCAPNY
16-12-80	COMPLYIED WITH CORROSION PREVENTATIVE OF UNDER FLOOR WORK SPECIFICATION NO. WR/H-3/80-5	NARF PNCLA FL
12-01-81	SPECIAL ONE TIME INSPECTION AS PER TWX P 172210Z NOV 80, INSPECTION OF AN-837-4 FITTING FOR PROPER OIL PASSAGE WAS ACCOMPLISHED AT 2473.1 A/C HRS	102 ARRSQ NYANG SCAPNY
30-07-84	MANUFACTURE & INST PILOT CONSOLE COVER IAW SUGGESTION NGB CA83-239 C/W	106 CAMS NYANG SCAPNY
17-10-84	MRB 61M1003-1339 INSTALLED ON ROTOR HEAD AT 3641.7 A/C HOURS	106 CAMS NYANG SCAPNY
07-11-85	MGB A1C364-124 INSTALLED ON ACFT	106 CAMS NYANG SCAPNY

APPENDIX # 9

HH-3E 69-05798 SIKORSKY A/C, STRATFORD CONN. DELIVERED 30-01-70

DATE	REMARKS	ORGANIZATION
05-09-86	MRB 61M1003-1339 REMOVED AT 4073.2 A/C HOURS	106 CAMS NYANG SCAPNY
18-05-87	TRB 61VR4814-4715 INSTALLED ON ACFT AT 4242.9 HOURS	106 CAMS NYANG SCAPNY
22-06-87	A/C HH-3E 69-05798 ARRIVED THIS STATION FOR DMISA NAVAIR 86 038FTG WITH 4259.3 ACFT HRS ACI WR/H-3/3/7/1 WAS COMPLETED 18-11-87	NADEP PNCLA FL
06-06-90	ACFT RECEIVED THIS STATION AT 4852.1 A/C HOURS	71 SOS DM AFB AZ
07-09-90	AUTOMATED HISTORY ESTABLISHED	71 SOS DM AFB AZ
07-09-91	REMOVED SLEEVE AND SPINDLE ASSY ON MRH SN A2125 AC HRS 5192.6	71 SOS DM AFB AZ
21-01-92	INSTALLED SLEEVE AND SPINDLE SN F-1468 BLACK POSITION AT 5353.8 HRS.	71 SOS DM AFB AZ
19-04-92	MRB 61M1003-1339 REMOVED AT 5416.9 A/C HOURS	71 SOS DM AFB AZ
12-09-92	HELICOPTERS LAST FLIGHT WITH THIS UNIT AT 5495.9 HOURS	71 SOS DM AFB AZ

GLOSSARY OF TERMS

ABWG	AIR BASE WING
A/C	AIRCAFT
ACI	ANLYTICAL CONDITION INSPECTION
ACW	
AGE	NUMBER OF YEARS ON A/C AT LAST READING
AFB	AIR FORCE BASE
AFRES	AIR FORCE RESERVES
AGS	
AIR TIME	NUMBER OF TOTAL FLYING HOURS ON AIRCRAFT
AL	ALABAMA
AK	ALASKA
AMARC	A/C MAINTENANCE AND REGENERATION CENTER
ANG	AIR NATIONAL GUARD
ANGB	AIR NATIONAL GUARD BASE
APO	
ARG	AIR RESCUE GROUP
ARRG	AEROSPACE RESCUE AND RECOVERY GROUP
ARRS	AEROSPACE RESCUE AND RECOVERY SQUADRON
ARS	AIR RESCUE SQUADRON
ATTW	
AZ	ARIZONA
CA	CALIFORNIA
CAMS	
C/C	CREW CHIEF
CCTW	
CH-3B	CARGO HELICOPTER-3 MODEL
CH-3C	CARGO HELICOPTER-3 MODEL
CH-3E	CARGO HELICOPTER-3 MODEL
CMS	
CO	COMPANY
COMP WG	COMPOSITE WING
CRS	
C/W	COMPLYED WITH
DATE	02-15-91 MONTH-DAY-YEAR
DEL.	DELIVERY
DIR	DIRECTOR
DMISA NAVAIR 76 26BFTG	
DM AFB AZ	DAVIS-MONTHAN AIR FORCE BASE ARIZONIA
FL	FLORIDA
FLD	FIELD
FMS	FIELD MAINTENANCE SQUADRON
FPO	
GA	GEORGIA
HH-3E	CARGO HELICOPTER-3 MODEL
IAW	IN ACCORDANCE WITH
IN	INCH
INSP	INSPECTION
IRAN	
LBS	POUNDS
LOCATION	BASES WHERE THE HELICOPTER WAS STATIONED

LTD	LIMITED
MAG	
MAT	MAINTENANCE
MAT	MATERIAL
MASS	
MD	MARYLAND
MDS	MODEL DESIGN SERIES
MGT	MANAGEMENT
MI	MICHIGAN
MSGT	MASTER SARGENT
NARF-PNCLA	NAVAL AIR REWORK FACILITY NAS PENSICOLA FL
NAS	NAVAL AIR STATION
NAVAVNDEPOT PNCLA	NAVAL AVIATION DEPOT PENSICOLA FL
NAV PLANT REP SIK STFD	
NGB	NATIONAL GUARD BUREAU
NM	NEW MEXICO
NY	NEW YORK
NYANG	NEW YORK AIR NATIONAL GUARD
OCM	
OMRON	
OR	OREGON
PI	PHILIPINES
PIA	PORTLAND INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT
PRANGED	CRASHED
R P	REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPINES
R W R W	RESCUE & WEATHER RECONNAISSANCE WING
SCAPNY	SUFFOLK COUNTY AIRPORT NEW YORK
SANGB	SELFRIDGE AIR NATIONAL GUARD BASE
S.E.A.	SOUTH EAST ASIA
SERIAL #	AIRCRAFT SERIAL NUMBER (TAIL NUMBER)
SOMS	
S.O.G.	SPECIAL OPERATIONS GROUP
S.O.S.	SPECIAL OPERATIONS SQUADRON
S.O.WG	SPECIAL OPERATIONS WING
SPOP WG	
SRW	
STD	STANDARD
TASS	
TAW	TACTICAL AIRLIFT WING
TAWC	TACTICAL AIR WARFARE CENTER
TDG	TACTICAL DRONE GROUP 07-76 TO
TDS	TACTICAL DRONE SQUADRON
TES	TEST EVALUATION SERVICE
USAF	UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
UT	UTAH
WG	WING

CH-3 & HH-3 HELICOPTERS THAT WERE DESTROYED OR ARE MISSING

CH-3B 62-12577	?
CH-3E 62-12579	S.E.A. 06-10-69
CH-3E 62-12582	S.E.A. 17-01-69
CH-3E 63-09678	S.E.A. 30-12-67
CH-3E 63-09681	S.E.A. 13-08-70
CH-3E 63-09682	S.E.A. 20-02-69
CH-3E 63-09685	S.E.A. 06-11-65
CH-3E 63-09689	?
CH-3E 64-14227	?
CH-3E 64-14229	?
CH-3E 64-14231	?
CH-3E 64-14236	S.E.A. 23-06-67
CH-3E 64-14237	S.E.A. 26-06-69
CH-3E 65-15691	S.E.A. 27-06-69
CH-3E 65-15694	?
CH-3E 66-13288	S.E.A. 03-02-69
CH-3E 66-13289	?
CH-3E 66-12394	S.E.A. 03-03-68
CH-3E 66-13295	S.E.A. 23-05-68
CH-3E 67-14702	S.E.A. 15-01-69
CH-3E 67-14721	?
HH-3E 64-14233	S.E.A NO DATE
HH-3E 65-12778	S.E.A. 20-10-66
HH-3E 65-12779	S.E.A. 06-02-67

CH-3 & HH-3 HELICOPTERS THAT WERE DESTROYED OR ARE MISSING

HH-3E 65-12782 S.E.A. 05-10-68

HH-3E 65-12785 S.E.A. 11-11-70 SON TAY PRISON

HH-3E 65-12786 ?

HH-3E 66-13278 ?

HH-3E 66-13279 S.E.A. 09-11-67

HH-3E 66-13280 3rd ARRG, 37 ARRS DA NANG VIETNAM S.E.A. 15-04-70

HH-3E 66-13281 S.E.A. 24-10-69

HH-3E 66-13282 S.E.A. 20-10-68

HH-3E 66-13283 S.E.A. 27-08-67

HH-3E 66-13287 ?

HH-3E 67-14710 S.E.A. 06-06-68

H-3 LOSSES TAIL # NOT KNOWN

1980	1550 CCTW KIRTLAND AFB NM	ROLLED DOWN HILL
1986	129 ARRS NAS MOFFETT FIELD CA	LOST POWER HARD LANDING NEAR MONMOTH CA
	129 ARRS NAS MOFFETT FIELD CA	CRASHED ON RANGE GEORGE AFB CA

UNITS WHO ARE FLYING OR HAVE FLOWN CH/HH-3 HELICOPTERS

1st HELI SQ	ANDREWS AFB MD	
1st OMS	FORBES FIELD AFB KAN	
1 SOS	CLARK AFB R P	APO 96274
1 SOWG	HURLBERT FIELD FL	
3 ARRG	TAN SON NHUT VIETNAM	
3 ARRGw DET 14		APO 96307
11 CAMS	McCELLAN AFB CA	
11 TDS	DAVIS-MONTHAN AFB AZ	
17 SOS	KADENA AFB OKINAWA	APO 96239
20 HELI SQ	TAN SON NHUT VIETNAM	
20 HELI SQ	UDORN ROYAL THAI AFB THIALAND	APO 96237
20 SOS	UDORN ROYAL THAI AFB THIALAND	APO 96237
21 HELI SQ	NAKHON PHANOM ROYAL THAI AFB THAILAND	APO 96310
21 SOS	NAKHON PHANOM ROYAL THAI AFB THAILAND	APO 96310
21 COMP WG		APO 98742
22 TDS	DAVIS-MONTHAN AFB AZ	
31 ARRS	CLARK AFB R P	APO 96274
33 ARRS	OSAN KOREA	APO 96570
37 ARRS	DA NANG VIETNAM	APO 96337
37 ARRS	UDORN ROYAL THAI AFB THAILAND	APO 96237
38 ARS	NAKHON PHANOM ROYAL THAI AFB THAILAND	APO 96310
38 ARRS	NAKHON PHANOM ROYAL THAI AFB THAILAND	APO 96310
38 ARRS	TAN SON NHUT VIETNAM	APO
38 ARRS	KADENE AFB OKINAWA	APO 96239

UNITS WHO ARE FLYING OR HAVE FLOWN CH/HH-3 HELICOPTERS

39 ARRS	TUY HOA VIETNAM	APO
39 ARRWG DET 2		APO 09020
39 ARRWG DET 6	LORING AFB MAINE	04750
39 ARRWG DET 14		APO 09023
39 ARRWG DET 14		FPO NY 09571
39 ARRW DET 15	PATRICK AFB FL	
40 ARRS DET 1	NAKHON PHANOM ROYAL THAI AFB THAILAND	APO 96310
40 ARRS DET 5	TACTICAL AIR WARFARE CENTER EGLIN AFB FL	
41 ARRS	PATRICK AFB FL	
41 ARRW	HQ McCELLAN AFB CA PACAF	
41 RWRWG DET 1	TYNDALL AFB FL	
41 RWRW DET 13	OSAN KOREA	APO 96570
41 RWRW DET 15	PATRICK AFB FL	
51 ABWG	OSAN KOREA	APO 96570
51 COMP	KADENA AFB OKINAWA	APO 96570
54 ARRSQ DET 2	LORING AFB ME	04750
56 ACW	NAKHON PHANOM ROYAL THAI AFB THAILAND	APO 96310
56 ARRS	KELAVIK ICELAND	APO 09673-2055
56 SPOP WG	NAKHON PHANOM ROYAL THAI AFB THAILAND	APO 96310
57 ARRS	WHEELUS FIELD LIBYA	
58 ARRS	EGLIN AFB FL	
67 ARRS	RAF WOODBRIDGE ENGLAND	
67 ARRS DET 14	KELAVIK ICELAND	FPO NY 09571-2055
71 ARRS	ELMONDORF AFB AK	
71 SOS	DAVIS-MONTHAN AFB AZ	

UNITS WHO ARE FLYING OR HAVE FLOWN CH/HH-3 HELICOPTERS

89 MAG	ANDREWS AFB MD	
100 SRW	DAVIS-MONTHAN AFB AZ	
100 SRW DET 10	DA NANG VIETNAM	APO 96377
100 SRW OL RC	OSAN KOREA	APO 96570
102 ARRSQ	SUFFOLK ANGB NY	
106 ARG	SUFFOLK ANGB NY	
106 CAMS	SUFFOLK ANGB NY	
129 ARRS	HOWARD ANGB CA	
129 ARG	NAS MOFFETT FIELD CA	
301 ARRS	HOMESTEAD AFB FL	
302 SOS	LUKE AFB AZ	
304 ARRS	PORTLAND IAP OR	
305 ARRS	SELFRIDGE ANGB MI	
310 ARRS	HOMESTEAD AFB FL	
341 SMW	MALSTROM AFB MT (SAC)	
343 CRS	ELMONDORF AFB ALASKA	
343 TFW	ELMONDORF AFB ALASKA	
355 TFW	DAVIS-MONTHAN AFB AZ	
374 TAW	CLARK AFB R P	APO 96274
405 FW	CLARK AFB R P	APO 96274
432 TDG	DAVIS-MONTHAN AFB AZ	
432 AGS	DAVIS-MONTHAN AFB AZ	
551 EWCW	OTIS AFB MA	

UNITS WHO ARE FLYING OR HAVE FLOWN CH/HH-3 HELICOPTERS

616 CAMS	ELMONDORF AFB AK	
703 SOS	SHAW AFB SC	
703 TASS	SHAW AFB SC	
939 ARRG	PORTLAND IAP OR	
939 CAMS	PORTLAND IAP OR	
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1370th OMS	TURNER AFB ALBANY GA	
1550 ATTW	HILL AFB UT	
1550 ATTWG	KIRTLAND AFB NM	
1550 CCTW	KIRTLAND AFB NM	
1550 FMS	KIRTLAND AFB NM	
3750 CMS	SHEPPARD AFB TX	
4080 SW	DM AFB AZ	
4507 CAMS	SHAW, AFB SC	
4950 TW	WRIGHT-PATTERSON AFB OH	
6510 TES WG	EDWARDS AFB CA	
6514 TES WG	HILL AFB UT	
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IN THIS ISSUE: SB-2 BOMBERS IN SPAIN ● BEN HOWARD'S DGA FAMILY ● THE NORTHROP XP-56
BRISTOL SCOUTS IN WWI ● GREEN HORNETS AND BLACK PONIES IN VIETNAM ● RESTORED P-47S

HOW THE "GREEN HORNETS" OF THE 20TH SPECIAL OPERATIONS SQUADRON FLEW

COVERTLY TO CAMBODIA



THE GENEVA accords of 1954 forbade the US and its SEATO allies to station forces in Laos, and the 1962 Geneva accords reaffirmed the US observance of Laos' and Cambodia's neutrality. However, conflict within Laos brought a marked US response — confining the growing guerilla war inside South Vietnam's borders proved to be an impossible task without conducting operations within neutral regions. Often, these activities erupted into major combat actions which proved difficult to suppress from a watching world. Eventually, President Nixon would admit that the US was, in fact, conducting warfare outside of Vietnam in response to the increased communist use of Laos and Cambodia for bases and supply lines into South Vietnam.

As early as 1958, the South Vietnamese government mounted unconventional warfare forays against the communists as a countermeasure. In 1960, the CIA received authorisation to operate in Laos to strengthen Laotian forces, but these efforts were largely unsuccessful and later that year, members of the Special Forces entered Laos. The CIA received further permission in 1961 to assist the South Vietnamese in conducting covert operations in North Vietnam and Laos — and the South Vietnamese government added Cambodia to these arrangements, for good measure. Also that year, the US Air Force established several bases in northern Thailand, in conjunction with SEATO exercises designed to display a show of force in the region. Sixteen Sikorsky H-34 helicopters were among the materials delivered to these bases, for onward distribution to Laotian forces to help prevent communist domination.

The Vietnam war continues to provide aviation historians with a variety of highly interesting accounts of the many units that operated covertly throughout the conflict. Noteworthy among them was the 20th Special Operations Squadron (SOS), also known as the "Green Hornets", which had the distinction of being the only combat helicopter squadron in the US Air Force. Officially released versions of the Green Hornets' history claim that the unit engaged in classified psychological warfare (psywar) operations. Relying upon available references and the personal accounts of participants, Wayne Mutza shows that this was not quite the truth. In reality, the 20th SOS served mainly as the exclusive air arm of Special Forces (SF, "Green Berets") units that conducted surreptitious operations inside the borders of nations declared off limits by virtue of neutrality.

In February 1964, Military Assistance Command — Vietnam (MACV) initiated its Studies and Observations Group (better known as Special Operations Group or SOG) to handle the broad mission of clandestine operations in the denied areas of Laos and Cambodia — and a few months later, such missions into Laos gained President Johnson's approval. The stage was thus set for what would become a vast secret network of highly trained teams which penetrated Laos, Cambodia (after early 1970), and even North Vietnam. These projects, undertaken by SF under the MACV-SOG umbrella, were primarily for reconnaissance, but also included POW rescue, downed aircrew recovery, assassinations, bomb damage assessment (BDA), prisoner snatches, sabotage and tapping enemy communications. Missions were often launched from FOBs (Forward Operating Bases) in Vietnam and US air bases in Thailand.

Air support for SOG operations initially took the form of VNAF H-34s, US Army UH-1s and USAF fixed-wing aircraft. Air transport in Laos was accomplished by civilian contract, mainly the CIA air arm known as Air America. Later in the war, USAF helicopters regularly flew missions in Laos to augment Air America and the often inadequate helicopter forces of the Laotian government. In most SOG operations,

(Heading photo) A Bell UH-1F of the 20th Special Operations Squadron near Tan Son Nhut Air Base, Vietnam, in September 1968. (Below) Another 1968 photo of a 20th SOS UH-1F.





This Bell UH-1P (65-7935) has a universal mount for its cabin gun but without the dust shield on the outer face. The Sagami mount is hinge-fitted to the forward end of the universal mount. The boom marking includes a Mexican character "swatting" the hornet. (Photo via Bob Chenoweth.)


helicopters proved superior to fixed-wing transports, pushing the transport helicopter to the forefront in the special air warfare scenario.


Organisation and background

The Air Force had recognised the helicopter's worth during the 'fifties, when it formed a transport helicopter force. Disbanded in 1956 when deemed unnecessary, this force gave way to helicopter airlift provided by ground forces. It wasn't until 1962 that the Air Force again displayed an inclination towards possessing an autonomous transport helicopter capability. This recommendation, based on the worsening situation in Vietnam, stemmed from the formation of a counter-insurgency (COIN) force trained specifically for night penetrations and support of SF and friendly guerillas in South East Asia. Designated the 4400th Combat Crew Training Squadron (CCTS), and nicknamed "Jungle Jim", the unit was replaced by the Special Air Warfare Center (SAWC) in April 1962, which became responsible for training the "Air Commandos". The SAWC yielded the 606th Air Commando Squadron (ACS), which was sent to Nakhon Phanom (NKP) Air Base in Thailand in 1966. This was a composite unit designed to augment and train the Thais in COIN activities, although little training was actually done. Among the unit's aircraft inventory were a number of new Bell UH-1F "Huey" helicopters which performed a variety of missions in Thailand and Laos, including civil action and support of the Thai Army and Border Patrol Police. Some cargo swapping and a few extra marks on the map enabled the helicopters to trade missions with Air America — crews in civilian clothing often flying "sterile" missions into Laos. The US, convinced that reports and some radar tracks of unidentified aircraft over Thailand indicated the presence of North Vietnamese intruders, beefed up its night intercept capabilities, using 606th helicopters as training targets. While in Thailand, the Huey pilots heard reports of communist helicopters resupplying troops in northern Thailand at night without lights. One exuberant Huey pilot wanted to intercept them and then to fly alongside and shoot them down or fly above them and drop chains into their rotors!

When the US government decided that the Thais should handle their own security duties, the 606th Hueys were transferred to Vietnam in June 1967, where they joined the Sikorsky CH-3Cs, dubbed "Big Charlies", of the 20th Helicopter Squadron at Tan Son Nhut Air Base. Established on 8 October 1965, the 20th Helicopter Squadron used 14 CH-3Cs for artillery support, medevac and recovery of downed light aircraft. Two of these aircraft were moved to NKP in


(Below left) A 1969 photo at Binh Thuy shows the extensively reworked engine exhaust area of a UH-1F. Notice the screened engine air inlets and baggage compartment. The "Green Hornet" in this case is black, and the warning arrow to the engine exhaust is red. (Below right) A close-up of the UH-1P '935 showing the XM-156 universal mount with MA 4A bomb rack and M60 machine gun on the swing-out Sagami mount.








(Above) A "slick" UH-1F refuelling at Ban Me Thuot in March 1968. (Photo Bob Steinbrunn.) (Below) UH-1P at Tuy Hoa in August 1970, with mini-guns fixed to fire forwards, under control of the pilot. Notice the armoured pilot seat and twin UHF/VHF antennae. (Gene Cole.)



February 1966, where they formed the "Pony Express" detachment conducting covert missions in Laos and Thailand. In June, the 20th transferred to Nha Trang, where its rôle in unconventional warfare gained momentum after a brief training period and link-up with SF. Possibly the reason behind the UH-1 move to Vietnam was that the Air Force contributed nothing and the Army therefore wanted and expected to have all the available UH-1s.

Also located at Nha Trang was the parent unit, the 14th Air Commando Wing, which comprised 12 special operations squadrons, of which only the 20th used helicopters. UH-1 strength was brought up to 15 aircraft in June 1967 and a segment of the unit was re-established at Udorn Air Base in Thailand in May 1968 with several UH-1s from the parent unit soon added.

(Below) The Kontum Forward Operating Base (FOB) in March 1968. This was a primary launching base for Special Forces teams operating into Laos and Cambodia. The nine Hueys visible were from the 189th AHC, on rotational duty to assist cross-border operation. (Photo Bob Steinbrunn.)





During a maintenance overhaul, the UH-1P serial 63-13163 was repainted in the USAF's standard SEA camouflage scheme, but with the darker shade of green omitted. It is seen here at Cam Ranh Bay in 1971 — compare with the regular three-tone scheme shown below. (Photo Tom Hansen.)



(Above) A twin-engined UH-1N version of the Huey at Cam Ranh Bay in late 1971, carrying LAU-59/B rocket pods, with mini-guns stowed in the cargo cabin. (Photo Tom Hansen.) (Below) An SOG team leaves a "Green Hornet" UH-1N after a mission. This aircraft is equipped with the XM-23 system which utilises M60D machine guns on pintle post mounts. (Photo via Bob Chenoweth.)






(Above) One of the "Green Hornet" UH-1Ps in February 1971 with the GAU-2B/A mini-guns and later style bomb racks. (Photo Jim Ball.) (Below) One of the original 20th SOS pilots, Maj Tom Garcia (lower left) with a typical SOG team (four indigenous Vietnamese and two US personnel) alongside a "slick" UH-1F. Rope ladders and body armour plates are visible on the cabin floor, and the infantry-type M60s fastened in the doorway have metal rods attached to the barrels to prevent them being fired into the aircraft. (Photo Tom Garcia.)



(Below) A Bell UH-1P with transmission cowling removed, showing a seven-shot LAU-59/A rocket pod suspended on an XM-156 mount. Barely visible is the 0·30-in (7,62-mm) mini-gun stowed in the cabin. (Photo Bob Chenoweth.)



Throughout its lifetime in SEA, the 20th SOS was frequently segmented into detachments which operated from locations such as Kontum and Ban Me Thuot, thereby making it difficult to ascertain exact dates that aircraft operated from certain areas. For some time, the Huey section of the 20th was called "E Flight". On 1 August 1968, the 20th Helicopter Squadron was renamed the 20th Special Operations Squadron, concurrent with the 14th ACW redesignation to 14th Special Operations Wing (SOW). The 20th was relocated to Tuy Hoa AB on 5 September 1969 while the 14th SOW moved to Phan Rang AB. In September 1970 the "Green Hornets" made a final move, this time to Cam Ranh Bay, where the unit remained until de-activation in March 1972.

Some of the pilots who were tasked for duty with the 606th ACS at NKP, Thailand, for six months, volunteered to go with the unit to Vietnam. The original six of these were sent to Nha Trang in spring 1966, while vacancies were filled with Thai-based CH-3 pilots whose lack of Huey experience sometimes compromised high risk missions. The UH-1 pilots were highly experienced, having flown UH-1Fs at missile bases in the US. The 20th SOS lost its first pilot KIA (killed in action) in the first few weeks of operations, on 31 March 1967.

In December 1967, a second Sikorsky unit, the 21st Helicopter Squadron, using the improved CH-3E, set up shop at NKP, from where it placed seismic sensors, conducted roadwatch infiltrations, and later launched team insertions for MACV-SOG. In the summer of 1969, the "Pony Express" CH-3s were absorbed into the 21st, while the UH-1s assigned to the unit joined the others with the 20th in Vietnam.

Missions of the 20th SOS

After the first helicopter infiltration in May 1965, SOG rapidly expanded its area of operations during 1966 and '67 — so far, in fact, that the reconnaissance teams soon could no longer use their maps showing borders deliberately positioned farther west. By 1967, nearly 300 patrols had been launched into Laos, as well as more than 80 larger forces to "exploit" targets uncovered by the reconnaissance teams. Early that year, MACV overrode the US government policy of not violating Cambodia's neutrality and began missions across its border. Intelligence gathering "across the fence" remained of paramount importance and soon became standard procedure.

Initially, the "Green Hornets" helicopters were pressed into service, along with VNAF H-34s of the 219th Helicopter Squadron and Army UH-1s, as troop carriers and gunships for reconnaissance teams. The 20th SOS quickly adapted to its new COIN rôle and soon became the preferred support unit for SF operations across the borders. Rapport between the two was keen, mainly because of the high risk of operations, which required precision teamwork and speed. During the greater part of its career, the speciality and primary mission of the 20th SOS was infiltration and exfiltration of SF teams in an operational area in Laos known as "Prairie Fire", which covered the vast Ho Chi Minh Trail network. Missions into Cambodia were called "Daniel Boone". All personnel involved in missions functioned "sterile", meaning that gear, weapons, clothing and even the helicopters, in the event of capture, could not be linked to US origins, lest an international incident were created with evidence of warfare being conducted beyond neutral boundaries. "Black" became a byword, used in reference to mission details; "black" missions were supported by unmarked aircraft called "Blackbirds", etc. Although Washington tacitly approved, the mounting of such missions was publicly denied by the US and South Vietnamese governments. To this day, the dilemma of POW/MIAs in Laos remains a sensitive issue.

The first SOG teams in Laos quickly wore thin the element of surprise. As missions escalated in number and strength, the teams often became the prey in deadly manhunts. Missions were assigned by MACV-SOG and usually were flown by four



The UH-1P shown in close-up at the foot of the opposite page is here seen receiving further attention from a ground crewman. The rocket pod, stowed mini-gun and dual UHF/VHF antenna are all visible. (Photo via Bob Chenoweth.)

gunships, a command aircraft, a rescue aircraft and the reconnaissance team transport. Later, smaller flights of four UH-1s were used, and these always worked in pairs to cover one another. On an intelligence mission, the idea was to insert the team as unobtrusively as possible, have them do the work and get out again in one piece. Initiating, encouraging, or in any way provoking contact with the enemy was a bad idea, since the odds heavily favoured the enemy. Getting the teams in was relatively easy, as there was time for careful planning and aerial reconnaissance of the LZ (landing zone). Usually consisting of two Americans and four indigenous troops, the teams spent a maximum of five days in the jungle. While on patrol, they had an aptitude for attracting trouble and the extraction often became a big production. Once the team was "in", it was standard procedure for the same helicopters to stand by at the nearest base for the extraction. An FAC (Forward Air Controller) usually worked the mission and, if necessary, could muster up heavy air support to cover a pick-up.

"Green Hornets" flew in loose formation, with the gunships providing cover. To mask an insertion, they touched down in several locations, with only one aircraft depositing a team. Another technique was to have a flight in trail formation flying low over the LZ — the lead Huey then dropped down to

UH-1P 63-13163 enjoys the relative luxury of a hardened apron. As other photos show, the Hueys often operated from unprepared surfaces and were habitually maintained under open skies. (Photo via Bob Chenoweth.)





A UH-1N operating at Cam Ranh Bay in 1971 reveals flat armour plating installed in the chin bubble. (Photo Tom Hansen.)

deposit the team while the others flew slowly overhead. As they passed, the insertion aircraft lifted to rejoin the procession at the rear, giving the impression that the flight had not altered its pattern. Secrecy was not essential on withdrawals, so the gunships orbited the LZ to attract and suppress enemy fire. Rarely was an LZ large enough for the helicopter to land for the pick-up. The alternative second choice method was to hover between 10 and 15 ft (3-4,6 m) and drop rope ladders. The method most often used involved the "McGuire Rig", which allowed the helicopter to pluck the men out of the jungle. It consisted of triple ropes, each with trapeze wrist locks, or fastened to the soldier's "Stabo Harness". The troops dangled 120 ft (37 m) below the aircraft, their hands free for firing weapons. Night infiltration and pick-up missions were extremely dangerous and performed only in emergencies, when possible aided by flareships.

High drama was often prevalent during the "Green Hornets" tenure in SEA. The mettle inherent in the 20th SOS crews was typified by the actions of 1st Lt James P Fleming on 26 November 1965, when he rescued a seven-man team under withering enemy fire. One gunship was shot down in the mêlée and Fleming was awarded the Medal of Honor. The next day his wingman was shot down, but Fleming and his crew rescued the occupants, earning him the Air Force Cross. Fleming had flown his combat qualification check ride only 12 days before the mission.


On 2 April 1968, SF MSGT Roy Benavidez jumped aboard a "Green Hornet" Huey preparing to depart on a mission to rescue a reconnaissance team pinned down near Loc Ninh. The first Huey was shot down attempting the pick-up and another was successful but not before a pilot and co-pilot were killed. Benavidez, who was severely wounded, was awarded the Medal of Honor for his actions. During a mission on 19 February 1968, a UH-1F was shot down attempting a team rescue. SF SSGT Fred W Zabitosky, though badly wounded, rescued the co-pilot, earning him the Medal of Honor. Because of the very nature of its exploits, the 20th SOS lost 19 Hueys in SEA, 13 of them shot down. One was lost north of Nha Trang when it was hit in flight by a 105-mm round. Five aboard were killed, reportedly including the squadron commander and a

These UH-1Ns are shown operating with the 24th Composite Wing (eventual successor to the 20th SOS) at Howard AFB in the Canal Zone. They have high-visibility markings and XM-94 20-mm grenade launchers mated with LAU-59/B rocket pods on the hardpoints. (USAF photo.)





(Above) A 1982 illustration of a UH-1N of the 20th SOS at Hurlburt Field, Florida, showing an unusual mottled colour scheme resulting from the application of a three-tone camouflage over light grey. Stencil-type national insignia are in black. (Right) LAU-59/B rocket pods on the UH-1N, 10 in (25,4 cm) longer than the LAU-59/A version. (Below) A pair of UH-1Ns over Hurlburt in May 1983. (USAF photos.)



civilian technical representative from Bell Helicopter. Five helicopters were lost (four by enemy fire) during 1967-68 alone, and the unit fell upon even harder times when five aircraft were lost to enemy fire during the first four months of 1969, an undisclosed number of crewmen being killed or wounded.

Cross-border operations peaked in 1969 and early 1970, but further losses and maintenance problems forced an end to such work. Missions ended on 1 July 1970, when the political decision was made to cease US troop lifts into Cambodia. The "Green Hornets" continued gunship support for the VNAF H-34s and occasionally made emergency pick-ups. During the



summer of 1971, several troop carrier flights of eight aircraft were made from Kontum to DaNang. During 1972, US helicopters flew only occasional infiltration missions and only on special request. In the second half of 1968 alone, 20th SOS members earned numerous awards for heroism, including six Silver Stars and 11 Purple Hearts. During 1967-68, six crewmen earned the Air Force Cross, and the squadron earned the Presidential Unit Citation in 1967 and multiple Air Force Outstanding Unit Awards.

The Air Force Huey

The mount of the "Green Hornets" was the Bell UH-1 series "Huey" helicopter (officially, the Iroquois), which had been selected by the Air Force in 1963 for missile site support duties. Designated the UH-1F (originally H-48 in the USAF designation system), and based on the Bell Model 204B, the aircraft was built to accept the GE T58-GE-3 engine already in use in USAF Sikorsky CH-3 helicopters, replacing the Lycoming turboshaft in Army versions of the UH-1. The driveshaft of the T58 ran aft, necessitating several engineering changes to be made. The engine was mounted backwards, allowing the driveshaft to fit into the transmission with the exhaust rerouted to the fuselage right side. The GE engine was unreliable but very powerful, requiring the installation of a step-down gearbox to decrease rpm. Indicative of the T58's power was an airlift by a 606th ACS UH-1F of 34 Thai flood victims, plus the crew of three! This standing record was achieved with the pilot performing an apparently routine lift-off. The powerful T58 permitted a favourite stunt performed by 20th SOS pilots, which was to lift straight up to 200 ft (61 m) and dive forward into a take-off attitude. UH-1Fs originally featured the open bell-mouth shaped engine air inlet; however, for use in SEA, this was changed to a set of removable screened air inlet filter sections. Like the 204B, the F model Huey had a 2-ft (61-cm) tail boom extension, permitting the installation of a baggage compartment. This compartment was inconveniently located directly below the exhaust outlet, because Bell fitted it before the Air Force decided which engine to use. The 1,272 shp (951 kW) power plant drove a 48-ft (14,6-m) main rotor with 21-in (53-cm) chord, enabling a gross weight of 9,000 lb (4 082 kg) to be used. UH-1F deliveries totalled 120 aircraft through 1967, with follow-on versions designated the TH-1F built during 1967 for instrument and rescue training.

The Air Force wasted no time in sending its UH-1Fs to SEA, the first Hueys serving with the 606th ACS in Thailand in 1966. The exact number of Air Force Hueys used in SEA is unknown, but reliable sources and photographic evidence indicate about 20 to 25 aircraft. A typical crew comprised a pilot, co-pilot and two gunners who doubled as crew chiefs. Air Force UH-1s in SEA wore the typical USAF tri-tone paint scheme with light grey undersides, but during maintenance overhauls, some Hueys were repainted with only the lighter shade of green. Markings were limited to simply a flat black serial number on the tail fin — standard practice having the last three digits of this number applied to the nose panel, also in flat black. Located on each side of the tail boom was a large stencilled hornet, usually in green and facing forwards, but at times black or facing to the rear. While the unit was at Tuy Hoa, the hornet began to appear everywhere, including on aircraft from other units. Personal markings were used on the Hueys, though not in abundance. On rare occasions, the USAF Hueys were observed in SEA with a small national insignia on the forward tail boom.

To fulfil the two-fold mission of transport and gun support, some UH-1Fs were modified shortly after the "Green Hornets" began operations in Vietnam. These helicopters were fitted with hardpoints, armour and crew-operated weapons. Eventually, some 20 aircraft were so modified and redesignated UH-1Ps. The standard weapons load on the "P" model comprised a pair of LAU-59/A (XM-157A) 2·75-in (70-cm) seven-shot rocket pods and two hand-operated GAU-2B/A (XM-93) 0·30-in (7,62-mm) pintle-mounted mini-guns. These gun systems were located in each cargo doorway and could be fixed forward for firing by the pilot. Their rate of fire was adjustable at either 2,000 or 4,000 rounds per minute. They could also be pivoted to a stowed position inside the aircraft. Fastened to each gun was a flex chute through which expended brass was diverted down and away from the aircraft. Some of the 20th SOS Hueys had the mini-guns fitted right from the start of operations. The rocket pods were attached to universal mounts on the aft hardpoints. Initially, the mounts used were the XM-156 type, familiar on Army Huey gunships, but these were later replaced in favour of a more compact mount of the type seen on US Marine Corps' Hueys.

UH-1Fs used as team transports were called "slicks", a term originated by Army Huey crews in Vietnam to describe a UH-1 lacking heavy armament systems. The UH-1F and P designations were used interchangeably within the unit as the number of Hueys modified with hardpoints increased. During the early years of operations, a number of 20th SOS Hueys also featured a Sagami mount, which incorporated a standard infantry model M60 machine gun affixed to a swing-out post arrangement. The Sagami was used on gunships as well as "slicks", but most of the latter featured M60s suspended from "bungee" cords in the cabin doorway. Fastened to the weapon's barrel was a long metal rod which prevented an over-zealous gunner from accidentally shooting into the aircraft. The guns were also fastened from below with a strap and were belt-fed through flexible ammunition chutes attached to containers fastened to the cabin floor.

SEA avionics were installed in the 20th SOS Hueys and many aircraft were seen with two VHF/UHF antennae on the cabin roof. All "Green Hornet" Hueys retained their cargo hooks, although these were rarely used. Passenger seats were not installed for the reconnaissance team missions — instead, crews frequently fastened lawn chairs to the cabin floor! In Vietnam, crews quickly adopted the practice of placing ceramic body armour plates in the nose "chin bubble" windows — gunners usually sat on them in the cargo area. While based in Thailand, the UH-1Fs also often displayed a placard in a bracket on the doorpost located between the pilot and cabin doors. The information on the placard depended on the cover story being used to explain a particular mission. Some titles used were "USAF, Thai Army, Lao Government", and even "Department of Health"!

At times, the 20th SOS was called upon to test new equipment. One example was a large infra-red searchlight tested while the UH-1s were part of the 606th ACS in Thailand. Later, in Vietnam, the unit tested a personnel detector, known as a "people sniffer", which detected chemical scents emitted by humans. Neither system was adopted for use by the unit. While at Nha Trang, two gunships flew "Firefly" missions over Binh Thuy for a time, but it's doubtful that they were fitted with searchlight equipment.

Twin Hueys arrive

In a move by the Air Force to upgrade its Hueys, the UH-1s of the 20th were gradually replaced by UH-1Ns after the unit moved to Cam Ranh Bay in late 1970. The UH-1N was well suited to the "Green Hornet" missions, having a greater payload capacity and twin engine safety. Initially developed by Bell for the Canadian Armed Forces, the twin-Huey was purchased simultaneously by the USAF and USN. Air Force N-model deliveries began in 1970, eventually totalling 79 aircraft. Power was supplied by two Pratt & Whitney PT6T-3 turbine engines having a total output of 1,800 shp (1 343 kW); the military engine designation was T400-CP-400. Maximum gross weight of the UH-1N was 10,000 lb (4 540 kg), maximum speed was 142 mph (228 km/h) and the maximum range at mission gross weight was 260 miles (418 km). The normal

passenger load was 14 plus pilot and 220 US gal (833 l) of fuel. Like their predecessors, the twin-engined Hueys of the 20th SOS were fitted with weapons systems — all gunship versions having GAU-2B/A and LAU-59/A weapons. In lieu of the mini-guns, the Ns could carry XM-94 rapid-fire 40-mm hand-operated grenade launchers. Installation, operation, and applicable systems paralleled those of the mini-guns. This system had an 800-round capacity, an effective range of 4,900 ft (1,500 m) and could fire 400 rpm. Often, a mini-gun was mounted in the left door and the 40-mm weapons in the right. The UH-1Ns arrived in Vietnam with flat black USAF titles and serial numbers on the tail fin, and standard camouflage, but the "USAF" and data block on the pilot's door were quickly oversprayed with flat black, and the hornet insignia added to the tail boom.

End of an era

Many lessons were learned from the SOG operations of the Vietnam war era. The full potential of these exploits was never realised, because of the inhibitions imposed by the US observance of the Geneva accords. America also feared that expanding the war into Laos and Cambodia would further involve North Vietnam or even China. Many of those lessons learned are formed into the doctrine of today's modern Special Operations Force (SOF).

From the end of the war until 1983, the 20th SOS continued to function at Hurlburt Field, Florida, as part of the 1st SOW of the Tactical Air Command (TAC). Aircraft used were the UH-1F, P, and N variants and CH-3Es, with the tail code "AO" carried in white on the tail fin, the serial number added on the tail boom in white, and small national insignia applied to the fuselage roof and belly, as well as the forward end of each tail boom side. Eventually, the older Hueys were phased out in favour of the twin-engined models and HH-53Cs replaced the CH-3s. Many of the older Hueys and CH-3s equipped reserve SOS units.

Today, Special Operations exists on a large scale, encompassing a mix of Air Force active, Reserve and Guard units flying a wide variety of special aircraft. Through a major reorganisation in March 1983, the 2nd Air Division was reactivated, becoming the focal point for all Air Force special operations activities. Through this reorganisation, the 20th SOS officially drew to a close its proud status as the only combat helicopter squadron in the Air Force. Its UH-1Ns were absorbed primarily into the 24th Composite Wing at Howard AFB in Panama. Besides this unit, other principal units of the 2nd Air Division include the 1st SOW, the USAF Special Operations School, and three squadrons at Hurlburt Field, two squadrons in the Philippines and one in Germany. Special emphasis is placed on unconventional warfare, using unique aircraft with special capabilities. In contrast to the days of Vietnam, a good proportion of helicopter missions are flown low level at night with night vision devices.

In an effort to upgrade the SOF to keep pace with the likelihood of low intensity conflict, the Army and Air Force signed an agreement on 22 May 1984 as an AirLand accord. The agreement provided that the Air Force transferred responsibility for providing helicopter support for SOF to the Army — this including about 100 Air Force helicopters dedicated to that mission. The changeover, occurring in July 1986, ended what proved to be a truly unique and colourful chapter in Air Force history. □

The author would like to thank the following for their contributions to this article: Dave Delisio, Tom Garcia, Craig Greenwood, Tom Hansen, James Ball, Gene Cole, Bell Helicopter and the USAF.

The UH-1N serial 96-6644 of the 20th SOS conducting open water training in June 1983. (USAF photo.)



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INSIDE STORY

With many of its files now declassified, the activities of MACV's Studies and Observation Group can finally be revealed.

By John B. Dwyer



The true story of SOG (the Military Assistance Command Vietnam's Studies and Observation Group) cannot be told fully," wrote Colonel John F. Sadler, SOG's last commander, in the preface to the organization's 1972 command history, "for this story is carried only in the hearts and minds of those who were SOG. Some of SOG's tasks were glamorous and self-rewarding, while others were tedious and uneventful; but all were essential to help stem the tide of communist aggression in southeast Asia. Professional, well-trained, exceptionally dedicated personnel have been the key to SOG's many successes. Five Medal of Honor awardees, two of whom made the supreme sacrifice, exemplify the type of men who made up SOG. The personnel of SOG are extremely proud of these men and the many other unsung and unheralded heroes who gave their lives."

While the full story of SOG will never be told due to the classification of some of its activities, much of the story can now finally be revealed as SOG's official records become declassified with the passing of time.

For example, on December 30, 1966, the Bright Light POW rescue operation code-named Cobra Tail was launched in Tay Ninh province in western III Corps. SOG's Joint Personnel Recovery Center (JPRC) planned and coordinated its execution based on verified information from an NVA (North Vietnamese Army) deserter. A veteran special air operations officer, Air Force Colonel Harry D. Aderholt, had set up the JPRC three months earlier on orders from the Pacific Air Forces commander, General Hunter Harris. With only a handful of men, but having authorization to use any of SOG's assets and those



SOG's unofficial stomping grounds extended far beyond the territory recognized by the regular U.S. military as being within its "rules of engagement."

of U.S. military forces, the JPRC was responsible for "personnel recovery operations throughout the SE Asia theater subsequent to termination of search & rescue efforts." As such, it became the focal point for all intelligence regarding detained or missing personnel in Southeast Asia. Related responsibilities included briefing aircrews on escape and evasion and establishing a SAFE (selected area for evasion) program inside North Vietnam into which the JPRC inserted SAFE activation teams that it had recruited and trained.


For Cobra Tail the JPRC utilized the U.S. 25th Infantry Division and SOG's own North Vietnam Studies Section (OPS-34), where Infantry 1st Lt. Frederic Caristo worked. A master of regional languages and dialects, Caristo had participated in debriefing a Hoi Chanh (a Viet Cong defector) informant who had told interrogators that two U.S. prisoners were being held at his camp, a fortified hamlet in Cambodia's "Fish Hook" region. Lieutenant Caristo convinced mission planners that an assault at noon, when Vietnamese normally began their "siesta," would achieve maximum surprise. It would be needed, for the camp, 1,500 meters inside Cambodia, was guarded by a reinforced NVA battalion and surrounded by minefields. Caristo volunteered to go in with the lead chopper carrying the Hoi Chanh to provide security for him, to serve as translator/interpreter and, once on the ground, to distinguish Cambodians from NVA.

At 1200 hours the lead chopper made its final approach, but because of a navigational error, it landed on the wrong side of the minefield. Caristo, CAR-15 in hand, jumped out. Almost immediately, orbiting gunships rained down suppressing fire. No longer was it a surprise assault. The now fully alerted enemy poured out intensive small arms, machine gun, RPG (rocket-propelled grenades) and recoilless rifle fire. Then the lead helo pilot, realizing his error, lifted off from the LZ and flew to the other side of the minefield to attempt an insertion with the other assault force helos. Caristo, the only person on the ground at that point, knew full well the POWs were in great danger and might be summarily executed. Knowing where their hut-prison was supposed to be, he headed for it, running through 50 meters of minefield and a gauntlet of friendly and enemy fire to get there. Bursting through the back wall, he surprised the occupants, Cambodian villagers, who told him the Americans had been moved the previous night. Outside, the assault force was taking more casualties, trapped by a second minefield lying between them and the NVA defenders. Assessing the grim situation, Caristo dashed through enemy fire for the second time to reach the assault force's position, and then he began leading them through the minefield. Knocked down at one point by an exploding bangalore torpedo, he got back up and persevered till he had guided all troops safely across to the other side, where they renewed their assault. On his way back to the hut complex, where he hoped other POWs might be located, Caristo spotted an NVA firing into the rear of the troops and silenced the enemy soldier with his rifle. Finding no POWs, he returned to the raiders, whose sweep of the hamlet had uncovered bunker complexes. Cautious entry into the first bunker had set off a booby trap. Understandably angered, the men were about to start lobbing grenades into all the bunkers when they—and Caristo, arriving on scene—heard cries from within. Realizing that the voices were those of Cambodian civilians, Caristo entered the bunkers and, after reassuring the Cambodians, brought them out safely. Because of his linguistic expertise, Caristo was able to identify 46 NVA trying to blend in with the civilians. His on the spot translation of captured documents led to the uncovering of several huge arms caches.

Thirty-five NVA were killed during Cobra Tail. Although no POWs were rescued, vital lessons were learned that would improve future Bright Light missions. For saving U.S. and Cambodian lives and for his selfless valor, Lieutenant (later Colonel) Caristo was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross.

Despite many, often valiant efforts through 1972, only one Bright Light mission succeeded in rescuing a live U.S. POW, though that prisoner died shortly afterward from wounds inflicted by his captors. No doubt some missions failed due to time wasted between the receipt of fresh, verified intelligence and mission launch—in the case of Cobra Tail, a wait of two weeks. The delays were a result of the bureaucratic process, especially the necessity of awaiting authorization from the Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV) staff and the staff of the Commander In Chief Pacific Command (CINCPAC) in Honolulu.

SOG, of which the JPRC was only a small part, was organized January 24, 1964, by General Order 6, Headquarters, U.S. Military Assistance Command Vietnam, as the Special Operations Group. It was given the cover name, Studies and Observation Group. Under the direct supervision of the MACV chief of staff, it was (for cover purposes) further designated as a separate staff section under the MACV commander, with MACV J-5 having special cognizance of its operations. Through 1972, SOG was commanded by Army Colonels Clyde Russell, Donald D. Blackburn, John K. Singlaub, Steven Cavanaugh and John F. Sadler. As the Joint Unconventional Warfare Task Force, SOG was authorized to plan and conduct covert-clandestine operations not only in North and South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia but also—if necessary—in Burma, the southern People's Republic of China provinces of Yunnan, Kwangsi and Kwangtung, and on Hainan Island in the Gulf of Tonkin. SOG's counterpart, the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF) Special Exploitation Service (SES, later Strategic Technical Services/Directorate) operated under the RVNAF Joint General Staff,



Major Owen Hitchings stands by the front door of his Fairchild C-123B Provider, nicknamed the "Gray Ghost." During a secret mission over North Vietnam, Hitchings was forced to "match wits" with an enemy surface-to-air missile that was launched at his plane.

and for much of its existence was commanded by Colonel Tran Van Ho.

The U.S. Army colonel who was chief of SOG had a CIA Special Assistant who served as liaison for agency activities, and CIA personnel were assigned to SOG's branches. As Colonel Charles M. Simpson notes in his book *Inside the Green Berets*, the working relationship wasn't always a smooth one. He mentions, for example, that SOG was denied authority to insert its people if a CIA team was already in the area.

From an initial complement of six officers and two enlisted men, SOG grew into a 380-man, multicompartmented headquarters in Saigon, directing the activities of some 10,000 operators. By 1972 the organization was comprised of eight divisions, six branches and five groups. The Operations/Training Studies Division (OPS-30)—divided into maritime, air, psychological, ground and training studies branches, which were further subdivided into ground, air, maritime and psyops groups—generated the majority of SOG's missions. In that secret world where strict compartmentalization and security ensured that the "need to know commandment" prevailed, SOG's own covert lexicon was used. North Vietnam was "New York," Cambodia was "Arizona," and Russia was "California." "Hailstones" were M24 resupply containers, "Face Value," was tactical reconnaissance in Cambodia, and "Buffalo Hunter" was the code name for SAC (Strategic Air Command) drone photography over North Vietnam. Code names were, of course, changed on a regular basis or when compromised.

The best known of all SOG's activities were those of its Ground Studies Group (OPS-35), which planned and coordinated Prairie Fire (later changed to Phu Dung) and Daniel Boone (later changed to Salem House, then Thot Not) cross-border operations into Laos and Cambodia. Personnel from the army's 5th Special Forces Group (SFG) led ARVN (Army of the Republic of Vietnam) and/or Cambodian recon teams (RTs) based at Command & Control North, Central and South at Da Nang, Kontum and Ban Me Thuot, or from mobile launch sites such as Quan Loi, on various missions. These missions ranged from strategic and tactical recons, to road, trail and river watches, route mining, interdiction and ambush, ground photography, wiretaps, artillery and airstrike spotting, bomb damage assessment, crash site inspection and POW rescue missions.

Air support for the RTs included CH-34s of the VNAF (Vietnamese Air Force) 219th Squadron, gunships from the U.S. Air Force 20th Special Operations Squadron (SOS) or other gunships, VNAF A-1E tactical aircraft, forward air control (FAC) planes and, if required, SOG C-123s or C-130s. Ready to react or to exploit RT-developed targets were ARVN-led indigenous commando units ranging from platoon-size "Hatchet" to battalion-size "Haymaker" forces. While "over the fence," RTs maintained communications with base via National Security Agency radio relay sites at Hickory Hill, near the DMZ, or Golf-5, which was located on an inaccessible mountain in southeastern Laos. The RTs always operated amid the enemy, and their exploits have become legendary. The five Medal of Honor recipients Colonel Sadler mentions were all RT personnel. Besides the RTs, there were special agent teams that operated inside Laos and Cambodia. SOG's Airborne Studies Group Director (OPS-36) controlled nine ARVN short term recon & target acquisition (STRATA) teams; five Earth Angel riverwatch teams, consisting of rallied (defector) NVA or ARVN dressed in NVA uniforms; and Cambodian intelligence teams dressed as Khmer Rouge and code-named Pike Hill.

Using the cover name Naval Advisory Detachment (NAD) Da Nang, the Maritime Operations Group (OPS-37) ran the activities of assigned SEAL (sea-air-land) Mobile Training Team and Mobile Support Team advisers (augmented by a U.S. Marine Corps Force Recon element). The advisers trained SES "Coastal Security Service" and VNN (Vietnamese Navy) officers and men as Lien Doi Nguoi Nhai (LDNN) Action Team commandos and crews for 80-foot Nasty-class PTFs

(patrol torpedo boats, fast) for covert operations against selected North Vietnam coastal and island targets under U.S. OPLAN 34-A.

Although Americans weren't authorized to go north of the 17th parallel, they did so anyway, as Captain Phil Bucklew, commander of the Naval Operations Support Group, Pacific, avers in his oral history, referring to SEALs and Boat Support Unit 1 advisers under his command. Through 1971, LDNN commandos and PTF crews conducted many raids and bombardments that destroyed installations, facilities and boats, while also supporting psyops programs such as the one described in General William C. Westmoreland's book *A Soldier Reports*. Using motorized junks, SOG LDNN operators kidnapped North Vietnamese fishermen and took them to Tiger Island near the DMZ. Deceiving their captives into believing they were anti-North Viet Communists operating inside the country, the LDNN gradually indoctrinated the fishermen in anti-Communist thinking. After eight weeks of being well fed and cared for, the fishermen were released where they had been abducted, supplied with gift kits and radios set on SOG and South Vietnam stations. In the words of General Westmoreland, the program's "tangible results will never be known."

In 1971, LDNN action teams were redesignated sea commando teams and assigned special missions inside South Vietnam, including JPRC Bright Light operations. One team member, Petty Officer 3rd Class Nguyen Van Kiet, became the only South Vietnamese to earn the Navy Cross. He did so while voluntarily accompanying SEAL Lieutenant Thomas R. Norris, then attached to SOG's successor Strategic Technical Directorate Advisory Team-158, on his heroic, persevering rescue of downed EB-66 navigator Lt. Col. Iceal Hambelton and OV-10 pilot Lieutenant Mark N. Clark on April 13, 1972, for which Norris was awarded the Medal of Honor (see "Seals Shadowy Rescue" *Vietnam* December 1990).

SOG's "air force" consisted of four specially configured, Fulton Recovery System capable "Stray Goose" C-130s of the 15th Air Commando/Special Operations Squadron (later 90th SOS) and four "Gray Ghost" C-123s of the 1st Flight Detachment, both based at Nha Trang, along with the 20th SOS, comprised of UH-1F and other model gunships and slicks, based at Ban Me Thuot, with forward deployed detachments at Tieu Atar and Duc Lap in II Corps. All of SOG's air support—U.S. Air Force, U.S. Army, U.S. Marine Corps and VNAF—was operationally controlled by its Air Studies Group Director (OPS-75) by agreement with the Seventh Air Force, whose parallel command was Deputy Director, Special Air Operations under CO, 14th Special Operations Wing. On any given day, approximately 100 aircraft were flying in support of SOG missions throughout the theater.

SOG C-123s and C-130s conducted low- and high-level parachute insertions of teams inside Cambodia, exfiltrations, the resupply of teams in North Vietnam and other special missions, which included Black Baron electronic countermeasures missions. In August 1966, Air Force Major Owen Hitchings of the 1st Flight Detachment became the second SOG pilot to fly a mission over North Vietnam, one that required him and his crew to fly low level to Vinh, climb to 14,000 feet and drop leaflets and small, parachute-rigged radios set on the Voice of America frequency. But when aircrews went "up north," it wasn't a matter of SOP (standard operating procedure). Once mission details were worked out and the seven-man crew of C-123B Whiskey Bravo, nicknamed Gray Ghost, had been briefed on anti-aircraft and SAM (surface-to-air missile) sites and MiGs, they were provided information on SAFE areas should they be forced or shot down.

Before flying to Udorn, Thailand, on the first leg of their mission, the Gray Ghost and her crew went covert. Major Hitchings was given the cover name Charles Wilson, his crew provided false civilian IDs. All U.S. Air Force markings on the plane were covered or removed—the only identifier left on the sanitized aircraft was a black letter inside the front door. Civilian flight publications were put aboard. The following night they took off, flying through the valleys of Laos at the daunting altitude of between 100 and 200 feet. Hitchings' copilot navigated on the right side, map in hand, and one of his navigators in a jump seat behind him did the same; both men communicated by intercom with the other navigator, who in turn gave directions to Hitchings, whose job was to make sure all was clear ahead.

Both mental and physical reserves were strained as the crew stayed alert, while Hitchings maneuvered the cumbersome aircraft to the target. Nearing Vinh, the plane took ground fire but no hits, flying over a SAM site that SOG intelligence had missed. After climbing to 14,000 feet, the crew dropped their leaflets and radios. It was then that the electronic warfare officer informed Hitchings that a SAM had locked onto them. At this point Hitchings, a former T-29 pilot from Texas, got to perform the SAM-evasion maneuver he had developed.

Executing wingover, Hitchings went into a full "split S," descending at an initial rate of 5,000 feet per minute. Although the crew was never sure a SAM had been launched at them, they knew positively that they had survived their first flight up north as Hitchings leveled off and flew the Gray Ghost back to Udorn and Nha Trang.


On November 26, 1968, 20th SOS UH-1F pilot James P. Fleming was supporting a 5th SFG long-range recon patrol near Duc Co. Braving hostile fire and knowing he was dangerously low on

THE STRATEGIC TECHNICAL DIRECTORATE

On May 1, 1972, the Strategic Technical Directorate Assistance Team-158 (STDAT-158) assumed SOG's residual functions. Manned by 59 officers, two warrant officers and 109 enlisted men, it was placed organizationally under the Army Advisory Group for cover purposes. The team continued to report directly to the MACV chief of staff and was tasked by MACV J2 (Intelligence) and J3 (Operations).

The team's mission was to provide advice, assistance, limited financial and materiel support to the Strategic Technical Directorate (STD) of the RVNAF Joint General Staff; to develop and coordinate plans for special operations and unconventional warfare; and to provide an interface between STD and MACV elements concerning operational matters. Team 158 was to keep MACV J2 and J3 fully informed of STD activities, see that STD operations best served MACV objectives, and ensure that STD intelligence collection activities were afforded the same degree of security protection as that given to U.S. efforts.

The RVNAF STD, meantime, had assumed operational control of forces for the execution of special operations and unconventional warfare as directed by the RVNAF Joint General Staff or other competent authority. Actually, the STD had been conducting Cambodian cross-border operations since 1970 through its liaison service. And after Nixon announced on February 8, 1971, that no U.S. troops were operating inside Laos, STD personnel assumed responsibility for recons and other missions inside that country. The STD formed its Special Mission Service (SMS) from the remnants of the ARVN Special Forces. Trained by the U.S. Special Mission Advisory Group, the SMS was involved in strategic reconnaissance missions. **J.B.D.**



Trumpy-class PTFs speed northward in the Gulf of Tonkin on another maritime operation. Although U.S. forces were not officially authorized to go north of the 17th parallel, SOG's components conducted numerous commando raids in North Vietnamese waters.

fuel and that the previous rescue chopper had been shot down, 1st Lt. (later Colonel) Fleming remained in an exposed position, bullets crashing through his windscreen, till all patrol members were on board. For his selfless heroism, Fleming was later awarded the Medal of Honor.

SOG's "air force" also dropped its version of "the big one." Code-named Commando Vault, the BLU-82 was a 15,000-pound demolition bomb. It consisted of a standard steel propane gas tank filled with slurry explosive (gas and napalm) that was set on a cradle attached to a standard heavy drop platform. The bomb was parachute extracted and stabilized during descent, its detonating rod exploding it four feet above ground. From 1968-70, SOG C-130s dropped 250 Commando Vaults on targets in Laos and Cambodia. The U.S.-led RT inserted a patrol to conduct bomb damage assessment of the one dropped January 10, 1971, on a suspected enemy location in the Dak Rolong Valley. They found a 70-meter clear area at the point of contact and extensive damage to trees for at least 300 meters around the target.

Besides its sea, air and land operations, SOG planned and executed special psyops and deception activities. Its "poison pen operation," for instance, involved sending letters from places such as France, Hong Kong and Singapore; the letters defamed North Vietnamese officials.

The Borden, or Milk Bottle, Project was a notional agent operation conceived and executed by SOG's Airborne Studies Group. To begin with, SOG ARVN operatives selected and screened NVA POWs. Upon agreeing to become spies for a secret mission (though SOG knew their motives were questionable at best), the volunteers were taken to a SOG camp for training in "spycraft" and to be airborne qualified. One agent was chosen, and, during a "secret briefing," informed that he was to become the newest member of a large U.S.-ARVN spy network inside North Vietnam. The notional agent was then put on a SOG C-130, given the coordinates of the "team" he was to contact, and parachuted into North Vietnam. There it was hoped he would run to the nearest outpost and tell his buddies all about the big, non-existent spy net in their own backyard, achieving the purpose of the project: to force the enemy to divert resources to uncover a bogus net.

In support of Lam Son 719, the ARVN multidivisional Laotian Panhandle incursion, SOG conducted diversionary operations at NVA Base Areas 611 and 614 in southern Laos and north of the tri-border region. Between January 12 and 17, 1971, SOG RTs were inserted at four diversionary drop zones but were quickly extracted because of enemy movement and contact. Eight other bogus DZs were used for simulated parachute raider insertions and actual resupply bundle insertions.

SOG's Training Studies Group (OPS-38) was responsible for training U.S. and ARVN personnel at its Long Thanh Training Detachment (LTTD), 15 miles east of Saigon, where its Vietnamese counterpart, the Camp Quyet Airborne Operations Training Center, was also located. The LTTD was staffed by nine officers and 39 enlisted men of the 5th SFG's Detachment B-53 (Special Operations Augmentation), combat-experienced personnel who served as instructors for the various courses. They were divided into those taught by U.S. personnel ones taught by U.S.-advised Vietnamese, and special courses over and above those in the regular curriculum for Americans, ARVN and Cambodians.

The three-week U.S. RT course consisted, in part, of instruction in techniques used in SOG programs, terrain appreciation and familiarization, constant training in special equipment, continual application of the lessons learned from experienced SOG veteran instructors and team monitors, and a combat operations graduation exercise.

In the U.S. "Prisoner Capture" course, students learned techniques for successfully capturing prisoners. On actual missions, teams sometimes used the SOG Bean Bag Round. Fired from an M-79 40mm grenade launcher, the round was a 40mm







TOP: Comrades in arms: Major Owen Hitchings (right), with the commander of a U.S. Special Forces A-team at Kham Duc. ABOVE: A U.S. Air Force helicopter rescues a downed airman from the jungle. Many such recoveries were made possible with the help of SOG reconnaissance teams or the intelligence they provided.

cartridge with a booster charge and a powdered, dye-covered bag filled with 4 ounces of BB shot that, upon impact, left an indelible stain on the captive.

The "Hand Held Low Level Photography" course trained U.S. personnel in photographic techniques that would be utilized from low-flying aircraft. Code-named Ford Drum, SOG's low-level photo missions involved a photographer/aerial observer in the rear seat of a Cessna 0-1 Birddog (FAC) snapping photos over the objective at treetop level using various telephoto lenses for his 35mm camera. Valid, timely intelligence was provided by these missions.

Vietnamese courses included those for ARVN RTs, STRATA teams and Special Commando Units (SCUs), a basic airborne and communications course, an ARVN medic course, and one in basic combat training. The STRATA course consisted of training in land navigation, tactics, leadership, weapons, demolition, commo, survival, forward observer procedures, jungle patrol base, psyops, first aid and air/airborne operations.

A typical STRATA mission is described in the SOG command history for 1971. In May, two teams were active on trail-watch missions north of Route 13 inside Cambodia. The first team made contact with four enemy elements ranging from one individual, who was killed, to an estimated enemy squad. The second team observed two enemy squads, and the next day, after the second team established an ambush position, two enemy approached. A Claymore mine was detonated and M-79 rounds were fired, causing the enemy to drop to the ground. Team members captured, searched and blindfolded the two prisoners. During extraction, one CH-34 helicopter received small-arms fire in its tail-rotor section and crashed. Three crew members were injured, but all were extracted. Four helicopter gunships struck enemy positions, resulting in one enemy killed, eight structures and three bunkers destroyed. The two prisoners, members of a medical holding unit, provided information on their unit.

The LTTD trained and maintained two squads of 12 to 14 assigned indigenous security personnel, normally U.S.-led, for the purpose of securing and/or rescuing downed aircraft and personnel engaged in LTTD operations. They were also used as a reserve force for any overengaged LTTD element.

To test the LTTD training curriculum and course graduates, actual combat operations were conducted in III Corps, with operational areas provided on request by the U.S. 1st Cavalry Division, Royal Thai Army Volunteer Force, Bien Hoa province and the Australian Task Force. Night combat parachute jumps were made on an individually required basis into nearby War Zone D. Training DZs (drop zones) Sally and Alice were located in the LTTD vicinity. Jumps were made from UH-1 Hueys, C-123s and C-130s. From 1969 to 1971, the Long Thanh Training Detachment graduated 1,835, 2,535 and 1,845 personnel respectively. In early 1972 the LTTD trained 43 Khmer Special Forces in airborne and recon techniques.

SOG ceased operations on March 31, 1972, except for the task of providing security for its Golf-5 radio relay site.

Colonel Sadler, the last SOG commander, said: "Some of SOG's tasks were glamorous and self-rewarding, while others were tedious and uneventful; but all were essential to help stem the tide of Communist aggression in southeast Asia." The Americans, the Vietnamese, the Cambodians and others did their very best, their achievements undimmed by the final outcome of that undeclared war. □

John B. Dwyer, who was with the 4th Infantry Division in Vietnam, has published many articles on special operations and warfare. His first book, Seaborne Deception, *was published by Praeger in June 1992. Suggested for further reading:* The U.S. Government and the Vietnam War, *Part 2, 1961-1964, Committee on Foreign Relations, Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C.; and* Vietnam: Order of Battle, *by Shelby L. Stanton.*

TOP SECRET

SOG'S SECRET WAR

"SOME OF THE HAIRIEST MISSIONS EVER CONCEIVED"



SOG Team member practices rappelling from a UH-1F helicopter at Command and Control South (Ban Me Thout). SOG Teams used this technique in areas where LZs could not be located, where the LZs were under fire and where employment of bombs to create a LZ would have attracted undue attention.

by Jim Graves

TOP SECRET

TOP Secret: Burn after reading or ingest.

Much of what you are about to read is covered by the National Security Act. Documents which give details on operations and projects described herein can be traced by looking up the index numbers listed in the Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV) history in the Pentagon.

However, the MACV history is a classified document.

Although most Vietnam veterans, war correspondents and students of the conflict are familiar with the acronym SOG — via rumor-control central, fleeting contact in 'Nam or short references that have appeared over the years in newspapers, magazines, books and movies — allusions to the group's activities have

The acronym SOG stood for Studies and Observation Group; the acronym itself was condensed from the full-blown MACVSOG: Military Assistance Command Vietnam Studies and Observation Group. Unofficially it was also known as the Special Operations Group.

SOG was organized in February 1964 by Gen. Paul D. Harkins, Commander MACV. Its basic mission was to conduct covert operations in the denied areas of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. Activities within the sphere of SOG's mission included: guerrilla warfare, subversion, sabotage, escape and evasion, direct-action missions, black and gray psychological operations and some operations best described just as unconventional warfare.

For a number of obvious and valid reasons, SOG from the beginning depended heavily on the U.S. Army for its personnel. But since it also drew troops from the Marine Corps (Force Recon), U.S. Navy (SEALs) and Air Force (air crews), and drew headquarters staff from all four services, it was by definition a Joint Unconventional Warfare Task Force. Since the Vietnamese were also involved, it could be called a Combined Unconventional Warfare Task Force. In addition, SOG used American civilians from the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and United States Information Agency (USIA), as well as civilians from other countries.

Depending on whose estimate one accepts, SOG during its heyday had 2,000 to 2,500 Americans, 7,000 to 8,000 Vietnamese (North and South), Nungs, Cambodians, Laotians, Chinese and others involved in its myriad operations or projects.



ABOVE: SOG Recon Team Nungs practice on firing range in camp. Nung in foreground is firing an M79 40mm grenade launcher while one in background is firing AKM 7.62mm rifle. On ground in rear is M-60 7.62mm machine gun.

As one former SOG troopie put it: "An octopus would wish that it had so many tentacles."

And if it did, it would wrap every one of them around its head and go off screaming if assigned the task of unscrambling the mixture of alphabet soup and operation/project names that provided cover for SOG operations in Southeast Asia.

With a rapidity that would bewilder the most diligent researcher, SOG Operations (the common denominator) acquired and abandoned code names and acronyms for purposes of cover. It worked so well that some people didn't know they were in SOG until later.

To get a real grasp on SOG, it is necessary to start at the beginning and with the Vietnamese.

Since 1958, South Vietnam's government had carried on unconventional-warfare operations against the communists. Since they were on the receiving end of North Vietnam's operations, South Vietnam saw no reason not to reciprocate. It is assumed that the CIA was in on the act from the very beginning.

In 1961, President John F. Kennedy authorized the Combined Studies Group — the operating arm of the CIA in Southeast Asia — to assist the South Vietnamese in conducting covert operations in both North Vietnam and Laos. These activities included infiltration of agents into North Vietnam to act as spies and saboteurs, and cross-border operations against Viet Cong and North Vietnamese base camps and supply lines in Laos. The South Vietnamese threw in Cambodia for good measure.

Those operations and a CIA/U.S. Army Special Forces operation, begun the year before, would have an effect on SOG.

In 1960, Kennedy authorized the CIA to conduct an operation named WHITE STAR in Laos. The purpose was to improve the military capability of the Laotian non-communist forces. When the CIA failed to make a dent in Laotian communist activity, the job was turned over to U.S. Army Col. Arthur D. "Bull" Simons, leader of the Son Tay raid in 1970 and the merc operation in Iran in 1978 financed by Texan H. Ross Perot (see "Who Dares Wins," SOF, June '79).

In 1960, Simons took 107 Special Forces men into the jungles of Laos. Benjamin F. Schemmer points out in his excellent book on the Son Tay raid, *The Raid*, that when Simons ar-



Studies and Observation Group launch site at Du Co.

BELOW: Master Sgt. Ed Clough (left) with a Nung team member somewhere in South Vietnam. The Nung is carrying an M3 45-caliber grease gun equipped with flash suppressor. Clough, a bit bigger than his native team members, survived the war.



rived in Laos there was no Laotian army there to train. Not to worry, GI. Simons went out and kidnapped 12 battalions of Muong tribesmen, "put them in compounds behind barbed wire, fed them, clothed them — and gradually taught them to soldier. They were eager to learn; life had a purpose and they were even being paid." Simons' 12 battalions of Muong were so successful that the North Vietnamese backed off from cross-border operations.

Direct American Special Forces involvement in WHITE STAR metamorphosed into Project 404 and lasted until 1962, when the Geneva Accords closed off that theater of operations to Americans — at least to American military. The North Vietnamese, the South Vietnamese and the CIA continued to be active in Laos.

As one thoroughly disgusted former WHITE STAR/404 man put it: "This is how fucking weird we do things. If you were on one of the last teams in there in '62 [he was] and your name was on the list that the ICC [International Control Commission] checked off, they [the U.S. government] wouldn't let you back in Laos."

In 1963, the organization that handled unconventional and covert warfare for the South Vietnamese took on the name Luc Long Dac Biet (LLDB), sometimes called the Vietnamese

TOP SECRET





Special Forces, and sometimes referred to disparagingly by Americans as "look long, duck back." The working relationships between the LLDB, its "Special Branch" which handled unconventional warfare, and the Green Berets of the U.S. were close in 1963, even though the Green Berets were ostensibly involved only in "bird watching" — sitting on the Laotian and Cambodian borders watching communist activity on the trails from "A" Camps. But even then some SF troops were leading Vietnamese units funded by the CSG/CIA.

In 1964, President Lyndon Johnson authorized implementation of Operations Plan (OPLAN) 34-A. That operation, the first with a direct tie-in to the Studies and Observation Group, began as a strategic-intelligence-gathering operation only. South Vietnam's LLDB "Special Branch" was supposed to supply the men; Military Assistance Command Vietnam the training sites and physical assets (boats, planes, guns); and the CIA funds and training.

In February 1964, MACV opened its Studies and Observation Group headquarters building in what had been the MACV 2 compound in Cholon, an adjunct of Saigon. In 1967 SOG moved to a building on Pasteur street in Saigon.

From the beginning, SOG's rather broad mission — clandestine operations in the denied areas of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia — gave the HQ staff the latitude to get involved in just about anything and, since SOG reported directly to the Commander MACV, first Gen. Harkins, then Gen. William C. Westmoreland, and finally Gen. Creighton W. Abrams, it had enough pull to co-opt existing operations and ones started up later by other military units.

However, in his book, *A Soldier Reports*, Westmoreland wrote: "Although SOG was a component of MACV, a special office in the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff surpervised its activities, for, from the first, Washington exercised the closest control over SOG's operations. Every action had to be approved in advance by the Secretary of Defense, Secretary of State, and the White House."

Some SOG operators have claimed that the CIA staff had considerably more control over activities than was thought at the time or has been admitted since. In effect, they assert that if the military in Vietnam turned down some pet projects as too risky, the operation would be sold and approved in Washington.


In *The Raid*, Schemmer wrote of Simons, head of a SOG operation: "In executing SOG missions, Simons refused, in his own words, to 'live with some of the restraints put on me.' But, he would add, 'I got away with it only because I didn't make any mistakes.' He knew that if he got caught, 'they'd get some other conductor for the trolley car and throw my dead body off the back.' "


The MACVSOG established in February 1964 was initially supposed to train, advise and support logistically the South Vietnamese LLDB "Special Branch" — changed to Special Exploitation Service (SES) in April 1964 — in the conduct of covert missions in Southeast Asia.


To achieve this, a Naval operation at Da Nang, an air-wing detachment at Nha Trang and a training element at a place called Bearcat, near the village of Long Thanh, 14 miles east of Saigon, were established.

One of the first SOG operations was named LEAPING LENA and was an attempt to monitor and interdict communist logistics on the Ho Chi Minh trail in Laos. Five- and six-man teams of South Vietnamese SES troops parachuted in for these missions.

TIMBERWORK, another early operation, may well have been the SOG code name for the PT-boat raids on North Vietnamese coastal installa-







LEFT: SOG Teams early in the Vietnam War carried sterile weapons (ones that could not be pinpointed as issue to U.S. forces) in cross-border operations. This indigenous trooper is carrying a 30-caliber Browning Automatic Rifle (BAR) over his shoulder and an M3 45-caliber grease gun.

CENTER: Cessna 0-1 "Bird Dog" was used as spotter plane and radio relay by SOG units operating in Cambodia, Laos and North Vietnam.

UPPER RIGHT: Modified CAR-15 was favorite weapon of SOG team members late in the war.

RIGHT: Silenced Hi-Standard .22 caliber pistol carried by SOG patrol members. This system was first used by OSS in World War II.

tions that some sources claim triggered the Tonkin Gulf incident. On 2 August 1964, the *U.S.S. Maddox*, participating in Operation DESOTO (patrols along North Vietnam's coast by American destroyers), came under attack by North Vietnamese PT boats beyond the 12-mile limit. Some Southeast Asia historians have since claimed that the North Vietnamese PT boats either were chasing South Vietnamese PT boats and hit the *Maddox* accidentally, or intentionally attacked the *Maddox*, assuming it was involved in the hanky-panky going down ashore.

There is strong reason to believe that one of SOG's most fascinating operations during the war was the launching of FASCINATION teams into North Vietnam.

The code name may be wrong (or right, depending on the time), but that particular facet of OPLAN 34-A is well documented in the books, mentioned previously, by Westmoreland and Schemmer. Each describes a slightly different method of operation and a slightly different goal — but since neither tied his description to a specific date, both could be right.

According to Schemmer, the plan was designed to shut down the North Vietnamese fishing industry by harassing the fishermen.

In Schemmer's version, the North Vietnamese fishermen were picked up along the coast by PT boats, then transferred to Phoenix Island near Da Nang. "There, they were treated royally, but their captors explained that next time it might be different. Because North Vietnamese political leaders often used fishing boats to send contraband weapons and supplies to the south, it might be necessary to sink the boats, and some innocent fishermen might be killed. Perhaps, they were told, it would be best not to fish for a while, or not to fish too zealously — just enough to provide for each fisherman's immediate family. Then, by way of apology for the inconvenience, all the captured fishermen were given baskets of presents that contained sewing kits, cloth, fresh meat, vegetables, cigarettes, spices, garden seeds, sandals, small garden tools, pocket knives — and transistor radios tuned to a single, pre-selected frequency [tuned to a SOG-operated propaganda station]."

The fishermen were then taken back north and turned loose. Schemmer claims that subsequent intelligence from captured NVA reported a severe fish shortage in the north. The program came to an end when the SOG fishermen started picking up numerous "double dippers," who risked capture for another shot at the bennies.

Westmoreland says the kidnappings were conducted by motorized South Vietnamese junks which took North Vietnamese civilians, "usually fishermen," to the island. There, out of sight from the mainland, the SOG troops played the role of "communists, but anti-North Vietnamese communists." Then, gradually, during their six-to-eight-week stay on the island, the civilians were indoctrinated into anti-communist thinking. When returned, the civilians were given kits and fixed-frequency radio. SOG provided the programs.

One SOG operator contacted by SOF added one more detail. "They dropped that program when it got too repetitive. When the boats pulled up in the canals along North Vietnam's coast, everybody in the village would jump in a sampan to try and get himself captured and taken off to Phoenix for a shopping trip."

Although the original SOG plan did not encompass direct action by the American personnel assigned to it, that changed before a year was out, because of results obtained by direct American participation in two other classified operations.

In late May or early June 1964, it appears that Johnson approved American cross-border operations into Laos. The first such ops were launched by Project DELTA — an organization formed out of the 5th Special

Forces Group.

Coming in a close second behind Project DELTA in launching the initial cross-border missions was Operation SHINING BRASS. In July 1964, A Company, 1st Special Forces Group, Okinawa, began sending teams of Green Berets into Vietnam on six-month TDY (Temporary Additional Duty) assignments to lead indigenous troops on cross-border operations into Laos.

Westmoreland was so impressed with the intelligence obtained by project DELTA that he had two other classified projects formed: SIGMA and OMEGA. Eventually, SIGMA operated from and in Vietnam's IV Corps and the lower half of III Corps. OMEGA operated in the upper half of III Corps and II Corps and DELTA operated in I Corps and the tri-border area, where Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos come together.

When Col. Donald V. Blackburn became the MACVSOG commander in May 1965, he moved quickly to assert SOG's control over all "over the fence" operations and, within a short time, Blackburn's men were ranging over the hills of not only Laos but North Vietnam.

Soon after Blackburn took command, SOG's activities became concentrated into five major operational areas: OPS 31 (maritime), OPS 32 (air operations), OPS 33 (psyops), OPLAN 34 (resistance and intelligence operations in North Vietnam) and OPS 35 (direct action, or strategic reconnaissance patrols across the fence).



Nung SOG Recon Team member at Command and Control South (Ban Me Thout) in early 1970. SOG Recon Teams were composed of three Americans and six-to-nine indigenous troops. Nungs, a Thai tribe of Chinese origin which lived in Vietnam were used frequently early in the war.

Studies and Observation Group OPS-31 teams ranged from north of Hanoi to the DMZ.

SOG continued to grow under Col. John K. Singlaub, Col. Blackburn's replacement as Commander MACVSOG. In 1966 Singlaub got permission to go into Cambodia and in 1968 operations were conducted in North Vietnam. In addition escape-and-evasion nets for downed airmen were established during Singlaub's reign and SOG equipment and training improved considerably.

SOG's OPS 31 operated from Da Nang. Involved was a U.S. element, called the Naval Advisory Detachment, which was a little hard to explain since most of the element's members were Force Recon Marines or U.S. Navy SEALs. In OPS 31, the Vietnamese SES traveled under the cover of the South Vietnamese Coastal Survey Service and, as one SOG type said, "tried to explain that it was surveying the coast of South Vietnam."

Operating from PT boats armed with 40mm automatic cannon and 50-caliber machine guns, SOG's OPS 31 teams ranged from north of Hanoi to the DMZ — gathering intelligence, disrupting night-time fishing operations and putting raiding parties ashore to ambush trains and convoys and attack any coastal-defense units which got in the way — in an operation named WHITE ELEPHANT.

SOG's OPS 32, headquartered in Nha Trang, supplied transportation and intelligence through six separate air units assigned there. Some of them were a bit unusual.

SOG's First Flight Detachment consisted of four C-123 "blackbirds" (the unmarked planes and helicopters which supported SOG missions were called "blackbirds"). What made the unit different was that, in addition to carrying U.S. crews, the ships flew on some missions with regular Chinese Air Force pilots — traveling "black": no papers at all, as civilians.

Another unusual facet of SOG's air arm was the 15th Air Commandos Squadron. Nicknamed the "Stray Goose" detachment, the Commandos flew C-130s with the latest in electronic-warfare and electronic-counter-warfare systems.

SOG also had "blackbirds" equipped for the most sophisticated delivery and recovery techniques. Airborne troops were delivered by static-line parachute jumps or by HALO (High Altitude, Low Opening) jumps. Late in the war, SOG patrols sometimes carried full-recovery systems, consisting of a balloon to be attached by a 500-foot line to the SOG man on the ground. The "blackbird" would snatch the balloon and bring the guy on the end of the line along for the ride. The "blackbirds" were also rigged to handle sophisticated cargo-delivery systems.

Another SOG ship was the C-121 Constellation flown by the U.S. Navy. The bird was crammed with radio equipment and trailed an antenna over a mile long while flying missions off the coast of Hanoi. The C-121 could broadcast right on the main government frequencies in North Vietnam and blank them out.

From early in the war SOG had a running battle going with the U.S Air Force over strike aircraft. The Air Force wanted to convert the 7th and 13th Air Forces to jets. SOG preferred the WWII-vintage A-1Es which could carry more bombs and stay on target longer than any jet. The A-1Es were kept.

Finally, there were helicopters used by SOG. SOG's primary ship was the UH-1F, flown from 1967 on by the U.S. Air Force's 20th Helicopter Squadron, an outfit nicknamed the "Green Hornets." Some of those UH-1Fs were converted to gunships,



Indigenous SOG troops outfitted in sterile uniforms and weapons prior to a cross-border operation. The soldier on the left is armed with an M2 30-caliber carbine (left) and a modified French MAT-49. The North Vietnamese captured a number of 9mm MAT-49 submachine guns from the French and modified them to take a Soviet 7.62x25 pistol cartridge.

equipped with side-firing 7.62mm "Miniguns" capable of firing up to 4,000 rounds per minute. Prior to the assignment of the 20th, the primary source of transport and gun helicopters was a Vietnamese Air Force Squadron of H-34s. The VNAF H-34s, described by former SOG members, as terrific, were also used after 1967 because of the experience of the pilots and because they were better suited to some missions.

SOG's OPS 33 consisted of both gray and black psychological operations — or psyops. The perpetrators of gray operations never identified themselves or told which side they were on. One of SOG's best gray psyops was the "Voice of Freedom," which used a 1,000,000-watt transmitter to broadcast programs into Hanoi in both Vietnamese and Chinese. Another SOG radio operation was a black op, that is, one that was passed off as being something it was not. Vietnamese agents, operating inside North Vietnam, broadcast over a number of stations that claimed to be part of the National Liberation Front.

One SOG black psyop involved the introduction of false documents into

MACVSOG EQUIPMENT AND WEAPONS

Following is an article prepared by Shelby L. Stanton on weapons and equipment carried by the men of MACVSOG, along with a drawing of a man in a STABO rig with auxiliary equipment. When reading any articles on MACVSOG, please keep in mind that at different times the equipment, tactics, formations, etc. changed.

FATIGUES: Usually plain 100% cotton-poplin jungle fatigues — the non-ripstop kind with shoulder straps and waist buttons (an early type of jungle fatigues) — sprayed with black spray-paint splotching, with sleeves worn down. Blood type (ex: A POS) embroidered over right pocket and "NO PEN" over left — if no penicillin could be administered. Sometimes the ordinary tropical ripstop was worn, and, rarely, issue camouflage (very late in the war on the latter). On some special operations, enemy uniforms were worn.

HATS: Most often, cut-down boonie caps or just bandanas.

SCARVES: Triangular medical OD bandages, also worn as sweatbands around the forehead.

OTHER CLOTHING: Canvas-duck AF survival vest (*not* the common mesh type) with sleeves and collar from a jungle-fatigue shirt sewn on, was often worn instead of a shirt, or over the "jungle sweater" (the nylon/triacetate, tricot knit sleeping shirt) if operating in the mountains. This because of the vest's improved carrying capacity.

FOOTGEAR: Canvas leggings laced midway up the calves; shoelaces on the side. These leggings go down over the jungle boots. They were optional but typical.

GEAR: STABO rig with ordinary pistol belt. The STABO rig was made in Taiwan by the CIA and other civilian agencies and named for the two sergeants (letters from their last names combined to form "Stabo") who designed it. (See sketch.) These had snap links attached for lift-out via chopper, allowed both arms to remain free for firing or carrying things and allowed the pistol belt to be worn undone. First-aid and miscellaneous gear (signal mirror, cut-down signal panel, mini-smokes, mini-grenades, etc.) were carried forward. A small gas mask was worn over the right chest, and a BAR belt was common. A knife of the individual's preference was carried upside down on the chest strap of the STABO rig.

A can of albumin blood-expander was also carried on the chest strap or just over the rucksack behind the neck (where the sun would often ruin it). A small, rubber intravenous (IV) tube was carried in the vest or shirt pocket. Survival-pack containers and canteen covers were used as ammunition pouches. Usually three one-quart canteens were carried behind. New M16 pouches were commonly used. The order of preference on the pistol belt was grenades, cut-down emergency panel in ammo pouch and mini-smokes up front; followed by ammo pouches (as described) and, in the rear, the canteens and two survival packets (A and B type). [Ed. Note: Operational and Reserve Survival Packets.]

WATCH: Army-issue Seiko with black face, black plastic band and wrist compass.

RADIO: URC-68

WEAPONS CARRIED BY EACH MAN:

1. Shoulder or hip holster, 9mm Browning automatic pistol.
2. High-Standard .22 with silencer in canvas pocket added to back of rucksack.
3. CAR-15 was most common. Rarely were enemy weapons used, except in North Vietnam, because the distinct sound of "friendly fire" was used for orientation in fire fights.
4. Sawed-off M-79 grenade launcher with snap-link through the trigger guard and through the web gear on the right side or, as an alternative, on strap over chest (with anti-personnel round in chamber).
5. Pen flares with special cartridges fitted into socket.

Also, other weapons carried instead of the CAR-15 were the Swedish K; Sten gun with silencer; M-1 carbine; M16 with suppressor; XM-203 — all according to individual preference.

RUCKSACK: Indigenous rucks only — full, but with no extraneous material hanging out.

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TOP SECRET



The members of Studies and Observation Group Recon Team Hammer, Command and Control South, 1970.

Viet Cong organizations in South Vietnam, and another the introduction of sabotaged ammo into communist ammunition stockpiles whenever possible.

The rigged rounds used in these ops were manufactured in the United States, then delivered to SOG in Saigon for delivery in or out of the country. Grenades with instantaneous fuses, 7.62mm rounds rigged to blow up when fired and mortar rounds which detonated in the tube were specialties of Operation ELDEST SON.

"It [ELDEST SON] was a good thing, because nothing is more beautiful than to see an aerial photo of a mortar site in which everything [trees, people, etc.] is blown out from the mortar," said a former SOG member.

ELDEST SON also provided grist for the SOG troops responsible for starting rumors among the VC. The line went: "You have to understand, comrades, that the Chinese [who supplied most of the ammo to North Vietnam] are having great difficulty maintaining quality control during their cultural revolution."

Once they heard that story, every time an NVA fired his rifle, or dropped a round down a mortar tube, it must have been done with trepidation.

According to some of the SOG troops who participated in the salting of bad rounds during ELDEST SON, the real trick was not finding the ammo cache, nor getting in but getting the ammo boxes open, the doctored rounds in and the boxes resealed without leaving a trace.

OPLAN 34 encompassed all agent-insertion activities into North Vietnam. In the early days of SOG, agents parachuted in but, as most of these efforts were unsuccessful, SOG started moving its agents — both individuals and teams — overland. The agents would infiltrate into Laos and then cross over.

Many, if not all, indigenous agents sent by SOG into North Vietnam were doubled by the NVA and, when that happened, SOG would play the agents as triples — feeding harmless but accurate information and disinformation north to cause problems.

SOG's most famous activities: strategic recon into Laos.

However, in 1968 Americans were involved in ground actions deep in North Vietnam on what were called KIT-CAT missions. Messages from those teams were channeled through a National Security Agency station named Tri Bach, near Hue-Phu Bai. Depending on the type of message received from the KIT-CAT teams it either went straight to Fort Belvoir, Md., by "flash" communications systems or through normal military channels.

SOG's most famous activities, and those best reported on so far (see pp. 47, 51), fell under OPS 35: strategic reconnaissance patrols into Laos, Cambodia and North Vietnam. OPS 35 was the largest of all the OPS, had the most men and equipment committed to it and was totally controlled by the Americans involved.

The first recon teams on the ground in Laos came from the 5th Special Forces Group's Project DELTA or the 1st Special Forces Group's SHINING BRASS project in 1964. The teams moved into the panhandle area of Laos looking for targets (camps, caches and choke points on the system of trails and roads that made up the Ho Chi Minh trail), to capture prisoners, place mines and sensors and plant the sabotaged rounds developed in the ELDEST SON program.

When Blackburn took over as Commander MACVSOG in June 1965, he snatched Project DELTA's over-the-fence operations for SOG, but it appears that, for some time, the personnel used to run the missions still came out of 1st Special Forces Group in Okinawa.

Under Blackburn and his OPS 35 commanding officer, Col. "Bull" Simons, the name of the operation in Laos became PRAIRIE FIRE. Later on, when Cambodia was added to the target list, it was called DANIEL BOONE. North Vietnam was added even later.

The basic element of the OPS 35 effort was the SOG Spike Teams. (During the later years in Vietnam the name changed to Recon teams.) Spike teams were a mixed force, usually three Americans and six-to-nine indigenous troops, called indigs. The first indig troops were usually Nungs — a Thai tribe of Chinese origin which lived in South Vietnam — and later the majority were Montagnards, though some were Vietnamese and Laotian.

When Col. Simons took over, the American personnel were still coming out of 1st Special Forces Group in Okinawa. But, soon afterward, Special Forces troops from Okinawa were given PCS (Permanent Change of Station) orders and sent to Vietnam. In addition, word went back to Fort Bragg, N.C., to other Special Forces troops in the 7th Special Forces Group that there was a demand for volunteers to run classified projects in Vietnam.

The Special Forces troops who ran the Spike Team patrols trained at Bearcat, near the village of Long Thanh. The One-Zero, or team-leader school, was there, as was the parachute-training facility.

The Americans went operational when they were assigned to one of SOG's four FOBs (Forward Operating Bases). FOB-1 was located at Phu Bai, FOB-2 at Kon Tum, FOB-3 at Khe Sanh and FOB-4 at Marble Mountain, Da Nang.

When Col. John K. Singlaub took over as Commander MACVSOG in 1966, SOG's FOBs underwent a name change to CCS, CCC and CCN: Com-

Continued on page 70

Continued from page 46

mand and Control North (Da Nang, Marble Mountain). FOB-3 (Khe Sanh) was phased out.

At the FOBs, and later at the Command and Control centers, SOG troops trained and planned their missions. Missions were launched either directly from the FOBs or from Launch Sites — just about any American or South Vietnamese compound in the country. Normally, SOG troops were expected to run one five-day mission per month but practicality sometimes forced troops to exceed that limit.

The Spike Teams running the first cross-border operations went into the field dressed in standard GI uniforms but Col. Simons demanded less-conspicuous attire, since any NVA or VC with a bit of sense would blast away at anything resembling an American jungle suit. It was Simons who started using NVA or VC clothing and, to a certain extent, weapons. Spike Teams, which had their choice of weapons, often went armed with AKs, French MAT-49 submachine guns or Swedish Ks. Since it was expected that Spike Teams, if they made contact, would generally be outnumbered and have to fight for a long time until extracted, the basic load of ammunition and ordnance carried was extensive. One Spike Team leader told SOF he sent his men out with a minimum of 45 magazines, plus grenades, claymores and sidearms.


Operational areas for recon patrols across the fence were designated Target Areas and given both a name and a number. Two examples — Quebec 1 and Hotel 9 — were notoriously bad TAs. Quebec 1 was 88 klicks from Dak To, east of Attapeau, Laos, and Hotel 9 was in Laos, north of the village of Ban Philadouang.

Upon insertion, standard operational procedure for the Spike Teams was to get into the jungle quickly and make the communists hunt for them. If the Spike Teams moved around hunting NVA, they risked being ambushed. By hiding in the bush, *they* could do the ambushing. Because of that SOP, and because the terrain where the Spike Teams operated has some of the thickest bush known to man, movement was limited. One former SOG Spike Team member said the average movement by a team on PRAIRIE FIRE missions was 150 meters per day.

If the Spike Team's major mission was to call in air strikes on NVA or VC targets in the TA, this was accomplished by radio relay to a FAC (Forward Air Controller) flying overhead in an O-1 (single-engine spotter plane) during daytime. The Spike Teams or the FAC could also contact a C-130 Airborne Command and Control Center (ABCCC), which flew over Southern Laos during the day. The daytime C-130 ABCCC was code named HILLSBORO and the night-time C-130 was code named MOONBEAM. At night, there was no O-1 overhead for the SOG team to coordinate with. SOG teams were also in contact with a radio-relay SOG unit located at a site called EAGLE'S NEST, which was on top of a mountain in Laos.

With an 0-1 FAC overhead, the Spike Team would pass targeting information to the FAC, who passed the information on to the C-130 ABCCC and requested strike approval. The ABCCC, not equipped with radar, would contact the Control and Reporting Center (CRC) at Da Nang's Monkey Mountain installation to ascertain what aircraft were in the area and available. The CRC at Da Nang would then release aircraft to the ABCCC in Laos, which would pass them on the FAC to make the air strikes.

Although many of the air strikes were carried out by Air Force A1-E Skyraiders, some were by Marine, Navy or South Vietnamese aircraft. All aircraft operating within the sweep of the CRC radar at Da Nang came under its control, and it could pick up air assets from other CRCs or



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the Control and Reporting Point (CRP) at Dong Ha (code named WATERBOY), if planes flying against other target areas were diverted by weather or if action picked up in Laos.

The strikes in Laos were named STEEL TIGER or TIGER HOUND, depending on whether they were located north or south, respectively, of the 17th Parallel. There was also CR at Pleiku.

At night, SOG Spike Teams used essentially the same assets, but could also call on a C-130 LAMPLIGHTER to illuminate the target with flares.

After 1967 SOG teams could call on AC-130 SPECTREs. These planes were armed with a mix of 7.62mm "Miniguns", 20mm Vulcan cannons and 40mm Bofor cannons. Later in the war some mounted a 105mm gun. Later-model AC-130s also had laser designators — which could pinpoint a target and direct a bomb to it — and some sophisticated sensors (details of which are still classified and which SOF has no intention of disclosing). The innovations made the AC-130s spectacularly successful.

In the early days of SOG, when Col. Blackburn commanded, American-personnel losses on the 45 cross-border ops pulled during that time were zero.

Various SOG Spike or Recon Team leaders attribute the relative ease of operations in Laos and Cambodia in those days, and under Singlaub later, to a number of factors: 1) the SF personnel assigned to SOG early on were better trained and operations better planned and, 2) the NVA didn't know what the hell was going on.

Staff Sgt. Fred Zabitosky, who worked in OPLAN 34 in 1966-67, OPS 35 in 1967-68 and SHINING BRASS, said: "The casualties were not that high then, compared to what we got later, because you used to be able to walk around Laos and Cambodia at will. You could wave to the North Vietnamese and they didn't know what the hell you were doing, because all your weapons were sterile; and you were sterile, cover stories and everything. Most of our people spoke French too.

The NVA was teling him it was his turn to go on guard.

"Hell, I pulled up in a night RON [remain overnight] position in Laos and the damn North Vietnamese were sleeping right there next to us — 10 to 15 meters away from us in a truck park."

In a similar incident, Zabitosky's team pulled up in its RON position only to discover that an NVA patrol had selected the same site. Sometime during the night, an NVA came over and woke Zabitosky to take his turn on guard duty.

SOF: "He woke you up!"

"I wouldn't move, so he finally got hold of one of my Nungs. He kept shaking him and talking to him and he finally got up. He told me later that the NVA was telling him it was his turn to go on guard. The NVA had just wandered into our RON."

Zabitosky's Nung did his turn.

In the days when the Spike Teams operated sterile, they would run into NVA on trails in broad daylight, sometimes without incident.

"You've got to understand," said Zabitosky, "I had Nungs who could talk to them [the NVA]. We would run into them on the trail and, when I heard them talking, I would just step off the trail into the bushes."

The Spike Team Nungs would tell the NVA they were a lost unit, then ask the NVA what outfit they were with.


On prisoner-snatch missions, essentially the same thing was done, but deliberately.

"I'd send two people out in NVA khaki uniforms, all sterile, with AKs," said Zabitosky. "I'd send them out to join the company — or whatever unit it was — then call in an air strike. At the same time as the air strike, they would grab one of the SOBs and start running back to the team."

It could be that such incidents engendered a program called the APACHES, later called ROADRUNNERS, which did not start in SOG, but

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which later came under SOG's wing.

The APACHE program originated in MACV J2 (intelligence operation for MACV) and was conducted by the J2's Field Force. The APACHE program authorized the Special Forces-types assigned to it to recruit troops from the indigenous population for in-country activities.

In the beginning, the APACHES had a relatively simple assignment: dress and act like a Viet Cong in Viet Cong territory. When you get to a Viet Cong headquarters unit, empty a magazine, throw a grenade and haul ass. Due to combat losses and refinement of technique, the pattern changed considerably by the time it was absorbed into SOG. But the basic idea remained the same: penetrate the denied areas and do damage.

The good old days in Laos — when Spike Teams could walk around unmolested — came to a halt when the NVA realized what they were doing and how good they were at it.

The NVA started watching LZs for SOG insertions and, in key target areas, they defended the LZs heavily. NVA trail watchers assigned to the less-heavily defended LZs used bamboo sticks to call in other NVA in the area until enough collected for an attack. SOG's troops called it the "jungle telephone." On the heavily defended LZs, the attacks came more quickly: at the point of touchdown.

"Some missions lasted 30 seconds on the ground. Others longer," said Zabitosky. "Once a Spike Team got on the ground, got off the LZ and started beating through that bush — then the NVA had a damn problem because we had all the air support in the world."

But by 1967-68, it was getting a lot tougher to get Spike Teams in, so the SOG operations staff came up with a number of techniques to alleviate the problems. One was to send a swarm of choppers into a target area — some making real insertions, the others just running diversionary passes. SOG also utilized NIGHTINGALE devices to cause diversions while a team was being inserted elsewhere. A slick would hover over an LZ and drop in a mechanical firefight simulator to draw in the NVA. Then a second slick would slip the team in.

As the war continued, losses on LZs in Laos and Cambodia continued to mount, so other techniques were developed. One of the best was the daisy-cutter, or 10,000-pound instant LZ — a bomb capable of punching a helicopter-size hole in the bush.

One of the toughest Target Areas in the tri-border area, according to Zabitosky and verified by other SOG troops, was one known as Hotel 9.

"When you mentioned Hotel 9, people went the other way," chuckled Zabitosky. "Let's see if I can give you a layout so you can get a general idea of the terrain.

"Hotel 9 was up in the area where Highway 9 crosses down into Cambodia. They [the NVA] were building highways into Cambodia. It was surrounded by 6,000-foot mountains on both sides and there was a river on one side.

"It was such a tough target that we saturated it one time with B-52s for 14 days. Then when we tried to insert a team, they got shot off the LZ.

"It took us five days of trying to finally get a Hatchet Team [which was larger than Spike Team] into Hotel 9 and, when they got there, the goddamned North Vietnamese had mined the landing zone, so when the guys jumped off they blew their feet off.

"Christ, we tried for months and months. I mean saturation bombing until there would be nothing left of the mountains. But still they would be burning .51 caliber, 37 and 57 mike-mike when you got in there.

"We would blow a tank or a truck right up above Hotel 9 and, within 15 minutes, they would have a tank retriever up there to get the goddamn tank or truck.

"We blasted down sides of mountains, because the mountains were near the road and it was a small road. Well, they had about 1,500 coolies working road repair day and night.

"Finally, I told them I wanted 14 slicks and I'd get them [his team] into Hotel 9.

"I put my team in the last two slicks and 12 slicks went over and started to insert on Hotel 9.

"I went over the mountain, got in, and was able to come down on Hotel 9 and run some operations.

"But Hotel 9 was a heartbreaker."

Nevertheless, on that mission, Zabitosky's team caught a 104-truck convoy on the road, and he stacked up 14 jets running them in to destroy the convoy.

In addition to the Spike Teams, SOG sent out Hatchet Teams and, much later in the war, Exploitation Companies. Both Hatchet Teams (which were 23-man platoons and could be composed of a number of Spike Teams), and Exploitation Companies simply attempted to bring firepower to bear on targets too hard to get at from the air and too big for a Spike Team.

In addition, Hatchet Teams would be formed up in the FOB when a Spike Team was in trouble on the ground. Missions to recover downed airmen in the denied areas, or Spike Teams in a heavy action were called BRIGHTLIGHTs. SOG became heavily involved in attempted rescues of downed air crews, and records on

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MIAs were kept by SOG headquarters in Saigon. Later on, the Exploitation Companies performed rescue operations under the supervision of another SOG organization called the Joint Personnel Recovery Center.

"They could run those things up to battalion size," said Jim Monaghan, another former SOG trooper and President of the Special Operations Association. "And they were also used for a couple of big raids. Sometimes they brought the Black Panther Ranger Battalion in with them. That was the best and one of the most decorated battalions in the South Vietnamese Army.

"After Lam Son 719 [the operation in 1972 when the South Vietnamese invaded the Techone area of Laos, near the 17th Parallel], they ran a raid 40 miles into Laos and freed about 130 Vietnamese.

"They didn't play it up that much because they didn't want the capability they had to become known," continued Monaghan. "But the Viets ran a couple of good missions to free people." [Eds. Note: According to Schemmer in *The Raid*, 91 rescue operations were conducted in South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia between 1966-70. Twenty were successful in freeing 318 soldiers and 60 civilians. One of Vietnam's untold stories.]


SOG's Spike Teams, Hatchet Teams and Exploitation Companies, as well as the other projects and operations, continued until American involvement ended in Vietnam, although the level of activity decreased significantly once the decision was made to draw down American participation and turn the war over to the Vietnamese.

But there was one final moment of glory for SOG. Its far-flung, highly skilled and experienced personnel were yanked back into Vietnam from all over the world when North Vietnam's Easter Invasion started on 30 March 1972. On that day the NVA, three-divisions strong and supported by T-54 and PT-76 amphibious tanks, swarmed across the DMZ and rolled the 3rd ARVN Division back below Quang Tri.

To stop the North Vietnamese from taking the northern half of the country, it was necessary to pull back considerable American resources, including some of the old SOG hands.

The word went out to Special Forces Groups in the U.S. and other places in the world, and former SOG personnel were rushed to Eglin Air Force Base in Florida, where they went through a "special" 48-hour course with the latest gunships available: the AC-130 SPECTRES (described previously). From Florida, the Special Forces troops rushed to

Continued on page 90



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SOG'S SECRET WAR

Continued from page 76

South Vietnam's I Corps and into combat. The mission was tank-busting, and results are "rumored" to have been spectacular. At any rate, by 16 September, the South Vietnamese were able to retake Quang Tri.

How successful was SOG?

That's difficult to assess, as the Pentagon to this day has never released any statistics. SOG, and its many, many tentacles are still wrapped within the TOP SECRET classification so loved by the pencil pushers in Washington and nervous nellies in the State Department.

When our reporter questioned U.S. Army officials in the Pentagon about many of the operations and projects described here, the reaction was:

"You're kidding."

"There are no records of these units. I'm sorry, but we can't help you on this."

"No way."

Our reply is: Why not?

SOG is rumored to have been one of the best-organized and best-run operations in Vietnam. The Army Special Forces, Marine Force Recon, Navy SEAL and Air Force air crews who did SOG's fighting were perhaps the best in Vietnam. Without doubt, they were the most highly trained.

SOG's troops fought hard and well and suffered enormously, both then and since. Casualty figures for SOG have never been released. They were buried in the numbers of other units. But SOG troopers imply that they were very high at some points in the war.

Their suffering has not yet ended. SOG personnel listed as missing in North Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos are not included among the SOG personnel listed as MIA by the Department of Defense. Former SOG personnel, a high percentage of whom suffered wounds in Vietnam, also report that they occasionally run into problems dealing with the Veterans Administration.

SOG's troops wounded in Laos, who turn to the VA for medical assistance, are routinely asked to provide supporting documentation on when, where and how they were hit. The records don't exist or cannot be pried loose from DOD.

While some former SOG personnel are willing to talk about not only what they did but where they did it, many are still reluctant to speak out.

However, it is long past time to do so. As one said: "There are no operations going on today. There is nothing we can compromise." He is correct. The technology used by SOG in the '60s and early '70s is old hat today. The operating tactics, the communists know well. After all, they were on the receiving end.

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No less an authority than retired Maj. Gen. Singlaub, head of MACV-SOG, has said it is time.


At the SOAR IV Convention (Special Operations Association — a group which includes SOG people and personnel from other classified operations), Singlaub said:

"I think these operations, which produced not only a great amount of intelligence, but destroyed an awful lot of North Vietnamese regular units and incredible amounts of supplies, will be the basis of thrilling books and movies for years to come.

"And as for you guys who were the stars of that program [OPS 35], the time has come now when I think we have to put this all together and let the world know that there were some pretty fine guys who fought that war in Vietnam, and that what they were doing was contributing directly to the success of our war efforts in Vietnam."

EDITOR'S NOTE: It is for the reasons outlined above that Soldier of Fortune *Magazine has decided to publish this section dedicated to SOG. Although SOF realizes that some of the information — quite a bit of it — is still classified, it is long past time for America to know where and how some of its finest soldiers fought and died.*

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SOG's Recon Team Python Holds Off the NVA

by Paul S. Franklin

SOME of the most hazardous missions ever attempted during the entire Vietnam conflict were successfully pulled off by team members of the U.S. Military Assistance Command Vietnam Studies and Observation Group — better known by the acronym, MACVSOG, or simply SOG. Composed mainly of highly trained Army Special Forces personnel, these teams ran reconnaissance and exploitation missions along the Ho Chi Minh Trail and other infiltration routes into South Vietnam and provided vital intelligence on communist-base areas in Laos and Cambodia. On occasion, they also launched recon teams into North Vietnam.

Unfortunately, little of SOG's actiivities has come to light. During the course of the war, all SOG operations carried a top-secret classification and required clearance at the highest levels of government. On the few occasions when SOG was mentioned in the media, the standard DOD (Department of Defense) response was to stonewall the topic, which only added to the intrigue. This situation persists today. Despite the advent of the Freedom of Information Act, only very limited information is available to the general public. The "company line" on SOG is a well-laundered 70-page document entrusted to a colonel in the Pentagon. Several who have read the manuscript agree that it is a sanitized version that provides only a very flimsy outline of what SOG was all about.

This attitude has caused bitterness and consternation among a number of former SOG personnel. They understood the need for secrecy during the war, but today they feel such secrecy is ridiculous.

"It's as though we never existed," lamented one ex-Recon Team leader who regularly operated inside Laos. "They [the brass] don't want to acknowledge that, despite the December 1969 Congressional ban on operations beyond the South Vietnamese borders, we continued to mount out RTs [Recon Teams]



for missions in Cambodia, Laos and, yes, even inside North Vietnam."

Other former-SOG types echoed his sentiments. One NCO who worked as an assistant team leader in 1969-70 decried the lack of recognition SOG activities have received in DOD publications on the Vietnam conflict. "Check it out yourself," he urged. "You'll read about the Marines, the Air Force, even the fuckin' Army leg units — but you won't find a single word about SOG — despite the fact that we pulled off some of the hairiest missions ever conceived."

"If the full story of the Special Operations Group is ever made public," said a third SOG vet, now retired, "it'll read like a combination of Robin Moore and H. Rider Haggard, with a little Jules Verne thrown in for color. The one difference is that it's all true. Some of our ops make the Israeli raid on Entebbe pale by comparison."

MACVSOG operations were planned by OP-30 at MACV 1, located on Pasteur Street in Saigon, and implemented by regional command-and-control elements. These elements included Command and Control North (CCN) based at Da Nang, Command and Control Central (CCC) at Kon Tum and Command and Control South (CCS) which operated out of the Central Highlands city of Ban Me Thuot.

The action arm of the regional elements was the Recon Team (RT), usually composed of two Americans and a varying number of indigenous mercenaries, known as "little people."

Team operations consisted of area reconnaissance on known or suspected infiltration routes in or near enemy-base areas to observe troop movement, snatch POWs or call air strikes. All RTs employed code names and, as a general rule, CCN teams were named for snakes, CCC teams for states and CCS teams for implements and weather. Although the recon teams amassed an enviable record of successful missions against overwhelming odds, the cost was high. It is estimated that the RTs sustained a casualty rate of 200 percent and a fatality rate of 70 percent.


The following account, compiled by SOF stringer Paul Franklin, details an operation carried out in early 1971 by Recon Team Python (CCN). It is based on official records and conversations with surviving team members and is typical of hundreds of SOG operations carried out during the U.S. involvement in Indochina. Moreover, it is the tale of an elite fighting force whose members, individually and collectively, always did more than they were required to do. The brave deeds of these professional warriors are an inspiration to all who value the American fighting spirit. Since the Pentagon refuses to recognize them, the American public must. We owe them at least that much. Poor is the nation that has no heroes. But shameful is the one that, having them, forgets.

IN mid-February 1971, Recon Team Python, consisting of four Americans and 10 indigenous personnel, was inserted by helicopter deep within enemy-held territory in the A Shau Valley along the South Vietnamese/Laotian border. Their mission: set up surveillance and static roadblocks against North Vietnamese troops attempting to back-door

TOP SECRET

allied units at Khe Sanh supporting Lam Son 719, the ARVN incursion into Laos. RT Python was also tasked with coordinating air support and communications for four other RTs working the same general area.

A number of formidable obstacles lay in their path. The surrounding terrain, consisting of dense undergrowth and triple-canopy overhang, was among the most difficult encountered in the Republic of South Vietnam. Intelligence of the area was extremely old — some say two years — and unreliable. Recent agent reports, however, indicated that a large concentration of NVA (North Vietnamese Army), estimated to be at regimental strength or above, would be moving up the valley floor under cover of darkness. Python's mission was to stop these troops from getting to Khe Sanh.



Portion of NVA column in open photographed by Studies and Observation Group Recon Team. Note faces turned toward camera. Photographer had just accidentally broken branch, alerting NVA to RT's presence a second before photo was taken. A few seconds later, 90 percent of NVA column was annihilated by claymore mines.

RT Python was launched from Phu Bai and flown to a small hilltop in the vicinity of Firebase Thor, some six kilometers north of Aloui in the A Shau Valley. On the final approach to Thor, the troop-carrying helicopters came under intense enemy fire. The pilot of the lead chopper inquired if the recon team leader or "One-Zero," 26-year-old Capt. Jim Butler, wanted to abort the mission.

He was told, "No," and instructed to take the choppers in. Once over the LZ, the choppers held a low hover but refused to descend to ground level, stating that they had intelligence the entire LZ had been mined by prior occupants. At that point, Butler leaped from the hovering bird and, utilizing the Marine Mine Sweep Method, quickly determined there were no mines on the LZ. He signaled the choppers and they quickly landed and unloaded the team and their gear.

Once on the ground, the RT members spent the next five hours emplacing mines, booby traps and automatic weapons, and digging in a 60mm mortar. They had been spotted, however, and soon began taking sporadic sniper fire, as the NVA attempted to pinpoint their location.

Late in the afternoon, the team's assistant team leader, or One-One, Staff Sgt. Les Chapman, monitored an extract call from a sister team which was in the area and had just successfully ambushed an NVA headquarters element. Chapman got a fix on the sister team's location and radioed for air assets to exfiltrate the team, which was still in heavy contact with the NVA.

The exfiltration aircraft arrived at dusk and, during the rescue operation, the pulling slick was shot down, with the command element of the beleaguered team hanging from ropes some 100 feet below the chopper. RT Python continued to monitor frequencies throughout the night and prepared for a search operation at first light.

At 0230, RT Python received a probe by an estimated 20 NVA with automatic weapons. Using M14 "toe-poppers" and claymore mines, they quickly suppressed the enemy attack. Pieces of nine NVA soldiers were found around the perimeter at daylight.

During the night probe, the team also monitored a weak distress signal from a survival radio, apparently transmitted by survivors of the previous day's helicopter crash, and directed search-and-rescue aircraft to that location.

Maintaining their vigil throughout the night, the team members could clearly observe heavy enemy-troop movement along the valley floor, as NVA guides directed their columns with low-intensity flashlights.

With daylight approaching, RT Python came under increasingly heavy enemy pressure. They refused extraction, however, and continued to direct air-strikes on NVA units as well as to direct rescue efforts in an attempt to retrieve survivors from the downed chopper.

During the course of the day's rescue attempts, another aircraft, an OV-10 Bronco, codenamed "Covey," went down under a heavy fusilade from entrenched enemy AA positions. By that time, however, the rescue operation had succeeded in collecting one survivor and five bodies from the helicopter crew and sister recon team.

Continuing to exchange fire with NVA forces converging on their position, RT Python sustained two wounded, but again refused evacuation until all search-and-rescue operations had ceased. As darkness closed in on the second day's fighting, Python team members directed AC-119 Stinger and AC-130 Spectre gunships in fire-suppression efforts to protect rescue operations still in progress on the ground.

At 2100, the team began taking probing fire from enemy recoilless rifles and automatic weapons. By using organic weapons and mines, and with the assistance of orbiting gunships, Python succeeded in turning back the enemy attack, but not before two additional team members were wounded. Stinger-09 managed to knock out an NVA recoilless-rifle position before departing the area to refuel and rearm.

Throughout the night, the team, using infrared strobe lights and SST-201X transponders, continued to direct other gunships against North Vietnamese columns moving through the valley, about two kilometers below their position. The confusion sown by the gunships succeeded in driving large contingents of the enemy onto the open valley floor, where they were easy prey for the miniguns and 20mm Vulcan cannon.

At 2330, the NVA pinpointed RT Python's position and immediately launched a heavy assault on all sides. Enemy soldiers penetrated close enough for the team to hear clearly shouted commands and the screams of wounded NVA. With the aid of gunships on station, RT Python was able, after several hours of fierce combat, to blunt the enemy attack. Spectre-04, mounting 20mm Vulcan cannon and 40mm Balfour cannon, flew directly overhead and fired 30 meters from RT Python's perimeter in a 360-degree arc.

The NVA were temporarily beaten back and, as they regrouped to renew their assault, Spectre-04 struck again. This time the NVA broke and ran, and hundreds of flashlights were observed moving helter-skelter toward the road on the valley floor. Shortly thereafter, Spectre-07 arrived on station and was employed similarly with similar results. From their hilltop position, Python team members heard eerie screams of pain and panic floating up from the valley floor.

The North Vietnamese were apparently slow learners, however, for at 0400 they brought up fresh troops and renewed their attack against the RT's position, concentrating on the eastern side. When it appeared that they were in danger of being overrun by sheer weight of numbers, Python's One-One employed the 60mm mortar as a direct-fire weapon and was instrumental in repulsing the attack. Although Chapman was severely wounded in this, he continued to expose himself to withering enemy fire to bolster the eastern perimeter.

Gunships firing within 10 meters of the perimeter were also employed to turn back the enemy advance. At first light, enemy activity had dropped to light sniper fire. The lull, however, was not destined to last long.

One hour later, as the sun was burning the last vestiges of jungle mist off the foliage, a squad of green-uniformed NVA was detected attempting to flank the RT's position. Chapman immediately organized a defensive party, consisting of himself and four indigenous mercenaries, and maneuvered to intercept the enemy element.

Almost simultaneously, a heavy diversionary attack was launched against the main body of the recon team. Chapman's defensive party succeeded in ambushing the small NVA force, killing two as the remainder fled into the bush. The defensive party then fell back and established a fighting position.

When the NVA regrouped and renewed their attack, they were again routed, losing several more men. Chapman and his four "little people" then returned to the main body, where they assisted in beating off the diversionary attack.

Despite the intense enemy pressure, RT Python again refused entreaties from headquarters to evacuate, instead diverting the extraction aircraft to the nearby site of a "Brightlight" team, which was now split and in heavy contact. The NVA persisted in their efforts to annihilate Python. Heedless of orbiting allied aircraft, they launched a massive assault at 0830 in a final attempt to overrun the team's position.

Taking heavy casualties, they still managed to fight their way uphill to the RT's entrenched position, seemingly oblivious of the overhead air armada. Using B-40 rockets and automatic weapons, the NVA began to swarm over the perimeter, firing directly into the team's imperiled position. Air assets on station expended all their ordnance in an attempt to save the RT.



During this final assault, a B-40 exploded inside the perimeter and the blast knocked one of the mercenaries outside the perimeter and several yards downslope of the position, amid the advancing NVA. With complete disregard for his own personal safety, Chapman charged down the slope to attempt a rescue. After killing four NVA at a distance of three meters, he managed to reach the man, now severaly wounded, and threw him on his back for the return trip to the team's position — some 30 meters uphill at a 50-degree angle.

As he ran back to the perimeter, the NVA kept a heavy hail of small-arms fire directed at him. Several times Chapman halted or was knocked down as rockets and grenades exploded in close proximity. With the entire firepower of the RT covering him, he finally managed to reach the perimeter. The mercernary was dead, however, having been hit several more times during the ascent.

Recon Team Python was now completely surrounded by the NVA and, just when it looked like they would go down fighting to a man, a set of A-1Es arrived on station. Using miniguns, rockets, white-phosphorous bombs and CBU-32 clusters, they wiped out the enemy on the salient and all the NVA along the eastern perimeter. An hour later, at 1038, Python — still under heavy enemy fire — consented to extraction. They had been in continuous close contact with the enemy for more than 72 hours.

In the after-action report and debriefings which followed, RT Python was officially credited with killing 42 NVA during this operation, as well as playing a crucial role in directing air assets which resulted in an additional estimated 350 NVA killed by air.

The intensity of the combat during this operation may also be judged by the amount of ordnance expended. During the three-day operation, RT Python members expended 20,000 rounds of 7.62mm ammunition through its four M60 machine guns, 100 rounds of 60mm mortar ammo, 500 M79 grenades, 100 M26 grenades, 1,000 rounds of 5.56mm ammo (M16) per individual, 145 M14 toe-poppers, 57 claymore mines and assorted homemade booby traps. They also directed and expended the entire resources of one AC-119 Stinger, five AC-130 Spectres, six A-1E Skyraiders and four Cobra gunships.

For the men of the Studies and Observation Group, particularly those who served on the recon teams, perhaps there is no tribute more fitting than that penned by Jean Larteguy, the famed French soldier/journalist who chronicled an earlier Indochina conflict. He wrote:

"I'd like to have two armies — one for display, with lovely guns, tanks, little soldiers, staffs, distinguished and doddering generals and dear little regimental officers, who would be deeply concerned over their general's bowel movements or their colonel's piles; an army that would be shown for a modest fee on every fairground in the country.

"The other would be the real one, composed entirely of young enthusiasts in camouflage uniforms, who would not be put on display but from whom impossible efforts would be demanded and to whom all sorts of tricks would be taught. That's the army in which I should like to fight."

The latter is the army in which the MACVSOG people *did* fight.