
1968

HISTORY OF THE 20th SPECIAL OPERATIONS SQUADRON







1968

History of the 20 Helicopter/ Special Operations Squadron

Numbered Air Force: 7th

Location: Udorn Royal Thai Air Force Base

Wing: 14th Air Commando Wing

Type Aircraft: H-3/ H-1

Hours : 23,215.8 # Sorties: 40875

Passengers: 59157 Cargo: 611,428,950 lbs. Expended 7.62: 3,502,920 rds 2.75 FFAR: 8547

Commander: Lt. Col. John M. Steen/ Lt. Col. William B. Skinner/ Lt. Col. James A. McMullen/ Lt. Col. Shirrel G. Martin/ Lt. Col. Wilbur C. Huff/ Lt. Col. Frank A. Di Figlia

Senior Enlisted: UNK

Personnel Strength (Min/Max): UNK Officers UNK Enlisted

Commentary: The 20th Helicopter Squadron continued to operate from Nha Trang until late 1968 when the command of the squadron was moved to Udorn. The commander changed frequently due to personal problems at home and numerous temporary positions of DO's. Confrontations with the enemy became more constant and fierce.

Significant Missions: 26 November 1968 1st Lt. James Fleming and crew flew a UH-1F into the fray to aid a 6 man reconnaissance team that was engaged with heavily armed hostile forces. Despite a previous exfil attempt that was shot down the crew flew in and balanced the skids on the riverbank with the tail over the water. The mission was successful despite heavy damage to the huey.

Significant Awards:

Medal of Honor 1
Silver Star: 26
Bronze Star: 4
Air Medals: 172

Air Force Cross: 2
Distinguished Flying Cross: 64
Purple Heart: 20

MEMORANDUM

Date: 27 Dec 94

From: 20 SOS/CCX

To: WHOM IT MAY CONCERN

Subject: DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION

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1. The documents contained herein are portions of the 1ST/16TH SOW histories for the dates shown on each document. The SOW histories as a whole are classified for the most part.

2. The documents in this binder are a compilation of materials from varied sources and have all been declassified if necessary. Sheets showing declassification are all posted in the last document protector for each respective binder.

3. Any materials you feel may be of questionable classification you are encouraged to bring to my attention and I will endeavor to alleviate your apprehensions.

SQUADRON HISTORIAN

SECRET [redacted] EYES ONLY

PROJECT CORONA HARVE
DO NOT DESTROY
No 4227922

HISTORICAL REPORT
20TH HELICOPTER SQUADRON
1 JANUARY - 31 MARCH 1968
SECRET SPECAT AIR FORCE EYES ONLY

GROUP-4
DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
DOD DIR 5200.10

APPROVED BY

John M. Steen

JOHN M. STEEN, Lt Colonel, USAF
Squadron Commander

John B. Skidmore

JOHN B. SKIDMORE, Captain, USAF
Historical Officer

SECRET [redacted] EYES ONLY

20HS 68-1

[redacted] [redacted]

ANNOTATED BIBLOGRAPHY

1. Letter dated 27 December 1967 from Colonel Hayden C. Curry Deputy Commander for Operations, 14th ACW.	1. This letter covers redesignation of flights in the 20th Helicopter Squadron. Location: Squadron Files.
2. Historical Reports, 20th Helicopter Squadron, Udorn RTAFB, Thailand January, February, March 1968 by Major Anthony E. Azure, Location: Historical Officer.	2. These reports are classified secret. Location: 20th Helicopter Squadron Safe, Historical File.
3. Historical Report, 20th Helicopter Squadron, Tan Son Nhut AFB, RVN, 1 January - 31 March 1968, by Captain John B. Skidmore, Unit Historical Officer, approved by Captain Paul A. Maye, Detachment Commander.	3. This report is classified secret. Location: 20th Helicopter Squadron Safe, Historical File.
4. Monthly Re-Cap UH-1F Sorties: Dated 1 February, 1 March, and 1 April 1968.	4. These reports are classified [redacted] Location: 20th Helicopter Squadron Safe, Reports File.
5. Management Status and Trends Reports: dated 3 February, 3 March, and 4 April 1968.	5. These reports provide statistics for the months January, February, March 1968 and are unclassified. Location: 20th Helicopter Squadron Operations File.
6. 7th Air Force Operations Order 509-68 "20th Helicopter Squadron" dated September 1967.	6. This order is classified secret. Location: 20th Helicopter Squadron Safe.
7. Interview by Captain John B. Skidmore, 20th Helicopter Squadron Historian with Lieutenant Colonel Thomas C. Bass, Chief UH-1F Operations 20th Helicopter Squadron 3 April 1968.	7. Interview covered problems, recommended solutions and discussion of classified information.
8. Letter from Captain Dennis D. Behrens, Chief Career Control Section to Headquarters PACAF (DPCM).	8. This letter covers manpower problems in the UH-1F aircraft and is classified confidential. Location: 20th Helicopter Squadron Safe, Historical File.
9. Interview by Captain John B. Skidmore, 20th Helicopter Squadron Historian with Captain Jackie D. Burgess UH-1F Maintenance Officer 4 April 1968.	9. Interview covered problems, recommended solutions and discussion of UH-1F Maintenance.

[redacted] [redacted]

10. Letter of Commendation - 20th Helicopter Squadron from Major General W. C. Lindley USAF dated 26 March 1968.	10. Attached.
11. Letter of Appreciation from Colonel Harry Urban USAF dated 13 February 1968.	11. Attached.
12. Letter of Appreciation from Colonel Perry C. Ford USAF dated 2 January 1968.	12. Attached.
13. Letter of Thanks from Captain James E. Pollak USAF dated 29 January 1968.	13. Attached.
14. Special Order GB-445 Department of the Air Force Washington dated 20 December 1967.	14. Attached.
15. Citation to Accompany the Award of the Air Force Outstanding Unit Award to the 20th Helicopter Squadron.	15. Attached.
16. Interview by 20th Helicopter Squadron Historian with 1st Lt Robert W. McComb, Civic Action Project Officer 3 April 1968.	16. Interview covered the civic action program.
17. The Air Commando, "20th Heli Stings Enemy Rescues Downed Pilot", Volume 3, Number 6, Nha Trang 16 February 1968	17. These articles cover the activities of the "Green Hornets" for six days in and around Ban Me Thuot and the rescue of Captain James E. Pollack, F-100 Pilot.
18. Interview by 20th Helicopter Squadron Historian with Captain John E. Fiser and Captain James R. Tolbert pilots in Hornet Flight 4 January 1968.	18. Interview covered rescue of down F-100 Pilot.
19. UH-1F Award and Decorations Book.	19. Book lists awards and decorations of the 20th Helicopter Squadron. Location: Awards and Decorations Desk 20th Helicopter Squadron.
20. Interview by 20th Helicopter Squadron Historian with Major Buel W. Woolverton, Chief Awards and Decorations Officer 20th Helicopter Squadron.	20. Interview covered activities of the 20th Helicopter Squadron during the reporting period.

(Security Classification - if classified) [redacted] FCP 9300

HISTORICAL DATA RECORD	REPORTING PERIOD FROM: 1 Jan 68	TO: 31 Mar 68	REPORTS CONTROL SYMBOL: AU-D5

FROM: (NAME AND LOCATION OF UNIT SUBMITTING THIS REPORT)
20th Helicopter Squadron
14th Air Commando Wing (PACAF)
APO San Francisco 96205

TO:
14th Air Commando Wing (DXI)
APO San Francisco 96205

IF MORE SPACE IS NEEDED FOR ANY ITEM, ATTACH ADDITIONAL SHEETS INDICATING APPLICABLE ITEM NUMBER.

SECTION I — ASSIGNMENT

MAJOR AIR COMMAND	NUMBERED AIR FORCE	AIR DIVISION	WING	GROUP
PACAF	7th	[redacted]	14th Air Commando Wing	14th Combat Support Group

SECTION II — SUBORDINATE UNITS

There are six flights located at three operating locations. "A", "B", and "C" flights are located at Udorn RTAFB, Thailand. "D", "E", and "F" flights are located at Tan Son Nhut and Nha Trang AFB, RVN.

SECTION III — MISSIONS

A. PRIMARY

"A", "B", and "C" flights - [redacted] counter-insurgency activities and transportation. "D", "E" and "F" flights - unconventional warfare, reconnaissance, film courier, base defense, SAW training, logistical support of U.S.A.F. Forces and U.S. sponsored activities, psychological warfare.

B. SECONDARY (OR OTHER)

"A", "B", and "C" flights - civic action, utility and rescue. "D", "E", and "F" flights - VIP courier, utility and rescue.

SECTION IV — PERSONNEL

STATUS	OFFICERS	AIRMEN	CIVILIANS	TOTAL
ASSIGNED	72	100	2	174
AUTHORIZED	77	109	4	190
ATTACHED		33		33

SECTION V — EQUIPMENT

A. AIRCRAFT
CH 3C-5
UH1F-15

B. WEAPONS (INCLUDING MISSILES)
12 - 7.62
8 - 3.75 Rocket Launchers
13 - M-60 Machine Guns

C. ELECTRONICS

D. OTHER

[redacted]

[redacted]

1. (U) Effective 1 January 1968 flights "B", "C", and "D" located at Udorn RTAFB were redesignated "A", "B", and "C" flights. "E" flight at Nha Trang AFB, RVN was redesignated "D", "E", and "F" flights. (1)

2. (S) The mission of the 20th Helicopter Squadron at Udorn RTAFB, Thailand remained unchanged during this reporting period. Our primary mission being to provide USAF logistical support to activities in Laos and the the support of [redacted]. (2)

3. (S) In the month of January the out of country USAF support missions consisted of 194:35 hours of flying time in 200 sorties. A total of 206,270 pounds of cargo and 467 passengers were carried. In support of CAS missions the CH3E aircraft flew 109:35 hours in 93 sorties and transported 15,500 pounds of cargo and 218 passengers. (2)

4. (C) On 29 December 1967 two CH-3E helicopters were involved in an assualt operation against hostile forces. The assigned mission was to infiltrate and exfiltrate [redacted] ground teams on a search and destroy operation. The flight had been drawing light to moderate small arms fire during seven previous sorties as they airlifted 219 combat troops in and out of the target area. On the final exfiltration landing the entire landing zone was racked by intense small arms and automatic weapon fire. The helicopter commanded by Major Villotti received several hits in the cockpit area, one bullet ripped through Major Villotti's flack vest and penetrated the back cushion and seat. The pilot, Lt Colonel Bumford, sustained a bullet impact against the chest of his flack vest, and he received slight facial cuts from flying glass. The ground team set up an effective perimeter defense, aided by the co-pilot Lt Daily, and the flight mechanic, Sgt Wells, firing from the cargo door and Airman Alexander firing from the aft ramp. Twenty-nine members of the ground team were able to withdraw into Major Villotti's aircraft while cover aircraft delivered ordnance against the hostile forces. Even though the aircraft received eleven small arms hits it was able to depart the landing zone without further damage. Major Hall aircraft commander of the second helicopter, was about to take-off when he noticed six ground troops still in a defensive position. Mortar shells were now impacting in the landing zone. Disregarding the hostile fire Major Hall hovered his helicopter over and picked up the remaining six troops. The now overloaded aircraft with thirty-four troops aboard was able to lift off and depart the landing zone without damage from hostile fire. The friendly forces suffered no losses while twenty-two dead hostile forces were counted by the Forward Air Controller only thirty yards from where the helicopter had landed. The value of wearing the flack vest was again demonstrated on this mission. The following crew members have been recommended for the Silver Star as a result of the action.

Lt Colonel George R. Bumford
Major James S. Villotti
Major Kyron V. Hall
Captain Ronald L. Skinner
Captain Joseph D. Cunningham
1st Lt Duane T. Daily
Sgt Arthur B. Martinelli
Sgt Ronald G. Wells

[redacted]

[redacted]

Sgt Louie Alexander, Jr.
Sgt Eugene N. Cothran (2)

5. (S) On 5 January, a roadwatch team of [redacted] personnel was infiltrated into North Vietnam for the purpose of gathering intelligence on road traffic. On 10 January, the squadron was assigned the mission of recovering the surviving members of this team who had been engaged by hostile forces. Two surviving members of the team were successfully rescued from the side of a hill using the CH-3E hoist cable. Major Kyron V. Hall was the aircraft commander on this mission. On 11 January, Major Hall again returned to the scene and rescued one more team member utilizing the rescue hoist cable. Small arms fire was encountered on both days from hostile ground forces. (2)

6. (U) In support of the Royal Thai Air Force, the Pony Express recovered two L-19's which had suffered crash damage. The two aircraft were airlifted with the external cargo sling from a remote northwest Thailand area, to a railroad siding where they could be shipped to Bangkok for repair. This airlift covered approximately 100 miles. (2)

7. (S) During February, the out of country logistical support consisted of 134:25 hours in 138 sorties. This is primarily a cargo hauling effort as evidenced by the fact 159,865 pounds of cargo was moved along with 246 passengers. In addition, USAF support missions in Thailand accounted for 49:40 hours of flying time in 75 sorties. Logistical support consisted of 29,020 pounds of cargo and 170 passengers. Poor weather conditions in Northern Laos this month caused one mission cancellation and hampered the success of several other missions in that area. In support of [redacted] the "Pony Express" accounted for 105:20 hours of flying time carrying 25,620 pounds of cargo, 243 passengers in 95 sorties. The majority of these missions were to the Steel Tiger area of Laos. (2)

8. (S) On the 4th and 5th of February the 20th Helicopter Squadron was assigned the mission of landing a company size assault force of [redacted] personnel into Southern Laos for the purpose of disrupting road traffic and to take prisoners if possible. Two CH-3E helicopters accompanied by four other friendly helicopters successfully infiltrated the assault team on 4 February, with A1E aircraft providing cover. On the morning of 5 February, the assault team was to be exfilled by the same force of helicopters. However, the assault force had come under attack during the night and reported they were surrounded by numerous hostile forces. As the two Pony Express CH-3E helicopters approached the landing zone they were subjected to intense ground fire, however the number one aircraft landed, loaded on 16 troops and departed the landing zone. One small caliber bullet penetrated the honey comb structure of the tail rotor of the number one aircraft, but caused no further damage and the aircraft was able to return to a friendly forward base. The number two aircraft, received six hits on the approach to the landing zone but did not land. Upon landing it was discovered that two main rotor blades had bullet holes through the honey comb structure with no adverse effect to the airfoil. No crew members suffered injuries on this mission. The majority of the assault team were later

[redacted]

recovered by other friendly helicopters after moving to a less hostile landing zone. (2)

9. (S) During this reporting period the accomplishments at Udorn were as follows: (2) (5)

Hours flown	1014.1
Sorties flown	1088
Passengers Carried	36.96
Cargo carried	318.6 Tons
Average operational ready tate	80.4 percent
Average aircraft utilization rate	82 hours per aircraft
Aircraft utilization authorized	50 hours per aircraft

10. (S) During this reporting period the primary mission of the UH-1F Detachment at Tan Son Nhut AFB, RVN remained Reconnaissance Film Delivery for the 460th and 16th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadrons with a secondary mission of VIP and Utility. However, the Giant Dragon requirement was deleted in January. (3)

11. (U) Personnel at Tan Son Nhut, TDY, three pilots, three maintenance mechanics, and one aircraft dispatcher. (3)

12. (C) In January a new system was developed so that all missions are now fragged through 7AF Strike Plans with it being the only fragging agency. The landing sites were divided into a morning flight at 0830 to Bien Hoa, Phu Loi, Lai Khe, Dau Tieng, Trang Sup, Cu Chi, Duc Hoa and back to Tan Son Nhut. The afternoon flight departs Tan Son Nhut at 1400 for Bien Hoa, Xuan Loc, Bluck Horse, Luscombe, Vung Tau, Bear Cat, Long Bien and back to Tan Son Nhut. Each flight is two-hours and thirty-minutes duration and covers a distance of one-hundred and thirty-five miles. (3)

13. (U) For VIP flights it is up to the mission commander to cross check all details and arrangements that have been made. It is not safe to assume that the project officer or protocal officer has carried out this function. As a minimum the following checklist should be followed: (3)

VIP CHECKLIST

Upon being fragged:

1. Coordinate with project officer
2. Coordinate with protocol
3. Preplan route and timing
4. Preplan backup aircraft if required

5. Schedule aircraft cleanup

6. Star plates as required

7. Coordinate with control agencies:

   MACV Pad

   Embassy Pad

   Base Ops VIP Pad

8. Review VIP procedures in AF publications:

   Enroute Supplement

   Tactical Aerodrone Directory

9. Ensure adequate aircraft security

10. Ground brief crew on enrire mission

PAUL A. MAYE, Captain, USAF
Detachment Commander

14. (Ø) During this period thirteen VIP flights were flown. The following is a partial list of VIP passengers: (3)

1. General J. D. Ryan - Commander of PACAF

2. General W. W. Momyer - Commander of 7AF

3. Lt General J. H. Moore - U. S. A T. Inspector General

4. Lt General A. P. Clark - Vice Commander TAC

5. Major General R. F. Worley - Vice Commander of 7AF

6. Major General G. F. Blood - Director of Operations 7AF

7. Brig General J. E. Bolt - Director of TACC 7AF

8. Brig General L. T. Seith - Chief of Staff 7AF

15. (U) It is recommended that each new mission commander come to Tan Son Nhut at least two days prior to the departure of the previous commander, to become familiar with the daily routine. (3)

16. (S) In addition to film delivery the "Green Hornets" were the primary support of the 519th Tactical Communications Squadron located at Trang Sup, RVN. On many occasions ammunition, radar and other replacement parts were transported to the men at "Penthouse". (3)

17. (U) A letter of appreciation was received from 7AF (SAC SARF) which stated that during this period, SAC Strategic Air Relocatable Photographic Facility couriers were transported by "Green Hornet" crews, to and from Bien Hoa Air Base to deliver mission material for processing. The flights were made almost daily for the entire period with many schedule changes on very short notice. The 20th Helicopter Squadron never failed to comply with the stringent requirements while they had an aircraft in commission. These flights made in SAC support, at times sustaining hostile fire, were most vital to the fulfillment of SAC's mission in SEA. They were executed with a degree of professionalism, esprit de corps, and cooperation seldom equalled. (3) (12)

18. (C) During this period the Tan Son Nhut detachment flew 716 sorties for 228.2 hours, carried 1284 passengers and 35.515 tons of cargo. (3)

19. (U) The mission of "D", "E", and "F" flights remains the same as during the previous reporting period. (7)

20. (C) The availability of UH-1F's is still critical and will continue to be critical until additional aircraft are delivered both for replacement and to fulfill additional requirements that arise. The problem again became very apparent during the Tet offensive when many aircraft were damaged and crews were injured. (7)

21. (C) The present enlisted personnel manning, during this period, required an excessive amount of duty performance from crews in the field. This was a direct result of joint gunner-helicopter mechanic useage. Therefore, crew rest periods quite often approached the maximum limits. This problem could be prevented in the future by making the basic crew of the UH-1F two gunners with armament AFSC's and one crewchief, one flying status from the A431X0 career field. (7)

22. (C) Pilots are still arriving in UH-1F's without the proper training required for our Southeast Asia missions. A request was sent to Headquarters PACAF requesting accelerated UH-1F pilot inputs (AF102XD) in the 20th Helicopter Squadron during the months of February and March 1968. This action was requested in order to prevent a potential loss in mission effectiveness during the months of April and May 1968. This is a result of 50 percent of the UH-1F authorized force rotating to the CONUS during those months. This will not only cause a severe reduction in our experience level, but will also create an additional training problem. (7) (8)

23. (U) Logistic Support has greatly improved during this period. Material Control ordered all parts and many parts were procured from the Army, by the use of the interservice agreement that was established between the services. (9)

24. (U) Maintenance transportation continued to be a problem. The transportation situation remains the same as reported in the previous history. However, the problem became more critical because the radio vehicle was out of commission most of the reporting period which resulted in a lack of supervision as there was no direct communications between Maintenance Control and the specialists on the line. (9)

25. (S) The SEAOR 56 "Lucky Tiger" modifications have now been completed on all fifteen UH-1F aircraft. (9)

26. (U) The biggest maintenance problem that occurred during this period was improperly rigged throttles. This resulted in a high out of commission rate for a short period of time until OJT training was accomplished. Since the training was conducted no additional throttle rigging problems have occurred. (9)

27. (U) While the accomplishments of the aircrews during this period were extraordinary they could not have done the job without the outstanding support provided by the rest of the squadron personnel. Around the clock maintenance, under extremely difficult conditions was performed to repair battle damage and make additional aircraft available. Nightly harrassment from enemy forces increased the hazardous conditions and frequently interrupted the work and rest routines. (20)

28. (U) On 4 January a flight of five UH-1F's from the 20th Helicopter Squadron were on a combination strike/training mission about 25 miles Southeast of Ban Me Thuot. As they neared their target they noticed an F-100 strike in progress five miles northwest of their position. The Huey gunships were starting to make their first pass on target when they heard a "Mayday" distress signal three times. "My wing man was just shot down. On the 115 degree radial of Channel 117 at 19 miles. He has a good chute". It was obviously one of the F-100's and Captain Robert P. Strcut transmitted on guard "Roger we will be there in three minutes with gunbirds and slicks". The flight of Green Hornets was able to pick up a visual on the parachute immediately about four miles a way in a large grassy swamp. The gunships circled the location providing the downed pilot with air cover while the slick, piloted by Captains John E. Fiser and William A. King, Jr., with Technical Sergeants Robert L. Andrews and Willard S. Richards standing by their door guns, came in immediately for the pick up. Captain James E. Pollack, the downed pilot, was laying on his back watching the whole show. The pickup was successfully accomplished with the downed pilot spending less than five minutes on the ground. Captain Pollack was returned to Ban Me Thuot (East) for first aid, picked up by a C-130 and returned to his home unit, at Tuy Hoa AFB, RVN, in less than two hours. A letter of gratitude was received by the 20th Helicopter Squadron from Captain Pollack. (13) (17) (18)

29. (S) The UH1F primary operation in support of "Daniel Boone" remains highly classified. However, when the NVA and VC launched their Tet offensive on 29 - 30 January 1968 the men and machines of the "Green Hornets" operating out of Ban Me Thuot, RVN responded bravely. During the week long battle, the squadron was

frequently called to aid friendly forces in the Ban Me Thuot area. Firing their mini-guns and rockets, the armed helicopters of the 20th struck the enemy successfully time after time. The gunships were first scrambled before dawn on 30 January. They fired on suspected mortar concentrations. Later that day two gunships drove VC and NVA troops from a stream of refugees and killed six of the enemy as confirmed by FAC's. Before the day was over, the gunships took part in an assault on an estimated two companies of NVA dropping 28 more of the enemy according to FAC's. On 1 February, forward air controllers called out gunships to support a friendly force trapped in a schoolhouse by heavy enemy fire. During this mission, the "Green Hornets" received yet another distress call from a friendly tank element pinned down by the enemy in the town of Ban Me Thuot. An estimated company of NVA had occupied a segment of the city. The "Green Hornets" rolled in and left an entire enemy block in flames, thereby relieving much of the pressure on friendly ground forces in the area. At 0330 hours on 2 February 1968, a gunship element was launched to attack observed enemy mortar positions. An enemy position was observed firing and was immediately attacked and destroyed by the gunships. A few minutes later, the flight was advised that an ARVN compound was under heavy attack 2 miles west of Ban Me Thuot. The flight leader contacted the U. S. Army Advisor in the compound for target identification. There were no flare ships available for illumination and the compound had to be identified by several buildings burning within the perimeter. The enemy had breached the southern defenses and were pouring into the compound. The gunships put their initial fire at 50 meters inside the perimeter and on succeeding passes worked outward to drive the enemy outside the compound. By 0410 hours the gunships had expended their ordnance and the compound was secure. Later that day, the crews were informed by the senior U. S. Advisor that their prompt response and extremely accurate fire, even in almost total darkness had, without a doubt saved the compound from being overrun and destroyed by the enemy. The 155th Helicopter Company at Ban Me Thuot Airstrip reported it was under constant mortar and sniper harassment. Some of their men had been shot off the tops of airplanes while trying to repair them. Two "Green Hornets" sanitized the surrounding area with rockets and minigun fire. Also the same day the Huey slicks and gunships of the 20th and the Army's 155th Helicopter Company assisted elements of the 173rd Airborne Brigade in a combat assault against Hill 491 south of Ban Me Thuot. Still later that day, a ground patrol making a sweep located a group of VC in a plantation. The 20th gunships went into a protective orbit over the area to keep the enemy from escaping. The friendly ground forces moved in and took 66 prisoners of war. The "Green Hornet" slicks carried the prisoners out. On 3 February the gunships again scrambled to aid elements of the 173rd in heavy contact with an NVA unit. Receiving heavy ground fire, the Green Hornets worked in support of friendly ground forces within 100 meters of where artillery shells were impacting against the NVA contingent. The gunships chalked up six KBA's confirmed by FAC's in that encounter. Once again, on Sunday evening 4 February the Green Hornets came to the aid of tanks. The tanks were pinned down by 57mm recoilless rifles and 50 caliber machineguns. Although some of the aircraft sustained battle damage and five aircrew members were wounded, the Green Hornets courageously carried on without the loss of a single aircraft or man. Other UH1F helicopters of the 20th brought in ammunition, supplies, evacuated wounded and transported 140 prisoners of war. (17) (20)

30. (S) During the period 13 February through 25 February the "Green Hornets", in conjunction with the 5th Special Forces, Detachments B-50, under operational control of First Field Forces Vietnam, conducted intensive reconnaissance operations in the area south and west of Ban Me Thuot to locate enemy forces which had participated in the attacks on Ban Me Thuot. Using a revised concept for inserting the reconnaissance patrols during this period 12 infiltrations of six man teams were made. On 9 occasions emergency exfiltrations of teams had to be performed due to their being compromised or in contact under fire from enemy forces. Five of these extractions had to be made using two helicopters for each team and McGuire Rigs. The McGuire rig is composed of three climbing ropes with a canvas sling and a trapeze wrist lock on each rope for lifting personnel out of heavy jungle. Due to the team's positions it is impossible to lower the helicopters for landing or rope ladder pickup. (20)

31. (S) The following is a recap of UH1F missions 1 January 1968 through 31 March 1968.

UH1F Hours Flown - 2769.1
Missions Fragged - 959
Sorties Flown - 5708
Passengers - 5345
Cargo in Tons - 110.275
Rounds 7.62 Expended - 834,350
3.75 Rockets Expended - 2070
SAR Alert Hours - 0

Type Sorties: Armed Helicopter
Infils = 224
Exfils = 228
Visual Recon = 109
Army Base Defense = 64
TAC Movement = 1302

Type Sorties: Unarmed Helicopter
Infils = 254
Exfils = 227
Visual Recon = 80
Army Support = 249
TAC Movement = 1452
AF Support = 1445
Med Evac = 13

Aircraft and aircrews at Ban Me Thuot are on 24 hour Ground Alert, 15 minute response. Approximate Ground Alert under the condition 15,225.3 hours. (4) (5)

32. (U) The 20th Helicopter Squadron is presently supporting a Leper Colony near Kontum, RVN. Each man in the squadron wrote to an organization in the United States asking for material donations. A large amount of used clothing and other useful items were received by the lepers. After Tet, the 20th Helicopter Squadron donated $15 to TARP. This money was used to help the Vietnamese people who were made homeless during the Tet offensive. During January and

February the members of the squadron donated #50 toward the "Dollars For Scholars" campaign. This money was used to send children in the Nha Trang area to primary and secondary schools. In the future we plan to establish a civic action project near Nha Trang, but at the present time no suitable project has been started in the Nha Trang Area. (16)

33. (U) The following awards and decorations were awarded to 20th personnel during this period: 1 Air Force Cross, 7 Silver Stars, 16 Distinguished Flying Crosses, 6 Purple Hearts and 23 Air Medals. (19)

34. (U) Major John C. Gruver was awarded the Air Force Cross for gallantry in connection with military operations against a heavily armed enemy force near Dak To, Republic of Vietnam. While flying a fire suppression mission in support of friendly ground forces, Major Gruver and his crew were diverted to assist a small Army unit that was in danger of being surrounded in an isolated bomb crater. Two seriously wounded men had prohibited evasive movement as a party of North Vietnamese Regulars worked to encircle the crater. As the crew approached the site, Major Gruver and Lieutenant Lavender noticed that an Army Huey downed in the brush beside the crater was threatened by a circle of fires started by the enemy. Despite their knowledge of enemy activity in the immediate area and their anticipation of resistance, the crews made an approach to a hover over the damaged helicopter to beat down the flames until the arrival of a Chinook that had been requested for its extraction. Sergeant Graves and Airman Herndon rode exposed in the open doorways to observe for and return enemy ground fire, which broke out sporadically from positions along a flanking ridge. Initially, heavy smoke screened the helicopter, but as the flames were suppressed and exposure in the hover accordingly increased, the danger from enemy small arms and automatic weapons grew. Major Gruver held the hover, under fire, until the Chinook called that he was initiating his approach. As the Chinook dropped to a hoover over the crash site, it took seventeen hits and was forced to break away. Major Gruver's crew flew a series of suppressive runs on suspected enemy emplacements while the Chinook made a second attempt and successfully airlifted the Huey from the scene by sling. The Major immediately turned his attention to the beleaguered ground unit. Ignoring their own safety in the face of enemy fire that had already downed one helicopter and severely damaged another, he and his crew set up an approach to the bomb crater. When the Army radio operator warned them that they were drawing fire, they continued, settling below the treeline and on down for a difficult landing in the crater itself, where the two wounded were taken on board. Major Gruver, after take-off lingered in the enemy field of fire to fly repeated suppressive passes covering the ground unit's withdrawal. The exceptional determination and aggressive airmanship of this crew saved an aircraft from destruction and a highly-trained team of american fighting men from capture or death. (19)

35. (U) The following squadron personnel were awarded decorations as listed below: (19)

Silver Star

Major Chester P. Brown
Major John R. Livermore
Major Benjamin A. Watson
Captain Robert P. Strout

Captain Ronald L. Hondler
Captain Richard E. Monroe
Captain John E. Fiser

Distinguished Flying Cross

Captain Robert P. Strout
Captain Donald L. Summers
Captain Frederick M. Johnson
Captain Robert R. Skinner
Captain Edward A. Young
1st Lt John M. Graham
1st Lt Robert W. McComb III
TSgt Robert L. Andrews
TSgt Arthur F. Downing
SSgt William F. Studebaker
SSgt Kenneth S. Rohrbouck
SSgt Charles W. Elliott
SSgt Herbert L. Conner
SSgt Edward Coleman
Sgt Eugene E. O'Leary
Sgt Ronald J. Wilkerson

Purple Heart

Captain Royal E. Foster, Jr.
Captain Leonard F. Ciemniecki
1st Lt Robert W. McComb III
SSgt Dennis L. Bowling
SSgt Herbert L. Conner
Sgt Ronald J. Wilkerson

36. (U) On 22 March 1968 General W. W. Momyer Commander of Seventh Air Force, presented the Air Force Outstanding Unit Award, First Oak Leaf Cluster, to the 20th Helicopter Squadron. The squadron commander Lt Colonel John M. Steen accepted the award on behalf of the 20th. The citation accompanying the award read as follows: "The 20th Helicopter Squadron distinguished itself by outstanding and meritorious service while supporting United States and Allied forces engaged in combat operations against hostile forces in unfriendly territory in all areas of Southeast Asia. Flying unarmed and unarmored helicopters, working often under intense ground fire, in periods of inclement weather and hours of darkness, crews of the 20th Helicopter Squadron completed hundreds of highly effective support sorties. The 20th Helicopter Squadron provided invaluable aid to the Government of Thailand in its efforts to fight domestic Communist Insurgency, and it supported the United States Overseas Mission in rural area assistance programs. By their outstanding achievements, the personnel of the 20th Helicopter Squadron have reflected great credit upon themselves and the United States Air Force". (14) (15)

20 May 1969

[illegible] AIR FORCE

[illegible]

reply to
attention: CO 12 Feb 1960

subject: Letter of [illegible]

to: [illegible]
APO 96331

1. [illegible] for the outstanding service
[illegible] Flight, as engineer of [illegible]
[illegible], between 27 November 1959 and
1 December 1959.

2. [illegible] the [illegible] was rescued, the organization, the
officers and [illegible] of the 36th Helicopter Squadron did
display a [illegible] to be commended. They
[illegible] quite [illegible] and
[illegible] of the [illegible]
[illegible] quite [illegible] and [illegible] would be
[illegible] Commendation [illegible].

3. The [illegible] performed [illegible] and the
performance [illegible].

4. Please [illegible] Helicopter
Squadron, [illegible].

[illegible]
Commander

1st Ind to Ltr fr [illegible] to Public Info Off (...CS), 20 Feb 66, Subj: Letter of Appreciation

1LACW (C) 11 March 1966

TO: DCG
2ACG (C)
1BLIDPI

1. It is a pleasure to forward this correspondence to you.

2. The support given to the members of the 1st Mobile Communications Group is an excellent living example of the cooperation and professionalism of the personnel of "I" Field. The results of those efforts have materially contributed to the full mission accomplishment of this communications Group.

3. Please add my appreciation to that of Colonel Green for this effort.

[signature]
L. A. [illegible], Colonel, USA
Vice Commander

2nd Ind

1LACW (DOO)

TO: 20th (C)

1. Four outstanding [illegible] operational and human relations support of Headquarters [illegible], 1st Cav, 1st Div for each 30 day period are commendable. [illegible] favorable image for the 20th Helicopter [illegible]

2. I appreciate [illegible]

[signature]
William C. Child, Colonel, USA
Deputy Commander for Operations

2 January 1951

[illegible]

[illegible] appreciation to your unit for service provided [illegible] Squadron during the period 15 August [illegible] December 1950.

[illegible] the period the Detachment Air Reconnaissance Photographic Technical Unit was [illegible] by [illegible] and [illegible] Air Base to [illegible] for the world [illegible] These flights were made almost [illegible] basis on very short notice. [illegible] November Detachment personnel [illegible] comply with each request [illegible] and [illegible] missions. These flights made [illegible] of enemy [illegible] in Korea. They were greeted with a degree of professionalism, courtesy, and cooperation which [illegible]

[illegible] my sincere appreciation to the officers and men of the 202d [illegible] Detachment for a job well done.

[illegible]
[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

The 20th Helicopter [illegible] itself by outstanding and meritorious service [illegible] United States and allied forces engaged in combat operations against hostile forces in Southeast Asia, from 1 November 1966 to 1 April [illegible]. During this period, the aircrews of the 20th Helicopter Squadron [illegible] a crisis against hostile forces in unfriendly territory in Southeast Asia. Flying [illegible] and unarmored helicopters [illegible] under intense ground fire, in periods of inclement weather [illegible], crews of the 20th Helicopter Squadron [illegible] [illegible] hostile areas. The 20th Helicopter Squadron [illegible] to the government of Thailand in its efforts to [illegible] and it supported the United States Government [illegible] programs. By their outstanding [illegible] the 20th Helicopter Squadron have reflected great credit upon themselves, the United States Air Force.

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON

SPECIAL ORDER
GB-445

2[illegible] December 1967

1. Each of the following units is awarded the Air Force Outstanding Unit Award for exceptionally meritorious service in support of military operations during the period indicated:

12th Tactical Reconnaissance Sq (PACAF) - 1 Jul 66 to 30 Jun 67)
16th Tactical Reconnaissance Sq (PACAF) - 1 Jul 66 to 30 Jun 67)
20th Helicopter Sq (PACAF) - 1 Nov 66 to 1 Apr 67
45th Tactical Reconnaissance Sq (PACAF) - 1 Jun 66 to 30 May 67)
57th Fighter Interceptor Sq (ADC) - 1 Apr 66 to 31 May 67
441st Field Maintenance Sq (MAC) - 1 Jul 65 to 30 Apr 67
Det 10, 1131st Air Traffic Control Flight Sq (Hq Comd USAF) - 1 Jul 65 to 30 Jun 67

2. The 740rd Aircraft Control & Warning Sq (AAC) is awarded the Air Force Outstanding Unit Award for exceptionally meritorious service in support of military operations from [illegible] Jul 65 to 31 Jul 67. The unit listed below share in the award for the same period:

Det 1, 1930th Communications Sq (AFCS)

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE

J. P. McCONNELL, General, USAF
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL

R. J. PUGH, Colonel, USAF
Director of Administrative Services

DISTRIBUTION
GO

20th Helicopter Squadron (20th HS)

(S) The mission of the 20th Helicopter Squadron remained unchanged during the quarter. The primary mission of "A", "B", and "C" Flights located at Udorn RTAFB, Thailand, was to provide USAF logistical support to activities [redacted]

(S) "D", "E", and "F" Flights, located at Tan Son Nhut and Nha Trang Air Bases, continued in their mission support of unconventional warfare, reconnaissance, film courier, base defense, SAW training, logistical support of USAF Forces and U.S. sponsored activities, and psychological warfare.

(U) On January 1, Flights "B", "C", and "D" located at Udorn RTAFB were redesignated "A", "B", and "C" Flights. "E" flight at Nha Trang was redesignated "D", "E", and "F" Flights.(71)

PERSONNEL

(C) Enlisted personnel strength during the period was below that necessary to perform the mission without requiring an excessive amount of extra duty from crews in the field. As a result, flight mechanics in the field performed both gunner and mechanic duties. This often caused crew rest periods to reach the maximum limits.

(C) Pilots are still arriving in UH1Fs without the proper training required for the type of missions performed in Southeast Asia. A message was sent to Headquarters PACAF requesting accelerated UH-1F pilot inputs (AF102XD) in the squadron during the months of February and March. The action was requested to prevent a potential loss in mission effectiveness during April and May, when 50 percent of the UH-1F authorized force rotates to the CONUS.

Maintenance and Logistics

(U) Logistic support greatly improved during the period. Materiel Control ordered all parts, with some procured from the Army by the use of an interservice agreement.

(U) The biggest maintenance problem that occurred during the period was correcting improperly rigged throttles. This caused a high out of commission rate for a short period until CMT training was accomplished. Since the tringing was conducted no additional throttle rigging problems have occurred.

(U) The SEAOR 56 "Lucky Tiger" modifications have now been completed on all 15 UH-1F aircraft.

(U) Maintenance transportation continued to be a problem. It became even more critical this period because the radio vehicle was out of commission most of the time, resulting in a lack of supervision, as there was no direct communication between Maintenance Control and the specialist on the line.

(U) While the accomplishments of the aircrews this period were extraordinary they could not have done the job without the support provided by the rest of the squadron personnel. Around the clock maintenance, sometimes under extremely difficult conditions, was performed to repair battle damage and make additional aircraft available. Nightly harrassment from enemy forces at times increased the hazardous conditions and frequently interrupted the work and rest routines.

(C) The availability of UH-1Fs is still critical and will continue to be critical until additional aircraft are delivered both for replacement and to fulfill additional requirements that arise. The problem again became very apparent during the Tet offencive when many aircraft were damaged and crews were injured.(73)

Air Operations

(C) On December 29, 1967, two CH-3E helicopters participarted in an assualt operation against enemy forces. The assigned mission was to infiltrate and exfiltrate indigenous ground teams on a search and destroy operation. The flight had drawn light to moderate small arms fire during seven previous sorties as they airlifted 219 combat troops in and out of the target area. On the final exfiltration landing, the entire landing zone came under heavy small arms and automatic weapons fire.

(C) The first helicopter received several hits in the cockpit area, but still managed to make a landing and exfiltrate 29 members of the teams. The co-pilot and flight mechanic provided covering fire from the doorways as the team made its way into the aircraft. Even though the aircraft received 11 small arms hits, it was still able to fly out of the landing zone without further damage.

(C) After taking on combat troops, the second helicopter began to depart from the landing zone when six ground troops were noticed in a defensive position. Disregarding the hostile fire--mortar shells impacting on the landing zone--the pilot hovered his helicopter over and picked up the remaining six troops.

(¢) The friendly forces suffered no losses while 22 enemy bodies were counted by the FAC only 30 yards from where the helicopters had landed.

(S) On January 5, a roadwatch team of [redacted] personnel was infiltrated into North Vietnam for the purpose of gathering intelligence on road traffic. On January 10, the squadron was assigned the mission of recovering the surviving members of the team who had been engaged by enemy forces. Two surviving members of the team were successfully rescued from the side of a hill using the CH-3E hoist cable. The next day the aircraft returned and rescued one more team member, again utilizing the rescue hoist cable. Small arms fire was received from enemy forces.

(S) A month later the squadron landed a company-size assault force of [redacted] personnel into Southern Laos for the purpose of disrupting road traffic and taking prisoners if possible. Two CH-3E helicopters accompanied by four other friendly helicopters successfully infiltrated the assault team on February 4, while A-1E aircraft provided air cover.

(S) Early February 5, the assualt team was to be exfiltrated by the same force of helicopters. However, the assault force had come under attack during the night and reported they were surrounded by numerous enemy forces. As the two Pony Express CH-3E helicopters approached the landing zone, they were subjected to intense ground fire. Only one aircraft landed and managed to load 16 troops. As the aircraft departed the landing zone one small caliber bullet penetrated the honeycomb structure of the tail rotor, but the aircraft was able to return to a friendly forward base.

(S) The second aircraft received six hits on the approach to the landing zone and was unable to land. Upon recovering at the forward base, it was discovered that the two main rotor blades had bullet holes through the honeycomb structure with no adverse effect to the airfoil. There were no crew injuries. The majority of the assault team was later recovered by the other friendly helicopters after moving to a less hostile landing zone.

(U) On another assignment, squadron crews recovered two Royal Thai Air Force L-19s which had suffered crash damage. The two aircraft were airlifted with the external cargo sling from a remote northwest Thailand area, to a railroad siding where they could be shipped to Bangkok for repair. This airlift covered approximately 100 miles.

(S) During January the out of country USAF support missions consisted of 194 hours of flying time in 200 sorties. A total of 206,270 pounds of cargo and 467 passengers were carried. In support of [redacted] missions the CH-3E aircraft flew 109 hours in 93 sorties and transported 15,500 pounds of cargo and 218 passengers.

(S) In February logistical support consisted of 134 hours in 138 sorties. There were 159,865 pounds of cargo moved along with 246 passengers. In addition USAF support mission in Thailand accounted for 49 hours of flying time in 75 sorties while logistical support was 29,020 pounds of cargo and 170 passengers ferried.

(S) Poor weather conditions in Northern Laos in February caused one mission cancellation and hampered the success of several other missions in that area. [redacted] squadron accounted for 105 hours of flying time while carrying 25,620 pounds of cargo and 243 passengers in 95 sorties.

(S) The majority of these missions were into the Steel Tiger area of Laos.(74)

(S) During the period the primary mission of the UH-1F detachment at Tan Son Nhut Air Base remained reconnaissance film delivery for the 460th and 16th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadrons, with a secondary mission of VIP transportation and general utility.

(C) In January a new system was developed so that all detachment missions are now fragged through 7AF Strike Plans. The landing sites were divided into morning flight 0830 to Bien Hoa, Phu Loi, Lai Khe, Dau Tieng, Trang Sup, Cu Chi, Duc Hoa and back to Tan Son Nhut. The afternoon flight departs Tan Son Nhut at 1400 hours for Bien Hoa, Xuan Loc, Black Horse, Luscombe, Vung Tau, Bear Cat, Long Bien and back to Tan Son Nhut. Each flight is two-hours and thirty-minutes in duration and covers a distance of 135 miles.(75)

(S) In addition to film delivery, the Green Hornets were the primary support of the 519th Tactical Communication Squadron located at Trang Sup. On many occasions ammunition, radar and other replacement parts were transported to the men at "Penthouse".

(C) During the period the Tan Son Nhut detachment flew 716 sorties in 228 hours, carried 1,284 passengers and 35 tons of cargo.

(S) The mission of the UH-1Fs assigned to Ban Me Thout remained unchanged during the quarter. The primary mission in support of "Daniel Boone" still remained highly classified.

(U) The Green Hornet air operations greatly increased during the quarter when the VC and NVA launched their Tet offensive.

(U) During the week-long battle, the squadron was frequently called on to aid friendly forces in the Ban Me Thout area. The gunships were first scrambled before dawn January 30. They fired on suspected mortar concentrations. Later that day two gunships drove VC and NVA troops from a stream of refugees and killed six of the enemy as confirmed by FACs. Before the day was over, the gunships took part in an assault on an estimated two companies of NVA, dropping 28 more of the enemy, according to FACs.

(U) February 1, FACs called out gunships to support a friendly force trapped in a school house by heavy enemy fire. During this mission, the Green Hornets received yet another distress call from a friendly tank element pinned down by the enemy in the town of Ban Me Thout. An estimated company of NVA had occupied a segment of the city. The Green Hornets rolled in and left an entire enemy block in flames, relieving much of the pressure on friendly ground forces in the area.

(U) At 0330 hours February 2, a gunship flight was launched to attack observed enemy mortar positions. An enemy position was observed firing and was immediately attacked and destroyed by the gunships. A few minutes later, the flight was advised that an ARVN compound was under heavy attack two miles west of the city. The flight leader contacted the U.S. Army Advisor in the compound for target identification. There were no flare ships available for illumination and the compound had to be identified by several buildings burning within the perimeter. The enemy had breached the southern defenses and were pouring into the compound. The gunships put their initial fire at 50 meters inside the perimeter and on succeeding passes worked outward to drive the enemy outside the compound.

(U) At 0410 hours the gunships had expended their ordance and the compound was secure. Later that day, the crews were informed by the senior advisor that their prompt response and extremely accurate fire, even in almost total darkness, had without a doubt, saved the compound from being overrun and destroyed by the enemy. The 155th Helicopter Company at Ban Me Thout Airstrip reported it was under constant mortar and sniper harrassment. Some of their men had been shot off the tops of airplanes while trying to repair them. Two Green Hornets "sanitized" the surrounding area with rockets and minigun fire. Also the same day the squadron slicks and gunships along with the Army's 155th Helicopter Company assisted elements of the 173rd Airborne Brigade in a combat assault against Hill 491 south of the city. Still later that day, a ground patrol making a sweep located a group of VC in a plantation. The squadron gunships went into a protective orbit over the area to keep the enemy from escaping. The friendly forces moved in and took 66 prisoners. The Green Hornet Slicks carried the prisoners out.

(U) On February 3, the gunships again scrambled to aid elements of the 173rd in heavy contact with an NVA unit. Receiving heavy ground fire, the Green Hornets worked in support of friendly ground forces within 100 meters of where artillery shells were impacting against the enemy. The gunships received six KBAs confirmed by the FACs in the encounter.

(U) On the evening of the fourth the Green Hornets came to the aid of tanks again. The tanks were pinned down by 57mm recoiless rifles and 50 caliber machine guns.

(U) During the offesnive some of the squadron aircraft received battle damage and five aircrew members were wounded.

(S) During the period from February 13 to 25, the Green Hornets in conjunction with the 5th Special Forces, Detachment B-50, under operational control of First Field Forces Vietnam, conducted intensive reconnaissance operations in the area south and west of Ban Me Thout to locate enemy forces which had participated in the attacks on the city.

(S) Using a revised concept for inserting the reconnaissance patrols during the period, 12 infiltrations of six-man teams were made. On nine occasions emergency exfiltrations of teams had to be performed due to their being compromised or in contact with enemy forces.

(S) Five of these extractions had to be made using two helicopters and McGuire rigs for each. The McGuire rig is composed of three climbing ropes with a canvas sling and a trapeze wrist lock on each rope, it is excellent for lifting personnel out of heavy jungle when it is impossible to lower helicopters for landing or rope ladder pickup.(76)

(S) UH-1F accomplishments for the quarter were:(77)

Hours flown	2,769
Missions fragged	959
Sorties Flown	5,708
Passengers	5,345
Cargo in tons	110.275
Rounds, 7.62 expended	834,350
3.75 rockets expended	2,070
SAR alert hours	0

Armed helicopter sorties

Infils	224
Exfils	228
Visual Recon	109
Army Base Defense	64
Tac Movement	1302

Unarmed Helicopter sorties

Infils	254
Exfils	227
Visual Recon	80
Army Support	249
Tac Movement	1452
AF Support	1445
Med Evac	13

Awards

(U) On March 22, 1968, General William W. Momyer, 7th Air Force Commander, presented the Air Force Outstanding Unit Award, First Oak Leaf Cluster, to the 20th Helicopter Squadron. The squadron commander, Lieutenant Colonel John M. Steen, accepted the award.(78)

Loss of CH-3C #63-9678

(C) On December 30, 1967, a CH-3C helicopter was lost near Lima Site 85 in Laos while on a supply mission. On December 31 the Wing Commander ordered an investigation to the Lima Site in an effort to determine the circumstances surrounding the aircraft loss.

(U) The team consisted of deputy commander for operations, wing safety representatives, 20th Helicopter Squadron commander, commander of the CH-3C flight (Udorn), operations officer, Sikorsky technical representative and qualified maintenance personnel, for a total of 11.

(C) The team first proceeded to Udorn RTAFB, where briefings were accomplished in intelligence, weather and crew and passenger procedures. because of the situation in Laos and the nature of the mission, both intelligence, escape and evasion and crew briefings were extensive.

(C) The departure from Udorn to Lima Site 85 was January 1, 1968, at 1000 local time. Three CH-3Cs participarted, flying as a flight on a regular fragged mission, as two of the CH-3Cs carried cargo for the site and the lead aircraft carried the passengers.

(C) The exact route, as flown by the downed CH-3C, was duplicated to have a full appreciation of weather, terrain, facilities, navigational aids, current intelligence data in relation to route of flight and the facilites being utilized, and operational procedures employed to cope with all of the above.

(C) Route of flight was direct from Udorn to a point 30 miles east of Vientiane, the to Lima Sites 98, 108, 50, 36, and 85. This dog-leg is necessary in order to avoid Vientiane (capital of Laos).

(U) The following is an account of the aircraft loss as uncovered by the investigation team:

(C) On the day of the loss, two CH-3Cs departed for Lima Site 85 laden with supplies.

(C) When the CH-3Cs arrived at the Landing Zone (LZ), the weather prohibited an immediate landing, so the two aircraft orbited the area for several minutes. Occasional cloud breaks appeared, and during one of these the two helicopters made their approaches to Lima Site 85. The first aircraft landed without incident. The second aircraft began an approach from the east side of the crest into the LZ, approximately three minutes latter. Cloud movement forced the pilot to make a circling approach from the oposite end of the pad about 200 feet north of the non-directional beacon antenna. Realizing that the approach would require his entire attention, the pilot directed the co-pilot to monitor the rotor RPM and the crew chief to observe the tail rotor. The elevation rises gradually at the west end of the LZ and the hillside is covered with 80 foot trees.

(C) The entire area around the site, elevation 5,740 feet, is insecure. Only the very top of the crest can be considered secure. Ground fire is received on all approaches to the landing pad from numerous vantage points by unfriendlies, who have made continuous attempts to infiltrate the site. The final phase of the helicopter landing is most critical because speeds are approaching that of a full hover, presenting an excellent target for small arms fire.

(U) The approach over the trees began normally with rotor RPM stable. Approximately 200 feet from the intended landing the aircraft suddenly experienced a power loss and began to settle. The crew chief called, "bring it up, you are in the tree's". The pilot applied full power but the aircraft continued to settle. He stated that at this time he felt he could have possible reached the landing site by dropping the nose of the aircraft. However the other aircraft was parked in such a way as to make a collision between the two inevitable. He elected to land short in the trees. The aircraft settled straight down with its rotor blades cutting off the top of an 80 foot tree. The hull of the Ch-3C broke off another tree directly underneath and it came to rest on its left side, partially held up by the remaining trunk of this tree.

(U) The top of the broken tree had torn into the rear section of the left engine and adjoining part of the fuselage. Other tree stumps and rocks tore several large holes in the underside, damaging most of the system components in lower compartments. One of the main rotor blades cut through the tail boom and drive shaft, and the aft part of the boom with the tail rotor and stablizer separated.

(U) Both the pilot and co-pilot stated that they could not explain the sudden settling of the aircraft. They said that the approach appeared to be normal throughout. Research of the aircraft history revealed no indication of mechanical difficulties that might have caused a power loss. Ground crews at the site said they had heard sporatic ground fire throughout the day. An inspection of the wreckage showed both engines had sustained considerable foreign object damage, most probably all resulting from the impact with the trees.

(U) It was not possible to determine if battle damage existed, as damage to the underside of the aircraft and to the rotor blades had nearly disintegrated. It is unlikely that all parts of the rotor blades will ever be found because of the dense jungle.

(S) The pilot was well experienced in helicopter operations and had flown into Lima Site 85 eight times prior to this flight, with weather always being a problem. Both pilots were current and well qualified.

(C) Due to the inaccessability of the area, the aircraft's position in the jungle, the elevation and associated poor weather, recovery of the aircraft was not recommended. The possible loss of additional resources is not worth the risk involved as the aircraft is probably damaged beyond economical repair.(79)

20th Helicopter Squadron (20th HS)

(S) The mission of the 20th Helicopter Squadron at Udorn RTAFB, Thailand changed during this period. The requirement to provide logistical support to a highly classified mission in Northern Laos was terminated. With the loss of this mission, support of controlled American sources (CAS) activities declined slightly due to an increase in mission support to Military Assistance Command-Vietnam, Special Observations Group (MACVSOG). Logistical support was provided to TACAN sites located in Thailand and Laos. In addition, the support of United States Special Forces training in Thailand increased during this period.(34)

(U) In May, Lieutenant Colonel William B. Skinner replaced Lieutenant Colonel John M. Steen as squadron commander. Colonel Steen became special assistant to the Deputy Commander, Special Air Operations, 14th ACW. Lieutenant Colonel James A. McMullen became second in command of the 20th as Special Assistant to the commander.

(S) The expected decrease in mission effectiveness mentioned in the last history did occur to some extent, but was not as severe as expected due to replacement personnel arriving approximately one month earlier than in the past. Some loss of effectiveness was experianced because some personnel had to be used without adequate time off, thus reducing their efficiency.

(U) The large changeover of personnel resulted in a number of organizational and personnel changes. The 20th is currently

under the direction of Colonel David C. Collins, Deputy Commander, Special Air Operations. Within the 20th, Lieutenant Colonel Frank A. DiFiglia became the chief of UH-1F Operations. He relieved Lieutenant Colonel Thomas C. Bass, who rotated to CONUS. Lieutenant Colonel Robert J. Wickwire became chief of Ban Me Thout operations.

(U) The organizational structure was revised to locate flights A, B and C at Udorn with CH-3C aircraft, and flights D, E, F and G at Tan Son Nhut and Nha Trang with UH-1F aircraft. UH-1F Maintenance is now directly under the commander of the 20th instead of the Chief of UH-1F Operations.(35)

(U) Due to the increase in personnel and aircraft, Flight G was formed at Nha Trang. However, the mission of D, E, F and G flights remained the same as during the previous quarter.

UDORN OPERATIONS

(S) During this reporting period, one CH3 helicopter was assigned to support an F-111 accident investigation team. Transportation was provided for the team to and from the crash site located in Thailand. This effort utilized one helicopter continuously for a period of six days.

(S) During the period, Lieutenant Colonel Shirrel G. Martin and his CH3 crew successfully rescued an A-1E pilot whose aircraft was shot down in central Laos while escorting two CH3 helicopters. The pilot parachuted into tall trees requiring the use of the jungle penetrator to accomplish the rescue. While under constant small arms fire and in close

proximity to a 37mm anti-aircraft gun. This action occurred following the successful infiltration of CAS roadwatch teams.

(C) On another occasion, the "Pony Express" was called upon to support the recovery of an A-1E aircraft that had crash landed 24 miles northeast of Udorn RTAFB. Transportation was provided for accident investigation personnel, as well as armament and maintenance personnel. Using the CH-3C external cargo sling, the 4400 pound A-1E engine was successfully carried to Udorn. Estimated weight was 6600 pounds, with wingtips removed at the wing folding point and the horizontal and vertical stabilizers removed.

(S) On three seperate missions the squadron transported Laotian refugees to safe areas in northern Laos. A total of 1,112 refugees were moved along with 24,350 pounds of personal belongings.

(S) May 24, CH-3C aircraft 661 was launched on a mission in support of a Thai T-28 crash in the vicinity of Chieng Mai, Thailand. After approximately one hour of flying, the crew reported a main transmission oil leak and that they were making a precautionary landing. A safe landing was accomplished without damage to the aircraft approximately 110 miles west of Udorn.

(S) Helicopter 692 was launched at 1815L to recover the crew and passengers from the downed aircraft. After minor difficulty due to darkness, the downed aircraft was located. Oil

was leaking from a fitting on the transmission. Temporary repairs were made, but because of the darkness and rough terrain, it was decided to leave the aircraft until the next morning when a more positive fix on the transmission leak could be made. Two American and four Thai Air Policemen remained with the downed aircraft. Crew and passengers from 692 and 681 returned to Udorn. Another aircraft carrying maintenance personnel was dispatched the following morning to repair the downed vehicle and complete the Chieng Mai mission.

(∅) June 21 three aircraft were sent to a forward operating site to accomplish several infiltration and exfiltration missions. At the first landing zone two teams were to be put in and one taken out. The lead helicopter, with Major William H. Chambers and Major James S. Villotti, landed for one team exchange.

(∅) The second helicopter, with Major Jay R. Oberg and Captain Carlton J. Fulmer, orbited nearby, waiting to approach the same Landing Zone (LZ). Small arms and automatic weapons fire was directed at the second helicopter. It received a total of five hits: two through the cockpit, one through the fuselage, one in the tail pylon and one in the packet of a main rotor blade. Major Oberg was hit in the face by flying plexiglass, but was not seriously injured. All three aircraft returned safely to the forward base and subsequently recovered to Udorn.(36)

(∅) Accomplishments at Udorn for this period were as follows:(37)

Hours Flown	1231
Sorties Flown	1425
Passengers Carried	5035
Cargo Carried (tons)	36.2
Average Operational Ready Rate	87.6%
Average Aircraft Utilization Rate	88.9 hours per aircraft
Aircraft Utilization Authorized	50 hours per aircraft

TAN SON NHUT OPERATIONS

(S) The primary mission of the UH-1F detachment at Tan Son Nhut Air Base remained Reconnaissance Film Delivery for the 12th and 16th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadrons, with a secondary mission of VIP and Utility.

(U) Personnel at Tan Son Nhut remained three pilots, three maintenance mechanics and one aircraft dispatcher, all on TDY.

(S) The aircraft continued to be fragged through 7th Air Force Strike Plans as required on flights to Bien Hoa, Phu Loi, Lai Khe, Dau Tieng, Trang Sup, Cu Chi, Duc Hoa, Xuan Loc, Black Horse, Luscombe, Vung Tau, Bear Cat and Long Bien.

(S) A medical evacuation sortie was flown in conjunction with a film delivery mission April 30. Captain Juday was following Highway One, two miles west of Xuan Loc, when he noticed an overturned jeep with a number of trucks stopping around it. He decided to take a closer look to see if he could be of assistance. The one injured man beside the vehicle was taken by the helicopter to the hospital at Blackhorse.

(C) Accomplishments for the period at Tan Son Nhut included 669 sorties flown in 198.2 hours.(38)

NHA TRANG

(C) One of the major armament problems this quarter was the lack of mounting yokes. These are mounting platforms that fit under the fuselage of the helicopter and are used to attach rocket pods to the aircraft. Without the yokes, the squadron is unable to put more than seven UH-1F gunships into service. Squadron officials estimated that five additional yokes would solve the shortage problem.

(C) Transportation was also a big problem this quarter. This is the result of the increased personnel manning and increased mission commitments. Additional ground vehicles are necessary at Ban Me Thout and Nha Trang.

(C) A jeep, borrowed from the Forward Air Control party at Ban Me Thout, is being used to tow power units, light carts, and trailers for ammo and rockets to expedite launch and turn-around between missions. The return request by the FAC party has created an urgent requirement for a vehicle capable of continuing the vital role. Another requirement stands for some type of mobile communications equipment, permitting the mission commander and/or maintenance NCOIC to monitor missions in progress and direct aircraft movements such as launch, recall, repositioning, etc. As the quarter ends, both requirements are yet unmet. Another transportation problem was caused by the reduction of flights between Udorn and Nha Trang, causing personnel enroute-

to Udorn to spend excessive time at Nha Trang. Other routes take from three to seven days. (39)

PERSONNEL

(C) The use of gunner-helicopter mechanics is still a problem in the field of excessive amounts of duty performance. This problem could be prevented in the future by making the basic crew of the UH-1F two gunners with armament AFSCs and one crew chief on flying status from the A431X0 career field.

(C) All new pilots arriving have been first-pilot qualified in the aircraft. However, a number of them have not had Top Secret clearance. Most of the mission training is accomplished at Ban Me Thuot. A new crew member must first ride with a mission qualified crew member for two weeks, or approximately 40 hours. To become fully combat qualified, he must ride with an instructor pilot for one week on the primary "Daniel Boone" mission. It would reduce the amount of training necessary if pilots would attend OCTS at Hurlburt AFB, Fla., and fly with the crews rather than undergo individual training.

MAINTENANCE

(S) Eight UH-1F aircraft were received during this period to bring unit strength to 23 aircraft. The SEAOR 56 "Lucky Tiger" modifications have now been completed on 23 aircraft. The newly arrived aircraft required a great deal of manhours to be put into operating condition. A Quality Control Deficiency Report was submitted on aircraft 165. The aircraft arrived with 38 discrepancies, 20 of which were grounding items.

Nearly 300 manhours were required to put the aircraft in commission.

(C) Materiel Control ordered some of the parts for the new aircraft, while others were procured from the Army by use of the interservice agreement. Approximately 20 percent of the supply items came from the Army. This interservice agreement led to a small misunderstanding between the Army and Air Force. B-50 at Ban Me Thuot received a message in which the Chief of Army Logistics stated they had no responsibility for logistical support of attached Air Force units. It was later learned that the message applied only to ammunition and fuel.

(U) Another maintenance headache was the shortage of bench stock supply items such as cotter keys, safety wire and bolts, which were extremely hard to obtain.

BAN ME THUOT OPERATIONS

(C) There are presently 10 UH-1Fs at Ban Me Thuot. Two aircraft are used as spares, one as a slick, the other a gunship.

(C) As the quarter began, "Green Hornets" were continuing their operations from the temporary camp at Ban Me Thuot (east) field. By mid-April, as a result of living in tents, approximately half the personnel in camp were affected with gastro-intestinal upsets. On June 11, the long awaited move to the new permanent camp was made. Morale shot up immediately.

(S) The UH-1F primary operation at Ban Me Thuot in support of "Daniel Boone" remains highly classified. Only nine days were spent in support of this operation. During the remaining

time the "Green Hornets" worked in conjunction with the 5th Special Forces Detachment B-50, under operational control of First Field Forces Vietnam.

(S) Using a revised concept of inserting reconnaissance patrols and "Hornet Forces" composed of 34 men serving as reaction forces, the UH-1Fs made 13 exfiltrations, of which one was by McGuire Rig. Thirteen enemy POWs were captured and [illegible] battlefield wounded were evacuated by the "Green Hornets." The aircraft sustained 22 hits from enemy fire, had three aircrew members wounded and were credited with 37 enemy kills.

(S) On April 3, Major Norman F. Eldridge and his UH-1F crew came to the aid of a beleagured reconnaissance team 15 miles southwest of Dan Me Thuot. Darkness had set in when the "Green Hornets" arrived on the scene. The gunship went down to provide close fire suppression and then Major Eldridge descended and turned his searchlight on to find a place to land. He noticed a hole in the jungle canopy and letdown through it. Unable to reach the ground, he hovered with his lights on until the team made a rope ladder pickup.

(S) On April 22, two gunships were launched to come to the aid of an Army Hornet Force from the Special Forces "A" Camp at Duc Lap, under the direction of the Forward Air Controller at the scene. The gunships rolled in and effectively suppressed the enemy fire.

(S) On May 3 the squadron used two gunships and three

slicks to liberate 10 indiginous personnel who had been prisoners of the Viet Cong.

(S) The camp at Ban Me Thuot came under enemy fire by mortar May 6. During a pause after three mortar impacts, two of the squadron gunships were launched. The camp was under fire from 0130 to 0330. An enemy mortar round hit the ammo storage area next to B-50 and shrapnel and live rounds from the ensuing explosions caused considerable damage.

(S) During the attack the Viet Cong used different tactics than the 20th had encountered previously. The enemy had the field encircled with mortar tubes, two in each firing position. As the gunships approached, the enemy would not fire until the number two gunship passed their position, making it extremely hard to locate their positions. Nevertheless, the two "Green Hornets" each knocked out a mortar position.(40)

(S) UH-1F accomplishments for the quarter were: (41)

Hours Flown	2524.3
Missions Fragged	1042
Sorties Flown	6095
Passengers	6976
Cargo (tons)	119.3
Rounds 7.62 Expended	707,600
2.75 Rockets Expended	2063
Alert Hours	16,634

ARMED HELICOPTER SORTIES

Infiltrations	223
Exfiltrations	249
Visual Reconnaissance	32
Army Base Defense	26
TAC Movement	1068

UNARMED HELICOPTER SORTIES

Infiltrations	325
Exfiltrations	363
Visual Reconnaissance	33
Army Support	259
TAC Movement	1807
AF Support	1682
Med Evac	28

AWARDS

(U) Decorations presented for the quarter were one Air Force Cross, two Silver Stars, seven Distinguished Flying Crosses, one Bronze Star (with "V" Device), 18 Air Medals, three Air Force Commendation Medals and three Purple Hearts.

[redacted] S [redacted]

FORCE EYES O[illegible]

HISTORICAL REPORT
20TH HELICOPTER SQUADRON
1 APRIL - 30 JUNE 1968
SECRET SPECAT AIR FORCE EYES ONLY

PROJECT CORONA HARVEST
DO NOT DESTROY
No. [illegible] CATALOGED

GROUP-3
Downgraded at 12 year
Not automatically [illegible]

APPROVED BY

JAMES A. McMULLEN, Lt Colonel, USAF
Special Assistant to the Commander

John B. Skidmore

JOHN B. SKIDMORE, Captain, USAF
Historical Officer

[redacted]

20H5 68-45

ANNOTATED BIBLOGRAPHY

1. Interview by Captain John B. Skidmore, 20th Helicopter Squadron Historian with Lieutenant Colonel James A. McMullen, Special Assistant to the Commander, 5 July 1968.	1. The interview covered organization structure, problems, recommended solutions and discussion of classified information.
2. Interview by 20th Helicopter Squadron Historian with Lieutenant Colonel Thomas C. Bass, Chief UH1F Operations 20th Helicopter Squadron, 3 April 1968.	2. The interview covered problems, recommended solutions and discussion of classified information.
3. Historical Reports, 20th Helicopter Squadron, Udorn RTAFB, Thailand April, May, June 1968 by Major Anthony E. Azure, Historical Officer.	3. These reports are classified Secret. Location: 20th Helicopter Squadron Safe, Historical File.
4. 20th Helicopter Squadron, Forward Operating Location, Daily Situation Reports: dated 1 April - 30 June 1968.	4. These reports are classified Confidential. Location: 20th Helicopter Squadron Safe, Ban Me Thuot Situation Reports.
5. Hornet Log Book: dated 1 April - 30 June 1968.	5. This is classified Confidential and it covers the day-to-day operations at Ban Me Thuot. Location: Mission Commanders desk Ban Me Thuot.
6. Interview by 20th Helicopter Squadron Historian with Captain Jackie D. Burgess UH1F Maintenance Officer, 5 July 1968.	6. Interview covered problems, recommended solutions and discussion of UH-1F Maintenance.
7. Quality Control Deficiency Report.	7. This report covers the discrepancies on aircraft 165. Location: UH1F Maintenance File.
8. Letter of Commendation, 20th Helicopter Squadron from Major Alfhed H. Paddock, Jr., U.S. Army dated 11 June 1968.	8. Attached.
9. Historical Interview by 20th Helicopter Squadron Historian with Major Henry A. Klung Tan Son Nhut Detachment Commander.	9. This interview covered the operation at Tan Son Nhut.
10. SAW (SEA) Helicopter Operations and Tactics, Draft Manual.	10. This manual is classified Confidential and is being prepared for reproduction. Location: 20th Helicopter Squadron Safe.

[redacted]

[redacted]

11. The use of helicopters in support of Radar and Comm/Navigations Sites in Southeast Asia December 1966 - June 1968.	11. Attached.
12. 7th Air Force Operations Order 509-68, 20th Helicopter Squadron, dated September 1967.	12. This order is classified Secret. Location: 20th Helicopter Squadron Safe.
13. UH-1F Awards and Decorations Book.	13. Book lists awards and decorations of the 20th Helicopter Squadron. Location: Awards and Decorations Desk 20th Helicopter Squadron.
14. Monthly Re-Cap UH-1F Sorties: dated April, May, June 1968.	14. These reports are classified Secret SPECAT Air Force Eyes Only. Location: 20th Helicopter Squadron Safe, Reports File.
15. Management Status and Trends Reports: dated April, May, June 1968.	15. These reports provide statistics for the months April, May and June 1968 and are unclassified. Location: 20th Helicopter Squadron Operations File.

[redacted]

(Security Classification - If Classified)

HISTORICAL DATA RECORD	REPORTING PERIOD FROM	TO	REPORTS CONTROL SYMBOL
	1 Apr 68	30 Jun 68	AU-D5

FROM: (NAME AND LOCATION OF UNIT SUBMITTING THIS REPORT)
20th Helicopter Squadron
14th Air Commando Wing (PACAF)
APO San Francisco 96205

TO:
14th Air Commando Wing (DXI)
APO San Francisco 96205

IF MORE SPACE IS NEEDED FOR ANY ITEM, ATTACH ADDITIONAL SHEETS INDICATING APPLICABLE ITEM NUMBER.

SECTION I — ASSIGNMENT

MAJOR AIR COMMAND	NUMBERED AIR FORCE	AIR DIVISION	WING	GROUP
PACAF	7th Air Force		14th Air Commando Wing	

SECTION II — SUBORDINATE UNITS

There are seven flights located at three operating locations. "A", "B", and "C" flights are located at Udorn RTAFB, Thailand. "D", "E", "F" and "G" flights are located at Tan Son Nhut and Nha Trang AB, RVN.

SECTION III — MISSIONS

A. PRIMARY "A", "B" and "C" flights - [redacted] counter-insurgency activities and transportation. "D", "E", "F" and "G" flights - unconventional warfare, reconnaissance film courier, base defense, SAW aining, logistical support of U. S. A. F. units or U. S. sponsored activites, psychological warfare.

B. SECONDARY (OR OTHER)
"A", "B", and "C" flights - Civic Action, utility and rescue. "D", "E", "F", and "G" flights - VIP courier, utility and rescue.

SECTION IV — PERSONNEL

STATUS	OFFICERS	AIRMEN	CIVILIANS	TOTAL
ASSIGNED	83	179	2	264
AUTHORIZED	90	231	4	325
ATTACHED				

SECTION V — EQUIPMENT

A. AIRCRAFT
CH 3-C-7
UH1F - 23

B. WEAPONS (INCLUDING MISSILES)
20 - 7.62 mini-guns
14 - 3.75 Rocket Launchers
13 - M-60 Machine Guns

C. ELECTRONICS
N/A

D. OTHER
N/A

AF FORM

1. (U) During the quarter Lieutenant Colonel William B. Skinner replaced Lieutenant Colonel John M. Steen as Commander of the 20th Helicopter Squadron. The transfer of command took place in May with Lieutenant Colonel Steen being reassigned as Special Assistant to the Deputy Commander, Special Air Operations, 14th Air Commando Wing. Lieutenant Colonel James A. McMullen became second in command of the 20th as Special Assistant to the Commander. (1)

2. (Ø) The potential loss in mission effectiveness that was mentioned in the last history did occur to some extent, but was not as severe as expected due to replacement personnel arriving approximately one month earlier than in the past. Some loss of effectiveness was experienced because some personnel had to be used without adequate time off, thus reducing their efficiency. However, when it is considered the approximately 50% of the personnel in the UH1F Operation rotated to the CONUS during this period it is a credit to their replacements that a greater reduction of effectiveness did not occur. (1) (2)

3. (U) The large changeover of personnel did result in a number of organizational and personnel changes. The 20th Helicopter Squadron is under the direction of Colonel David C. Collins - Deputy Commander, Special Air Operations, 14th Air Commando Wing. Within the 20th Lieutenant Colonel Frank A. Di Figlia became Chief of UH1F Operations thus relieving Lieutenant Colonel Thomas C. Bass who rotated to the CONUS. Lieutenant Colonel Robert J. Wickwire became Chief of Ban Me Thuot Operations. The organizational structure was revised with flights "A", "B" and "C" being located at Udorn RTAFB with CH3C aircraft. Flights "D", "E", "F" and "G" are located at Tan Son Nhut and Nha Trang AB, RVN with UH1F aircraft. UH1F Maintenance is now directly under the Commander of the 20th instead of the Chief of UH1F Operations. The attached diagram shows the new organizational structure. (1)

4. (U) Due to the increase in personnel and aircraft Flight "G" was formed at Nha Trang AB, RVN. However, the mission of "D", "E", "F" and "G" flights remained the same as during the previous reporting period. (1)

5. (Ø) The mission of the 20th Helicopter Squadron at Udorn RTAFB, Thailand changed during this period. The requirement to provide logistical support to a highly classified mission in Northern Laos was terminated. With the loss of this mission, support [redacted] activities declined slightly due to an increase in mission support to Military Assistance Command - Vietnam, Special Operations Group (MACVSOG). Logistical support was provided to TACAN sites located in Thailand and Laos. In addition, the support of United States Special Forces training in Thailand increased during this period. (3)

6. (Ø) During this period one CH3 helicopter was assigned to support an F-111 accident investigation team. Transportation was provided for the investigation team members to and from the crash site located in Thailand. This effort utilized one helicopter continuously for a period of six days. (3)

[redacted]

[redacted]

7. (S) During this period, Lt Colonel Shirrel G. Martin and crew successfully rescued an A1E pilot whose aircraft was shot down in Central Laos while escorting two CH-3 helicopters. The pilot parachuted into tall trees requireing the use of the rescue hoist and the tree penetrator to accomplish the rescue. While under constant small arms fire and in close proximity to a 37mm anti-aircraft gun, the downed pilot was rescued only through the courage and determination of Lt Colonel Martin and his crew. This action occurred following the successful infiltration of a [redacted] roadwatch team. (3)

8. (S) The "Pony Express" was called upon to support the recovery of an A1E aircraft that had crashed landed 24 miles Northeast of Udorn RTAFB. Transportation was provided for accident investigation personnel, as well as armament and maintenance personnel. Using the CH-3E external cargo sling, the 4400 pound A-1E engine was successfully carried to Udorn RTAFB. The following day the A1E fuselage was successfully returned to Udorn RTAFB. Estimated weight was 6600 pounds, with the wing tips removed at the wing folding point and the horizontal and vertical stabilizers removed. This is another example of the various missions accomplished by the 20th Helicopter Squadron. (3)

9. (S) On three separate missions the 20th Helicopter Squadron CH-3E helicopters transported Loation refugees to safe areas in Northern Laos. A total of 1112 refugees were moved along with 24,350 pounds of personal belongings. (3)

10. (S) On 24 May, CH3C aircraft 681 was launched on a mission in support of a Thai T-28 crash in the vicinity of Chiang Mai, Thailand. After approximately one hour of flying time the crew reported a main transmission oil leak and that they were making a precautionary landing. A safe landing was accomplished without damage to the aircraft approximately 110 miles west of Udorn. Another helicopter, 692 with Major Villotti and Major Hall was launched at 1815L to recover the crew and passengers from the downed aircraft. After minor difficulty due to darkness, the downed aircraft was located. The Transmission oil leak was from a fitting on the transmission. Temporary repairs were made, however due to darkness and the enroute terrain, it was decided to leave the aircraft until the next morning when a more positive fix on the transmission leak could be made. Two American and four Thai Air Policemen remained with the downed aircraft and 692 and the crew and passengers from 681, returned to Udorn. The next morning another aircraft with a maintenance crew was dispatched to repair and recover the downed aircraft, and to complete the mission to Chiang Mai. Two Americans from Udorn were killed in the T-28 crash. The mission was to recover their remains. (3)

11. (S) Two CH3C helicopters were dispatched to transport a generator to TACAN Channel 79. Just prior to reaching Channel 79, Major Hall in 582 had a auxiliary servo malfunction. A hydraulic line in the auxiliary servo system had ruptured. Major Hall made a landing at LS 98. A new hydraulic line was flown in. The crews then completed their mission and returned to Udorn without further difficulty. (3)

12. (S) On 21 June three aircraft were sent to a forward operating site to accomplish several infils and exfils. At the first landing zone two teams

[redacted]

[redacted]

were to be put in and one taken out. The lead helicopter Major Chambers and Major Villotti landed to off load and on load one team. The second helicopter, Major Oberg and Captain Fulmer, orbited nearby, waiting to approach to the same LZ. Small arms and automatic weapons fire was directed at the second helicopter. It received a total of five hits; two through the cockpit, one through the fuselage, one in the tail pylon, and one in the packet of a main rotor blade. Major Oberg was hit in the face by flying plexiglass, but was not seriously injured. All three aircraft returned safely to the forward base and subsequently recovered to Udorn. (3)

13. (S) During this reporting period the accomplishments at Udorn were as follows: (3) (15)

Hours flown - 1231

Sorties flown - 1425

Passengers carried - 5035

Cargo carried - 36.2 tons

Average operational ready rate - 87.6%

Average aircraft utilization rate- 88.9 hours per aircraft

Aircraft utilization authorized - 50 hours per aircraft

14. (S) During this reporting period the primary mission of the UH-1F Detachment at Tan Son Nhut AB, RVN remained Reconnaissance Film Delivery for the 12th and 16th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadrons with a secondary mission of VIP and Utility. (9)

15. (U) Personnel at Tan Son Nhut, TDY, three pilots, three maintenance mechanics and one aircraft dispatcher. (9)

16. (C) The aircraft was fragged through 7th Air Force Strike Plans as required on flights to Bien Hoa, Phu Loi, Lai Khe, Dau Tieng, Trang Sup, Cu Chi, Duc Hoa, Xuan Loc, Black Horse, Luscombe, Vung Tau, Bear Cat and Long Bien. (9)

17. (C) During this period twelve VIP flights were flown. The following is a partial list of VIP passengers. (9)

General J. D. Ryan - Commander of PACAF

General W. W. Momyer - Commander of 7AF

Major General R. F. Worley - Vice Commander of 7AF

Major General Carlton - DCS/O SAC

Major General Campbell - DCS/M, SAC

[redacted]

Brig General Seith - Chief of Staff 7AF

Brig General McLaughlin - Commander 834th Air Division

18. (C) A medical evacuation sortie was flown in conjunction with a film delivery mission on 30 April. Captain Juday was flying along highway one, two miles west of Xuan Loc, RVN when he noticed an overturned jeep with a number of trucks stopping around it. He decided to take a closer look to see if the aircraft could be of assistance. There was an injured man beside the vehicle. Captain Juday landed, picked up the man and took him to the hospital at Blackhorse. (9)

19. (C) During this period the Tan Son Nhut detachment flew 669 sorties for 198.2 hours.

20. (C) One of the biggest concerns during this period, is that the unit cannot put more than seven UH-1F gunships into service until additional mounting yokes can be obtained. The yokes are mounting platforms that fit under the fuselage of the helicopter and are necessary to attach rocket pods to the aircraft. It is desirable that at least five additional yokes be obtained as soon as possible. (1)

21. (C) The biggest problem during this time period has been the lack of adequate transportation. This is a result of the increased personnel manning and increased mission commitments. Additional ground vehicles are necessary at Ban Me Thuot and Nha Trang. The C-47 from base flight at Udorn RTAFB, was cut back to one flight per week. This required new personnel enroute to Udorn to spend excessive time at Nha Trang AB. Another route would take from 3 - 7 days. (1)

22. (C) With the eight additional aircraft that were received, sufficient aircraft are now available to fulfill mission requirements. (1)

23. (C) The joint gunner-helicopter mechanic usage is still a problem in the field as it requires an excessive amount of duty performance. This problem could be prevented in the future by making the basic crew of the UH-1F two gunners with armament AFSC's and one crew chief, on flying status from the A431X0 career field. (1) (2)

24. (C) Pilots that are arriving have all been first pilot qualified in the aircraft. However, a number of pilots have been arriving without Top Secret clearances and cannot be used on the primary mission until they obtain a clearance. Most of the mission training is accomplished at Ban Me Thuot. A new crewmember must first ride with a mission qualified crewmember for two weeks, or approximately forty hours. Then before he can become fully combat qualified he must ride with an instructor pilot for one week on the mission. It would reduce the amount of training necessary if new crewmembers would attend CCTS at Hulburt AFB, Florida as crews and fly as crews rather than obtaining individual training. (1)

25. (S) Eight UH1F aircra ft were received during this period for a total of twenty-three aircraft. The SEAOR 56 "Lucky Tiger" modifications have now

[redacted]

[redacted]

been completed on all twenty-three aircraft. The newly arrived aircraft required a great deal of manhours to be put in operating condition. A Quality Control Deficiency Report was submitted on aircraft 165. The aircraft arrived with thirty-eight discrepancies, twenty of which were grounding items. Approximately 300 manhours were required to put the aircraft in commission. (6) (7)

26. (C) Material Control ordered all parts and many parts were procured from the Army, by use of the interservice agreement that was established between the services. Approximately 20% of the supply items came from the Army. This system seems to be working better however, the UH1F maintenance was unable to obtain damper rods, control tubes and inlet filters. B-50 at Ban Me Thuot received a message in which the Chief of Army Logistics stated they had no responsibility for logistical support of attached Air Force units. It was since learned that this meant only ammunition and fuel. (4) (6)

27. (U) The biggest maintenance problem that occurred during this reporting period was the fact that bench stock items such as cotter keys, safety wire and bolts, were extremely hard to obtain. Another major problem is that OJT training is extremely difficult because instructors and students are seldom together as a result of operating from remote locations. (6)

28. (C) Ten UH-1F's are located at Ban Me Thuot. Two aircraft are used as spares, one as a slick and the other as a gunship.

29. (C) From the beginning of the quarter the "Green Hornets" continued to operate from the temporary camp at Ban Me Thuot (East). By mid April, as a result of living in tents under poor living conditions, gastro-intestional upsets became very prevalent. At one time approximately one-half of the personnel in camp were affected. On 11 June the long awaited move to the new permanent camp was made. The morale of the 20th personnel raised tremendously with the move as a result of having modern facilities at their disposal. (5) (8)

30. (C) Transportation for the 20th Helicopter Squadron at Ban Me Thuot is becoming a problem. The jeep being used is borrowed and the forward air controllers have requested it be returned. Therefore, it is a urgent requirement to obtain a vehicle capable of towing power units, light carts and trailers for ammo and rockets to expedite launch or turn-around between missions. At least two jeeps or one jeep and one weapons carrier should be made available. Another requirement is for some type of mobile communications equipment, permitting the mission commander and/or the maintenance NCOIC to monitor missions in progress and direct aircraft movements such as launch, recall, repositioning etc., it is recommended that a jeep containing communications equipment such as those used by ALO's and other tactical air support squadron personnel for use at forward operating locations be obtained as soon as possible. Failure to obtain adequate transportation will increase the probability of degraded mission effectiveness and could cause additional complications in coordinating and executing the complex operation. (4)

[redacted]

31. (S) The UH1F primary operation in support of "Daniel Boone" remains highly classified. However, only nine days were spent in the support of the "Daniel Boone" operation. During the remaining time the "Green Hornets" in conjunction with the 5th Special Forces, Detachment B-50, under operational control of First Field Forces Vietnam, conducted intensive reconnaissance, reaction, search and destroy operations in the Ban Me Thuot and Duc Lap areas of the Republic of Vietnam. Using a revised concept of inserting reconnaissance patrols and "Hornet Forces", which are composed of thirty-four men serving as reaction forces, the UH1F's made thirteen emergency exfils, of which one was by McGuire Rig. Thirteen enemy POW's were captured and thirty-nine battle field wounded were evacuated by the "Green Hornets". The huey aircraft sustained twenty-two hits from enemy fire, had three aircrew members wounded and were credited with thirty-seven enemy kills. (4) (5)

32. (U) On 9 May UH1F 925 was involved in a fire incident while refueling. Due to mission requirements the hueys are required to refuel with engines running. While refueling a pressure surge in the refueling hose caused excessive spray to be forced out the refueling recepticle, it ignited and burned the aircraft around the filter, bulkhead and generator before it was extinguished. There were no personnel injuries. 14ACWOI 55-35 has been modified to have the refueling crew check the pressure in the line before starting to refuel, and to turn the generator switch off and leave the battery switch on during refueling. This will allow a greater safety margin on combat refuelings in the future. (4) (5)

33. (S) The men and machines of the 20th Helicopter Squadron located at Ban Me Thuot were called upon time and time again. On 3 April 1968 Major Norman F. Eldridge and crew came to the aid of a beleaguered reconnaissance team 15 miles southwest of Ban Me Thuot. Darkness had set in by the time the "Green Hornets" arrived on the scene. The gunships of the 20th went down to provide close, fire suppression and then Major Eldridge desended and turned his search light on to find a place to land. He noticed a hole in the jungle canopy and letdown through it, but he could not reach the ground, therefore, he made a rope ladder pickup and hovered with his lights on until the team was on board. On 22 April two gunships were launched to come to the aid of a Army Hornet Force, from the Special Forces "A" Camp at Duc Lap, under the direction of the forward air controller at the scene. The "Yankee" gunships rolled in and suppressed the enemy fire. On 3 May the "Green Hornets" used two gunships and three slicks to liberate ten indigenous personnel who had been prisoners of the Viet Cong. On 6 May 1968 at 0130 the camp at Ban Me Thuot came under enemy mortar fire. Two of the gunships launched durning a pause after the first three mortar impacts. The camp was under fire from 0130 until 0330. The UH1F pilots estimated they destroyed two mortar positions. One by each crew, before friendly guns and mortars took over. The crews consisted of Captain Godowski, Captain Tolbert, Sergeant Gutierrez, Airman First Class Kehl, Captain Nupen, Captain Daily, Sergeant Lewis and Sergeant Mushrush. An enemy mortar round hit the ammo storage area next to B-50, shrapnel and live rounds from the ensuing explosions caused considerable damage. The two crews worked with Ban Me Thuot Control trying to spot and destroy additional enemy rocket sites. Results were unknown. During the

previously mentioned attack the Viet Cong used different tactics than the 20th had encountered previously. They had the field encircled with mortar tubes, two tubes in each firing position. As the helicopter gunships approached they would not fire until the number two gunship passed their position. Therefore, it was extremely hard to locate their positions. On 7 May 1968 the "Green Hornet" gunships were suppressing enemy fire in support of a Hornet Force ten miles southeast of Ban Me Thuot. Sergeant Olson a mini-gunner spotted one wounded enemy on the ground "playing dead". Under the Sergeant's direction the Hornet Force was diverted and captured the man. During interrogation considerable intelligence was received from this POW. On 9 May the UH1F slicks transported 54/100 kilo bags of rice that a Hornet Force from First Company B-50 had located in a cache 20 miles southwest of Ban Me Thuot. On 16 June Hornet Forces from First, Second and Third Companies, on a search and destroy operation twenty miles North of Ban Me Thuot became engaged in heavy contact with a large enemy force. They were receiving heavy automatic weapons and mortar fire from the enemy forces that had surrounded their position. The "Huey" gunships of the 20th Helicopter Squadron were called in and gave mini-gun and rocket support. Three of the gunships received a total of sixteen hits resulting in two aircraft being put out of commission and three gunners, Sergeants Crowe, Merritt and Bowling being wounded by the heavy automatic weapons fire they received. Student 06 the commander of the besieged ground forces stated that he was extremely short on ammunition and had wounded that needed medical evacuation as soon as possible. Darkness had now set in and a "Spooky" aircraft was called in to provide night illumination support. Captain Skidmore, Captain Juday, Sergeant Niezgocki and Sergeant Cosco volunteered for the med evac and resupply mission. Two huey gunships provided fire support and the slick made the approach under the flare illumination. The ammunition was unloaded and five wounded were placed on board, three of which were in critical condition. The UH1F departed the landing zone and returned the wounded for medical treatment. (4) (5)

34. (S) The following is a recap of UH1F missions 1 April 1968 through 30 June 1968.

UH1F Hours Flown - 2524.3

Missions Fragged - 1042

Sorties Flown - 6095

Passengers - 6976

Cargo in Tons - 119.3

Rounds 7.62 Expended - 707,600

3.75 Rockets Expended - 2063

Alert Hours - 16,634

[redacted]

Type Sorties: Armed Helicopter

Infils = 223

Exfils = 249

Visual Recon = 32

Army Base Defense = 26

TAC Movement = 1068

Type Sorties: Unarmed Helicopter

Infils = 325

Exfils = 363

Visual Rec = 33

Army Support = 259

TAC Movement = 1807

AF Support = 1682

Med Evac = 28

Two aircraft and crews at Nha Trang stood eleven hours base defense alert. Aircraft and aircrews at Ban Me Thuot are on 24 hour ground alert 15 minute response. Approximate ground alert under this condition 16,365 hours. (14) (15)

35. (U) Sergeant Russel M. Hunt was awarded the Air Force Cross for gallantry in connection with military operations against a heavily armed enemy force near Dak To, Republic of Vietnam. He was assigned as a helicopter mechanic aboard a UH-1F helicopter which was attempting to evacuate allied forces pinned down by North Vietnamese troops when it was hit by ground fire and crashed. Despite painful head and face injuries, Sergeant Hunt retrieved medical supplies and water from the downed helicopter and administered First Aid to other wounded amidst constant enemy fire. Sergeant Hunt assisted in carrying the wounded through the jungle to a landing zone where he again exposed himself to hostile fire to give visual landing directions to recovery helicopters. (13)

36. (U) The following awards and decorations were awarded to 20th Helicopter Squadron personnel during this period. 1 Air Force Cross, 2 Silver Stars, 7 Distinguished Flying Crosses, 1 Bronze Star with "V" device, 18 Air Medals, 3 Air Force Commendation Medals and 3 Purple Hearts. (13)

[redacted]

[redacted]

37. (U) The following squadron personnel were awarded decorations as listed below: (13)

Silver Star

Captain Michael R. Armstrong

Captain Paul A. Maye

Distinguished Flying Cross

Captain Patrick C. Hardee

Captain Edward A. Young

SSgt Herbert L. Conner

SSgt Emile J. Mercier

SSgt Lindell R. West

Sgt Chester R. Filipski

Sgt Donald R. [illegible]

Bronze Star With "V" Device

Sgt Thomas A. Reid

Purple Heart

SSgt Dennis L. Bowling

Sgt William J. Crowe

Sgt Ronald T. Merritt

38. (U) A letter of commendation was received from Major Alfred H. Paddock former commander of B-50. It stated that his affiliation with the 20th began in June, 1967, at Forward Operating Base Two in Kontum, at which time they were providing helicopter support for two classified reconnaissance programs. In August, 1967, the 20th Helicopter Squadron became the primary supporting aviation unit for a classified reconnaissance program in which he was the project officer. When the "Green Hornets" moved to Ban Me Thuot in December 1967 they had provided helicopter support for over 100 targets, operations in which they inserted and extracted reconnaissance teams deep within enemy-held territory. On many of these operations, intense enemy ground fire was directed at the recon teams and helicopters. It is a measure of the courage and professionalism of both gunship and troop transport personnel that during this entire period only one U.S. reconnaissance team member was wounded in action. In December, 1967, the 20th Helicopter Squadron Operating Location moved to Ban Me Thuot to support Detachment B-50 in the expansion of a highly

[redacted]

[redacted]

classified reconnaissance project. Operating from a temporary camp under under austere living conditions, the 20th began full scale operations in a completely new area after only a four-day interval for the move from Kontum. In December they inaugurated the new program at Ban Me Thuot by participating in the successful capture and extraction of an important NVA prisoner from a previously considered enemy sanctuary. This operation was executed with such quick reaction and professionalism that the POW and recon team was extracted before the enemy could react and even bring fire upon them. During the period 1 December 1967 to 11 June 1968, they have supported over 170 targets. These targets were gradually increased from purely reconnaissance team missions to heliborne platoon and company size reaction exploitation operations. Throughout this change in emphasis to more offensive activity, the 20th adjusted quickly and continued their outstanding support, even in the midst of a large turnover of experienced pilots and crew personnel. He stated that it had been his extreme pleasure to have been associated with the finest helicopter unit that he had seen in eleven years of professional soldering. (3)

39. (U) A narrative report on the use of helicopters in support of TACAN/ radar and communication sites was prepared and submitted to 7th Air Force. The information was extracted from historical data on the 20th Helicopter Squadron from 1 January 1966 to 15 June 1968 and is attached to this report. (11)

40. (U) The 20th Helicopter Squadron is preparing another manual of SAW (SEA) Helicopter Operations and Tactics. This manual is a discussion of tactics and lessons learned by the 20th and will be included with the next history. (10)

[redacted]

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, [illegible] INFANTRY DIVISION
APO SAN FRANCISCO [illegible], 1ST SPECIAL FORCES
[illegible] group APO SF

11 June 1968

SUBJECT: Letter of Recommendation

TO: Commanding Officer
1st Lt. [illegible]
APO San Francisco [illegible]

1. On the occasion of your departure from the Republic of Vietnam I wish to express my appreciation for the support rendered by the 20th Helicopter Squadron, and to commend them on a highly professional performance.

2. My association with the 20th began in June, 1967, at Forward Operational Base 7 in Phuoc Long Province, which was then being supported by helicopters from the 20th. In August, 1967, the 20th became the primary helicopter unit for a classified reconnaissance program in which I was [illegible]. Until June 1968, when I left Vietnam, this unit provided effective support for over 100 targets, operations in which [illegible] reconnaissance teams deep within enemy held territory. In many of these operations, intense enemy ground fire was directed at the small teams and helicopters. It is a measure of the courage and professionalism of [illegible] and their transport personnel that [illegible] operations [illegible] were successful. The reconnaissance team members and crewmembers of the helicopters which, to the knowledge of the 20th, highly effective unit [illegible] for the insertion and extraction of [illegible] teams were outstanding.

3. In December, 1967, the 20th turned to [illegible] to support [illegible] in the [illegible] of a highly classified reconnaissance project. Operating from a heavily [illegible] base camp with [illegible] living conditions, the 20th began full scale operations in a completely new area after only a four-day interval for the move [illegible]. In December they [illegible] the new program at [illegible] the [illegible] in the successful capture and [illegible] of [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] from a previously considered enemy sanctuary. This [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] quick reaction and professionalism [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] extracted before the enemy could react and [illegible] [illegible]. During the period 1 Dec 67 to the present, the 20th has supported over [illegible] targets conducted by [illegible] Det B. These [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] and [illegible] primarily reconnaissance team

[redacted]

DCSO 26 JUN 1968

Use of Helicopters in Support of SEA TACS (U)

7AF (DOOT)

1. Reference is made to your message (U) subject as above, DOOT 1710C5Z Jun 68.

2. A narrative report on the use of helicopters in support of TACAN/radar/communication sites is attached. It covers the period Dec 1966 - June 1968. The records available are the unit history 20th Heli Sq and the records of two project officers. One is the 1973 Comm Sq, Udorn RTAFB, and the other is the Office of Plans, Hq 7/13AF Udorn RTAFB.

3. The report is classified Secret as parts of it give a clear identification or inference of the geographical location of some of the installations.

4. This letter does not contain classified information.

FOR THE COMMANDER

DAVID C COLLINS, Colonel, USAF
Deputy Commander for Special Air Operations

1 Atch
a/s (S) (2 cys)

Cy to: 20HS

Copy for 20HS w/o pictures referred to in par 9 of Atch 1

[redacted]

The Use of Helicopters in Support of Radar and Comm/Navigations Sites in Southeast Asia December 1965 - June 1968

1. The helicopters of the 20th Heli Sq were used to install and support Radar and Comm/Nav installation soon after their arrival in-country. The first recorded use was to fly a coaxial cable from the foot of Monkey Mountain at Danang to the summit where a GCI radar site was being installed. This was in January 1966 and a CH-3 was used. In the same time period CH-3's were used to airlift generator sets weighing up to 5,000 pounds for radar sites and other uses.

2. In May 1966 a CH-3 lifted and installed a 2,500 pound radar antennas on top of a 75' steel tower at Udorn. It then placed the dome over it. In the same time period much of the radar gear for "Viking" radar station was airlifted by CH-3, although apparently not all of it.

3. In October 1966 CH-3's supported construction of the radar site at Hon Tre Island off Nha Trang, carrying radar equipment and construction equipment. In January 1967 support to construction and maintenance to the Hon Tre site amounted to an airlift of 50,000 pounds. A Navy radar site at Con Son Island was supported to the extent of 52,000 pounds in the same month.

4. Numerous TACAN sites have been and are supported and maintained by helicopters. These include sites in RVN, Thailand, and Laos. Channel 99, and 67 in Thailand are currently supported by helicopter as is Channel 72 and 79 in Laos. The weekly airlift requirements for each operating TACAN is on the order of 6,500 pounds of POL, parts, food and water plus eight passengers. The distance from the nearest installation varies from 30 miles to 150 miles. The altitude ranges from 580' MSL to 5,200 feet with temperatures up to 80° at 5,200 feet.

5. Several TACAN sites have been completely installed by helicopter transport. A recent one is Channel 99 in Thailand. In this case in addition to CH-3 support, assistance had to be requested of the US Army who provided a CH-47 for the main package of the TACAN weighing 7,200 pounds. The remaining heavy components are the generators which weigh about 3,400 lbs and often can be handled by the CH-3. Depending on weather and distances the airlift of all components can be completed in 2 - 3 days by one helicopter. (See pictures attached.)

6. During 1967 one Air Force radar site, a component of the tactical air control system, was transported to the operating site completely by helicopter. The site was extremely remote and on a karst at an altitude of 5,600 feet MSL. The nearest landing site for C-123 or C-7 aircraft was some 35 miles distant. Beginning in late July 1967 about 175,000 pounds of radar equipment was carried to the site by October 1967. Additional construction supplies and equipment about doubled the tonnage carried in that period. The time schedule for installation was extended significantly because of weather problems and to some extent awaiting dispatch of heavy lift support from US Army CH-47's. One or two CH-47's were on loan from the US Army for a two to three month period for this operation,

[redacted]

[redacted]

although [illegible] Air Force [illegible] were supporting continuously along with them and carried [illegible] of the cargo. The CH-47's were required to move the three 7,000 [illegible] of the radar as well as these pieces of equipment in excess [illegible] only 2,500 pounds, the limit for the CH-3 at that altitude. [illegible] duration of this site it was completely supported by helicopter [illegible] (CH-3's) which carried in all food, equipment, supplies, and personnel for both the radar site and a TACAN site which was located on the same peak. This continued until the site was taken by the enemy in March 1968.

7. Miscellaneous communications equipment have been employed by both UH-1F and CH-3 helicopters. In RVN a number of temporary radio relay sites have been installed and removed by the UH-1F. These generally consist of portable, lightweight equipment plus a few personnel along with the logistic support for the period of stay. These sites are used in support of Special Forces Long Range Reconnaissance teams which the 20th Heli Sq UH-1F's support. In Thailand the UH-1F's supported the US Overseer Mission by airlifting passengers and equipment to arrange for and install VHF radios in the isolated villages of Northeast Thailand. They were intended for use to pass the warning of Communist terrorist activity and summon military assistance.

6. The CH-3, the largest helicopter the Air Force has in SEA for general helicopter support, can carry up to 6,000 pounds or more under ideal conditions. These conditions include such specifics as low density altitude, inside cabin load, clear approach and landing zone, and favorable weather and winds. Whenever one or more of these parameters are less than optimum, the capability is lessened. This is why heavy lift CH-47's have been required in many cases for loads as low as 3,500 pounds. Overall, in the last year and one half, a CH-47 has been required for a total of about four months. At the present time a requirement to airlift an Air America C-7 out of a remote site remains unsatisfied because of lack of heavy lift. One or more TACAN/radar sites are likely to be initiated by 7/13 AF in the near future and these too will require heavy lift beyond the capability of the CH-3. It is certain although not provable, that certain projects were deferred, sited in less desirable alternate locations or supported by alternate, more time consuming means because heavylift helicopters were not on hand. It is also quite certain that countless other Air Force projects received extensive heavy lift helicopter support from US Army resources.

9. Pictures are attached showing installations at two sites. The first set shows Channel 99 in Thailand. The second set shows some of the components of a radar set at a classified site.

9 Atch
Pictures a/s

[redacted]

and gratitude and into the light of day and once again the support of TAC air, gunships, and artillery. There is an insoluble bond rightly formed between the lone small forces on the ground and the lone "Guardian Angel" in the sky that is not supplanted by anything else day or night.[100]

(U) The Air Force was credited with 557 estimated KBA and 534 actual for the battle out of the total 1,113 enemy dead.[101]

(U) Field commanders have called this the greatest ARVN victory of the war, and rightly so. The ARVN battalions, the Montaguard companies, the CIDG and the Mike Force Units of the Special Forces Group each wrote part of this historical battle. Their faults were few, their courage as strong as that expected of any fighting man. The fact that the CIDGs were fighting with their women and children by their sides, with the women often loading guns and carrying ammo, is reminiscent of our "minutemen" at Concord. But in this battle of minds and men, victory went to those who remained standing and are still defending the Duc Lap outpost.[102]

HELICOPTER OPERATIONS

(S) Operations of the 20th SOS remained basically the same during the period. The squadron has seven flights located at three operating locations. "A", "B" and "C" flights are at Udorn RTAFB, Thailand. "D", "E", "F" and "G" flights are located at Tan Son Nhut and Nha Trang Air Bases in South Vietnam.[103]

(S) The primary missions of the Thailand based flights is to support [redacted] counter-insurgency activities and air transportation. The flights in South Vietnam conduct unconventional warfare, reconnaissance,

film courier, base defense, special air warfare, training, logistical support of USAF units or US sponsored activities, search and destroy and psychological warfare. Civic actions and rescue are secondary missions of all flights, while the Tan Son Nhut flights also acts as VIP couriers.[104]

(S) The unit has 10 CH-3C aircraft and 23 UH-1F aircraft. Some of the helicopters are equipped with 7.62 mini-guns, 2.75 rocket launchers and M-60 machine guns.[105]

(S) The movement of four UH-1F helicopters, crews and support personnel to Udorn RTAFB, Thailand, was completed on July 28. One additional UH-1F and crew was deployed to Tan Son Nhut AB, RVN, on August 5. The four "Hueys" and crews at Udorn were deployed on a permanent basis, while the two UH-1F's at Tan Son Nhut will continue to be rotated to Nha Trang for support.[106]

(S) Logistical support for TACAN sites in Thailand [redacted] increased during this period with the additional aircraft. Support was also provided to U.S. Army Special Forces training in Thailand and to various civic action projects in Thailand.[107]

(C) During this period, the CH-3 aircraft strength at Udorn reached the authorized level of 10 aircraft. However the average number or aircraft possessed by the squadron has varied from 5.4 to 5.7 and is due to the appearance of structural fatigue cracks in the station 290 bulkhead. One aircraft remained in IRAN and three aircraft remained in the 7AF Rapid Aircraft Maintenance (RAM) team at Udorn. Delays in receiving the repair kit has been the main problem associated with the repair. Actions have been

[redacted]

taken to resolve the repair kit problem.[108]

(S) During this reporting period, the flying accomplishments at Udorn for the CH-3 were as follows:[109]

Hours flown: 1,376.4

Sorties flown: 1,281

Passengers carried: 4,109

Cargo carried: 202,720 tons

Average operational ready rate: 80.4 percent

Average aircraft utilization rate: 76.4 hours per aircraft per month

Average aircraft utilization rate authorized: 56.6 per aircraft per month.

(S) The following is a recap of UH-1F missions flown during the quarter:[110]

UH-1F hours flown: 3,085.7

Missions fragged: 1,397

Sorties flown: 6,594

Passengers: 8,359

Cargo hauled: 167.8 tons

7.62 rounds expended: 627,320

2.75 rockets expended: 1,518

Alert hours: 18,540

Type sorties: Armed Helicopter

Infiltrations: 171

Exfiltrations: 147

Visual reconnaissance: 19

[redacted]

Army base defense: 5

Tactical troop movements: 1,380

Unarmed Helicopter

Infiltrations: 420

Exfiltrations: 298

Visual reconnaissance: 6

Army support: 287

Tactical troop movements: 1,622

Air Force passenger support: 1,718

Medical evacuations: 16

(S) One aircraft and crew at Nha Trang was used for base defense alert, and aircraft and aircrews at Ban Me Thuot are on 24-hour ground alert, 15 minute response. Approximately 18,540 hours ground alert under these conditions for the period.[11]

(S) On July 28, the CH-3 flights at Udorn were augmented by the deployment of four UH-1F helicopters from Nha Trang. After extensive theater orientation briefings were completed, UH-1F crews began operations on August 1. UH-1F helicopters have been effectively utilized for logistical support of [redacted] in-country [redacted] TACAN sites. Employment of UH-1F helicopters in the special air warfare role has been restricted to close air support missions and have not been employed on MAC SOG missions for two primary reasons: Current SOG target areas are beyond their effective combat range and SOG missions require overflying at 10,000 feet or above two 37mm anti-aircraft high threat areas.[12]

SPECIAL AND SIGNIFICANT MISSIONS

(Ø) On September 20 and 21 the 20th SOS provided two CH-3 helicopters for a special VIP airlift requirement operating from Vientiane, Laos. On September 20, Laotian Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma, U.S. Ambassador to Laos Mr. William H. Sullivan, Mr. Eugene R. Black, Special Advisor to President Johnson on Asian Economic and Social Development, and a party of 17 Laotian and American dignitaries were flown to Thalaat, Laos, and returned to Vientiane. On September 21, Mr. Black and a party of 14 were flown on an inspection survey of the proposed Pa Mong dam site on the Mekong River."

[redacted] (Ø) On July 21, Captain Walter W. Martin and crew rescued an A-1E pilot who had bailed out over North Vietnam. The fragged mission in support [redacted] was a routine infiltration of a nine man roadwatch team followed by an exfiltration of a 12 man team. Two CH-3 helicopters escorted by two A-1E aircraft proceeded to the target area located approximately 120 miles east of Nahkom Phanom near the North Vietnamese border. Shortly after the completion of the infil/exfil mission one of the escort A-1E aircraft experienced a runaway propeller. The [redacted] aircraft vectored the A-1E to a relatively safe area across the border into North Vietnam where the pilot bailed out without difficulty and landed uninjured in the top of a multi-canopied jungle. Captain Martin and his crew brought their aircraft to a hover over the tree tops and lowered the jungle penetrator next to the pilot, who had managed to crawl onto a large limb. The pilot secured himself to the

penetrator seat and was hoisted to safety aboard the helicopter. The entire pickup was accomplished in approximately one minute, due to the alertness and professional competence of the crew.[114]

(S) On September 2, 20th SOS pilots flew camera crews and test evaluators for the test of a captured ZU-23mm enemy anti-aircraft weapon. The tests were held at Chu Chi, RVN and were accomplished by U.S. Army personnel firing the weapon while USAF test officials and camera crews recorded the results. The tests, conducted in daylight and in hours of darkness, consisted of photographing the weapon and the firing from various positions along a programmed line of fire. In the past, the U.S. services had been unable to obtain this much needed film for briefing pilots and personnel on weapon identification. The film was produced by the 600th Photo Squadron from Tan Son Nhut AB.[115]

(S) On September 18, the 20th at Tan Son Nhut flew support of a classified weapons test near Dau Tieng, RVN. During this test, two 20th pilots flew the VIP helicopter containing General George S. Brown, Seventh Air Force Commander, and members of the 7AF staff. A second and third aircraft were flown by 20th pilots with camera crews and test evaluators. The test involved a new type bomb and was conducted immediately following an enemy mortar attack on Dau Tieng. The Army flew a combat assault force into the impact area to accomplish ground observation and bomb damage assessment. The weapon was delivered by A-1's while F-100s flew cover.[116]

(S) During the period, the UH-1Fs at Nha Trang were fragged

for special missions to help develop a detection and interception capability for low altitude, slow flying aircraft. On July 11 and 12, pilots flew day and night calibration and penetration missions against Port Call Radar and the Hawk Missile Detachment on Hon Tre Island under the code name "Find Em". A-37 fighters with "starlight scopes" were used as interceptors. In support of the "Find Em" mission 12 sorties were flown for 6.6 hours and 21 passengers were carried.[17]

Find Em

(Ø) On August 18, one UH-1F and crew deployed to Dong Ha, RVN, near the DMZ as directed by 7AF Hq. The mission was in support of operations "Have Fear" and "Swamp Gas". The flying involved ferrying personnel and cargo from Dong Ha to Con Thien, RVN, plus other flights necessary for developing detection and intercept capabilities. During the period from August 18 to September 4, a total of 117 sorties and 41.9 hours were flown. A total of 204 passengers and 1,500 pounds of cargo were carried in support of these missions.[18]

(Ø) Nha Trang local area mission requirements were placed on the 20th's schedule during the quarter. Operations plans call for local area visual reconnaissance flights by UH-1Fs to support the Joint Defense Mission of Nha Trang. The 20th was also required to maintain a UH-1F gunship and crew on gunship alert from 1900 to 0600 hours nightly during the period.[19]

(C) The 20th continued to support "Daniel Boone," which remains a highly classified operation. However, only approximately half of the period was spent in support of the "Daniel Boone"

operation. During the remaining time the "Green Hornets" in conjunction with the 5th Special Forces Detachment B-50, under operational control of the I Field Forces, Vietnam (U.S. Army) conducted intensive reconnaissance, reaction, search and destroy operations in the Ban Me Thuot, Duc Lap and Song Be areas of II Corps. The 20th has 10 UH-1Fs located at Ban Me Thuot, two as spares and one as a slick (unarmed), and the other as a gunship to conduct these operations.[120]

(S) Using a revised concept of inserting reconnaissance patrols and "Hornet Forces," which are composed of 34 men, serving as reaction forces, the UH-1Fs made 41 emergency exfiltrations. Two enemy POWs were captured and 25 battlefield wounded were evacuated by the "Green Hornets." The aircraft sustained 40 hits from enemy fire, five aircrew members were wounded and were the unit was credited with 123 enemy kills.[121]

(S) The 20th was called upon time and time again at Ban Me Thuot despite 12 attacks on the camp and extremely poor flying weather. On July 2, gunships assisted a reconnaissance team from the Duc Lap Special Forces Camp in breaking contact with a large enemy force, and were credited with seven confirmed KBA.[122]

(S) On July 25, the "Green Hornets" were launched to come to the aid of a long range reconnaicsance patrol that had made contact with an enemy force of at least two platoons. The patrol had retreated into a small depression surrounded by high jungle growth. Realizing that the team could be overrun at anytime, the pilot, Captain Nupen, as gunship lead, and Major Klung, his wing-

man, directed mini-gun fire in the team's support. Their firing passes succeeded in slowing the enemy advance, but both aircraft had malfunctions of their mini-guns and were unable to fire in the team's support. Instead of pulling off target, the crews continued to make passes to draw as much ground fire away from the team as possible. At this time, the beleagured team reported that the enemy was massing his forces in an area 50 to 100 meters north of their position. A rocket pass was made into the enemy position. The team leader confirmed that the rockets were on target by the cries he heard after each rocket run. Despite the fact that replacement gunships were still several minutes away, Major Hoover immediately descended into the area. Due to the positioning of the enemy, only one corridor of approach was available. His approach required a difficult descent under crosswing conditions into a very confined landing zone. Sporadic ground fire was encountered during the entire descent, approach and landing. Sergeants Schwartz and Miller assisted the team members into the helicopter and Major Hoover departed without receiving additional enemy gun fire.[124]

(S) On July 31, squadron pilots received credit for 45 KBA, one of their largest single totals of the year. Two UH-1Fs were launched to aid a search and destroy force from Duc Lap Special Forces Camp. The force had been surrounded by an estimated NVA retiment and had no avenue of escape. Despite a 100 foot ceiling and NVA soldiers within 30 meters of the friendly force, the UH-1F gunships provided 360 degree mini-gun fire around the team for 30

minutes and cleared a path of escape to the north. The weather started breaking and fighter aircraft were called in. After approximately 20 minutes of bombing, the ground force requested the fighters break off target and the "Green Hornets" be called in, as the bombing was forcing the NVA loser to the friendly position.[125]

(S) Captain Godowski located the rear elements of the friendly forces and the two gunships made mini-gun and rocket passes until they were no longer receiving ground fire. The ground commander stated that he thought their situation was hopeless until he saw the two gunships break through the overcast. He credited the gunships with the high KBA.[126]

PROBLEM AREAS

(C) The UH-1F parking area at Nha Trang is very congested. A work order was submitted to extend the parking area and to stabelize the sand adjacent to the parking ramp. This will give additional maneuvering space and greatly reduce the possibility of foreign object damage in the future.[127]

(U) The construction of a new maintenance facility for the 20th at Nha Trang has been approved. However, no date has been set to start construction. Therefore, the 20th continues to conduct phase inspections and other maintenance, exposed to nature's elements.[128]

(C) A great improvement was experienced in UH-1F logistic support during this period. All parts were ordered through Demand Processing and approximately 15 percent of the supply items were

procured from the Army by use of the inter-service agreement. As a result of this system, for the first time since the UH-1Fs have been in Vietnam, no aircraft were out of commission for NORS items. However, the 20th did experience difficulty in obtaining 622A FM radios as replacement for defective radios. This problem is the result of a large number of fixed wing aircraft being equipped with this radio in Southeast Asia, thus depleting the replacement stock. The FM radio is the primary radio used in air-to-ground communications and is also used as a homing device by the UH-1Fs. Unless a sufficient supply of FM radios is received in the near future, a mission degradation will be experienced.[129]

(Ø) One of the biggest concerns during the period is that the unit cannot put more than seven UH-1F gunships into service until additional mounting yokes can be obtained. The yokes are mounting platforms that fit under the fuselage of the helicopter and are necessary to attach rocket pods to the aircraft. It is desireable that at least 10 additional yokes be obtained as soon as possible so that a total of 17 gunships could be put into service, if necessary.[130]

(Ø) Another problem area experienced was lack of air transportation. This is a result of the increase in personnel and mission requirements. Additional ground vehicles are required at Ban Me Thuot and Nha Trang. The C-47 from base flight at Udorn RTAFB makes a weekly trip on Thursday. This requires new personnel enroute to Udorn to spend excessive time at Nha Trang. Another route would take three to seven days. This problem becomes more

apparent with the deployment of the four UH-1F helicopters to Udorn as replacement parts are ordered through Demand Processing at Nha Trang. Therefore, due to the transportation required, an excessive period of time passes before the new part is received at Udorn and the defective part is returned to Nha Trang.[131]

(C) Communications problems with operating locations at Ban Me Thuot and Udorn were experienced due to needed repairs on the Single Side Band radio, no backup unit available and few adequate telephone lines.[132]

(C) All new pilots that arrived during the period were first pilot qualified. Most of the mission training for the UH-1F was accomplished at Ban Me Thuot. New pilots flew a two week orientation tour, one week in gunships and one week in slicks.[133]

SPECIAL OPERATIONS

(C) The 15th Special Operations Squadron continued to conduct tactical airlift operations in support of selected US and Republic of Vietnam counter-insurgency forces in Southeast Asia. They also conducted rescue and recovery operations as directed by the Joint Personnel Recovery Center using the Fulton Recovery System and carried out a program of unconventional warfare operations assigned under 7AF Operations Order 460-68, "Combat Spear", classified Top Secret.[134]

(C) The units are equipped with four C-130E Hercules aircraft rigged for the Fulton Recovery System.[135]

(U) Lieutenant Colonel Russell A. Bunn became squadron commander on September 4, replacing Lieutenant Colonel Thomas F. Hines,

[redacted]

HISTORICAL REPORT
20TH SPECIAL OPERATIONS SQUADRON
1 JULY - 30 SEPTEMBER 1968
SECRET SPECAT AIR FORCE EYES ONLY

[redacted]

APPROVED BY:

for James A McMullen, Lt Col
WILLIAM B. SKINNER, Lt Colonel, USAF
Commander

John B. Skidmore
JOHN B. SKIDMORE, Captain, USAF
Historical Officer

[redacted]

20HS 68-125

(Security Classification - If Classified) [redacted] RCS: 5500

HISTORICAL DATA [redacted]	REPORTING PERIOD FROM: 1 July 1968 TO: 30 Sep 1968	REPORTS CONTROL SYMBOL: AU-D3

1. (NAME AND LOCATION OF UNIT SUBMITTING THIS REPORT)
20th Special Operations Squadron
14th Special Operations Wing (PACAF)
APO San Francisco 96205

TO:
14th Special Operations Wing (DXI)
APO San Francisco 96205

IF MORE SPACE IS NEEDED FOR ANY ITEM, ATTACH ADDITIONAL SHEETS INDICATING APPLICABLE ITEM NUMBER.

SECTION I — ASSIGNMENT

MAJOR AIR COMMAND	NUMBERED AIR FORCE	AIR DIVISION	WING	GROUP
PACAF	7th Air Force		14th Special Operations Wing	

SECTION II — SUBORDINATE UNITS

There are seven flights located at three operating locations. "A", "B" and "C" flights are located at Udorn RTAFB, Thailand. "D", "E", "F" and "G" flights are located at Tan Son Nhut and Nha Trang AB, RVN

SECTION III — MISSIONS

A. PRIMARY "A", "B" and "C" Flights - [redacted] "D", "E", "F" and "G" flights - unconventional warfare, escort, [illegible] courier, base defense, SAW training, logistical support of [illegible] sponsored activities, phychological warfare.

B. SECONDARY (OR OTHER)
"A", "B", and "C" Flights - Civic action, utility and rescue.
"D", "E", "F" and "G" Flights - VIP courier, utility and rescue.

PROJECT CORONA HARVEST
DO NOT DESTROY
CATALOGED
No 227196

SECTION IV — PERSONNEL

STATUS	OFFICERS	AIRMEN	CIVILIANS	TOTAL
ASSIGNED	95	207	2	304
AUTHORIZED	88	215	0	303
ATTACHED	0	0	0	0

SECTION V — EQUIPMENT

A. AIRCRAFT
CH-3C - 10
UH-1F - 23

B. WEAPONS (INCLUDING MISSILES)
20 - 7.62 Mini-guns
14 - 2.75 Rocket launchers
13 - M-60 Machine guns

C. ELECTRONICS

D. OTHER

[redacted]

AF FORM [illegible] (if classified)

[redacted]

ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. Interview by Captain John B. Skidmore, 20th Special Operations Squadron Historian with Lieutenant Colonel James A. McMullen, Special Assistant to the Commander, 25 September 1968.

1. The interview covered organization structure, problems, recommendations, recommended solutions and discussion of classified information.

2. Interview by 20th Special Operations Squadron Historian with Lieutenant Colonel Frank A. DiFiglia, Chief UH-1F Operations, 25 September 1968.

2. The interview covered problems, recommended solutions and discussion of classified information.

3. Historical Reports, 20th Special Operations Squadron, Udorn RTAFB, Thailand, July, August, September 1968 by Major Anthony E. Azure, Historical Officer

3. These reports are classified Secret. Location: 20th Special Operations Squadron Safe, Historical File.

4. 20th Special Operations Forward Operating Location, Daily Situation Reports: dated 1 July - 30 September 1968.

4. These reports are classified Confidential. Location: 20th Special Operations Squadron Safe, Ban Me Thuot Situation Reports.

5. Hornet Log Book: dated 1 July - 30 September 1968

5. This is classified Confidential and it covers the day-to-day operations at Ban Me Thuot. Location: Mission Commander's Desk, Ban Me Thuot.

6. Interview by 20th Special Operations Squadron Historian with Captain Jackie D. Burgess, UH-1F Maintenance Officer, 25 September 1968

6. The interview covered problems, recommended solutions and discussion of UH-1F Maintenance.

7. 7th Air Force Operations Order 509-68 20th Helicopter Squadron, dated September 1968.

7. This order is classified Secret. Location: 20th Special Operations Squadron Safe.

8. UH-1F Awards and Decorations Book.

8. This book lists awards and decorations of the 20th Special Operations Squadron. Location: Awards and Decorations Desk, 20th Special Operations Squadron.

[redacted]

[redacted] [redacted]

9. Monthly recap UH-1F Sorties: dated July, August, September 1968.	9. These reports are classified Secret SPECAT Air Force Eyes Only. Location: 20th Special Operations Squadron Safe, Reports File.
10. Management Status and Trends Reports: dated July, August, September 1968.	10. These reports provide statistics for the months April, May and June 1968 and are unclassified. Location: 20th Special Operations Squadron File.
11. Letter dated 1 August 1968, from Colonel Robert M. Hancock, Commander 14th Combat Support Group (PACAF)	11. Attached.
12. 14 ACWOI 55-25, Nha Trang AB, Vietnam, dated 27 June 1968	12. Attached.
13. The Air Commando, "9th SOS Pilot Saves Lost Flyer", Volume 3, Number 34, Nha Trang, 21 September 1968.	13. This article covers the rescue of a downed Army pilot.
14. Historical Reports, 20th Special Operations Squadron, Tan Son Nhut AB, RVN, July, August, September 1968.	14. These reports cover the activities at Tan Son Nhut during this period.
15. Interview by 20th Special Operations Squadron Historian with Captain Harlan C. Nupen, UH-1F Pilot, 25 September 1968.	15. This interview covered classified missions flown at Tan Son Nhut.
16. DD Form 173, "UH-1F Incident Report," dated 12 July 1968.	16. This report covered the aircraft incident, 8 July 1968.
17. DD Form 173, "UH-1F Incident Report," dated 30 August 1968.	17. This report covered the aircraft incident, 27 August 1968.
18. 20th SOS Mission Debriefing Forms, dated 1 July - 24 September 1968.	18. These reports cover the missions flown 1 July - 24 September 1968. Location: Awards and Decorations Desk, 20th Special Operations Squadron.
19. Interview by 20th Special Operations Squadron Historian with Major Nelson B. Turner, Jr., UH-1F Pilot, 30 September 1968.	19. The interview covered his missions 18 August - 4 September 1968.
20. Interview by 20th Special Operations Squadron Historian with Major Norman F. Eldridge, Civic Action Project Officer, 25, September 1968.	20. This interview covered the civic action program.

[redacted] [redacted]

[redacted]

1. (U) The 20th Helicopter Squadron was redesignated the 20th Special Operations Squadron on 1 August 1966. (See G Series Orders) Lieutenant Colonel William B. Skinner was the Commander and there were no significant changes to the organizational structure during this quarter. (11)

2. (S) The movement of four UH-1F helicopters, crews and support personnel to Udorn RTAFB, Thailand was completed on 28 July. One additional UH-1F and crew was deployed to Tan Son Nhut AB, RVN on 5 August. The four "Hueys" and crews at Udorn were deployed on a permanent basis, while the two UH-1F's at Tan Son Nhut will continue to be rotated to Nha Trang, RVN for support. (1)

3. (S) On 31 July the space for the 20th Special Operations Squadron, Administration Officer was deleted, and after 6 October it will become an extra duty for squadron personnel at Nha Trang, RVN. This action was necessary for USAF manning purposes. (1)

4. (C) The Personnel Records and 53e's for personnel stationed at Udorn will be transferred from Nha Trang to Udorn sometime in the near future. (1)

5. (S) The mission of the 20th Special Operations Squadron at Udorn RTAFB, Thailand remained unchanged during this reporting period. The primary commitments were support of [redacted] Military Assistance Command - Vietnam, Special Operations Group (MAC SOG). Logistical support for [redacted] sites located in Thailand and Laos increased during this period. Support was also provided to U. S. Army Special Forces training in Thailand and to various civic action projects in Thailand. (3)

6. (S) During this period the CH-3 aircraft strength at Udorn reached the authorized level of ten aircraft. However, the average number of aircraft possessed by the Squadron has varied from 5.4 to 5.7, and is due to the appearance of structural fatigue cracks in the Station 290 bulkhead. One aircraft remained in [redacted] and three aircraft remained in the 7th AF Rapid Aircraft Maintenance (RAM) team at Udorn. Delays in receiving repair kit has been the main problem associated with the repair. The CH-3 Systems Support Manager, Warner Robbins Air Materiel Area has taken action to resolve the repair kit delivery problem. (3)

7. (S) On a [redacted] mission in Central Laos, one ALE escort aircraft experienced complete engine failure. The pilot bailed out, without difficulty, and landed in tall trees. Major James S. Villotti and crew accomplished a hoist rescue of the uninjured pilot. (3)

8. (U) During this period the maintenance section at Udorn was required to accomplish a main transmission change at a small landing strip in Thailand. Major Edwin H. Shearer made a precautionary landing in a rice paddy, at night, due to a main transmission chip detector light. Investigation revealed metal particles in the transmission oil. The next day, after draining and flushing the main transmission, the aircraft was flown eight miles to a small landing strip. A new transmission and necessary support equipment was flown in by a C-123. The main transmission change was accomplished in four days and the aircraft returned to Udorn. (3)

[redacted]

[redacted]

9. (S) On a three ship [redacted] mission into Southern Laos two [redacted] action teams were to be infiltrated into the same landing zone. The first helicopter landed without encountering small arms fire, but as the second helicopter approached the landing zone small arms fire was encountered which struck the CH-3 helicopter. Two rounds penetrated the cockpit area, however neither pilot was hit. The pilot Major Jay R. Oberg received a superficial face cut due to flying plexiglass. The first helicopter departed the landing zone without incident and all three aircraft returned safely to a forward operating base in Southern Laos. Inspection of the aircraft revealed five bullets had struck the aircraft inflicting minor damage. The aircraft was flown back to Udorn without difficulty. (3)

10. (S) On 20 June, Major Walter L. Helm was mission commander of a two ship MAC SOG exfiltration mission in North Vietnam. Enemy forces had made intermittent contact with the ground team during the previous two days. Approximately two miles from the landing zone the aircraft were fired on by hostile ground forces. Major Helm suspected his aircraft had been hit but observing no damage he elected to continue the mission. The ground team was located in a small stream bed with ninety foot trees. Four lifts on the rescue hoist and approximately twelve minutes were required to extract the seven man team. In spite of the close proximity of hostile ground forces the mission was successfully completed. Inspection of the aircraft revealed three small arm hits; one in the forward wheel well, one through the left sponsan and one through a main rotor blade. No injury occurred to personnel on board. (3)

11. (S) During July, initial steps were taken for the installation of a new TACAN site in Northern Laos. This operation began on 22 July when two CH-3 helicopters flew to Lima Site 36 carrying technical personnel to select the TACAN installation site. A suitable site was selected and arrangements made to begin installation. On 28 July an Army CH-47 arrived at Udorn to provide the heavy lift capability needed to complete the TACAN installation. Squadron CH-3 helicopters escorted the CH-47 throughout the TACAN installation. The new TACAN Channel 92 became operational on 6 August 1968. The 20th is not required to provide logistical support to this site on a routine basis. CH-3 support consisted of 70 hours from 22 July through 12 August 1968. (3)

12. (S) On 11 July, a CH-3 piloted by Captain Ronald L. Skinner was conducting an infil/exfil mission operating out of STOL site 165 in Southern Laos. The landing zone was located approximately 35 miles to the northeast. The approach to the landing zone was planned at low level to avoid a 37 mm anti-aircraft gun located 1½ miles from the landing zone. As the helicopter began the final approach to the landing zone, intense small arms fire was directed at the [redacted]. Captain Skinner immediate-

[redacted]

[redacted] The aircraft and crew later returned safely to Udorn. (3)

[redacted]

[redacted]

13. (S) On 21 July, Captain Walter W. Martin and crew rescued an A-1E pilot that had bailed out over North Vietnam. The fragged mission in support [redacted] was a routine infil of a nine man roadwatch team followed by an exfil of a 12 man team. Two CH-3 helicopters escorted by two A-1E aircraft proceeded to the target area located approximately 120 miles east of Nahkom Phanom near the North Vietnam border. Shortly after the completion of the infil/exfil mission one of the escort A-1E aircraft experienced a runaway propeller. The [redacted] aircraft vectored the A-1E to a relatively safe area across the border into North Vietnam where the pilot bailed out without difficulty and landed uninjured in the top of a multi-canopied jungle. Captain Martin and his crew brought their aircraft to a hover over the tree tops and lowered the jungle penetrator next to the pilot who had managed to crawl onto a large limb. The pilot secured himself to the jungle penetrator seat and was hoisted to safety aboard the hovering helicopter. The entire pickup was accomplished in approximately one minute, due to the alertness and professional competence of Captain Martin and his crew. (3)

14. (S) On 28 July, the CH-3 flights at Udorn were augmented by the deployment of four UH-1F helicopters from Nha Trang AB, RVN. After extensive theater orientation briefings were completed, UH-1F aircrews began operations on 1 August 1968. UH-1F helicopters have been effectively utilized for logistical support of both in country and out country TACAN sites. Employment of UH-1F helicopters in the Special Air Warfare missions has been restricted to [redacted] and have not been employed on ABC 309 missions [redacted] (S) current BDA target areas are beyond their effective combat [redacted] and, [redacted]

15. (S) On 20 and 21 September, the 20th Special Operations Squadron provided two CH-3 helicopters for a special VIP airlift requirement operating from Vientiane, Laos. On 20 September, Laotian Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma, U. S. Ambassador to Laos Mr William H. Sullivan, Mr. Eugene R. Black, Special Advisor to President Johnson on Asian economic and social development and a party of seventeen Laotian and American dignitaries were flown to Thalaat, Laos and returned to Vientiane. On 21 September, Mr. Black and a party of fourteen were flown on an inspection survey of the proposed Pa Mong dam site on the Mekong River. (3)

16. (S) During this reporting period the accomplishments at Udorn were as follows:

Hours flown - 1376.4

Sorties flown - 1281

Passengers carried - 4,109

Cargo carried - 202,720 tons

Average operational ready rate - 80.4%

[redacted]

[redacted] AIR FORCE EYES [redacted]

Average aircraft utilization rate - 76.4 hours per aircraft per month.

Average aircraft utilization rate authorized - 56.6 hours per aircraft per month.

17. (S) During this reporting period the primary mission of the UH-1F Detachment at Tan Son Nhut AB, RVN remained Reconnaissance Film Delivery for the 12th and 16th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadrons with a secondary mission of VIP and utility. (7) (14)

18. (U) Personnel at Tan Son Nhut, TDY - one Mission Commander, four pilots and five maintenance mechanics. The Mission Commander is rotated after 90 days. The other four pilots are rotated, back to Nha Trang, after 30 days. The maintenance personnel are rotated after 90 days and the crew chiefs are rotated with their aircraft. (1)

19. (S) The aircraft were fragged through 7th Air Force Strike Plans as required on flights to Bien Hoa, Phu Loi, Lai Khe, Dau Tieng, Trang Sup, Chu Chi, Duc Hoa, Xuan Loc, Black Horse, Luscombe, Vung Tau, Bear Cat and Long Bien. (14)

20. (U) During this period eighteen VIP flights were flown by the 20th at Tan Son Nhut. (14)

21. (S) On 2 September Major Manning and Captain Nupen flew camera crews and test evaluators, for the tests of a captured ZU-23MM enemy anti-aircraft weapon. The tests were held at Chu Chi, RVN and were accomplished by U. S. Army personnel firing the weapon while USAF test officials and camera crews recorded the results. The tests, conducted in daylight and in hours of darkness consisted of photographing the weapon and the firing from various positions along a programmed line of fire. In the past the U. S. Services had been unable to obtain this much needed film for briefing pilots and personnel on weapon identification. The film was produced by the 600th Photographic Squadron from Tan Son Nhut. (15)

22. (S) On 18 September the 20th at Tan Son Nhut flew support of a classified weapons test near Dau Trieng, RVN. During this test Major Courtney and Major Massey flew the VIP helicopter containing General Brown and the Seventh Air Force Staff. A second aircraft was flown by Captains Nupen and Connerat and the third "Huey" was flown by Major Eppinger and Captain Edwards. These aircraft each flew camera crews and test evaluators. The test involved a new type bomb and was conducted immediately following an enemy mortar attach on Dau Tieng. The Army flew a combat assault force into the impact area to accomplish ground observation and bomb damage assessment. The weapon was delivered by A-1's while F-100's flew cover. Final results are unknown at this time. (15)

[redacted] EYES ONLY [redacted]

[redacted]

23. (U) During this period the Tan Son Nhut detachment flew 1133 sorties for 351.1 hours, transported 51,666 pounds of cargo and 2,2724 passengers. (14)

24. (C) One of the biggest problems during this time period has been the lack of adequate transportation. This is a result of the increase in personnel and mission commitments. Additional ground vehicles are required at Ban Me Thuot and Nha Trang. The C-47 from base flight at Udorn RTAFB makes a weekly trip on Thursday. This requires new personnel enroute to Udorn to spend excessive time at Nha Trang. Another route would take from 3 - 7 days. This problem became more apparent with the deployment of the four UH-1F helicopters to Udorn, as parts are ordered through Demand Processing at Nha Trang, RVN. Therefore, due to the transportation required, an excessive period of time passes before the new part is received at Udorn and the defective part is returned to Nha Trang. The vehicles that the squadron is now using are in need of repair as the 14th Transportation Squadron was unable to obtain necessary replacements parts during this period. (1) (6)

25. (C) The 20th experienced communications problems with operating locations at Ban Me Thuot, RVN and Udorn RTAFB, Thailand throughout this period. The problems with Ban Me Thuot were caused by the single side-band radio being out of commission and no backup unit available. Since very few telephone circuits are available between Ban Me Thuot and Nha Trang, it was very difficult to communicate. Communication was also a problem with Udorn as hot line communications through the 14th SOW TUCC at Nha Trang was very weak during this period. (1)

26. (U) The 20th has experienced difficulty in executing an effective OJT program in maintenance. This is due to operating from diversified locations on an extended TDY basis. During this period temporary OJT supervisors were assigned while trainees were at forward operating locations. This new procedure resulted in a 100% passing rate on OJT testing during this reporting period. (6)

27. (C) All new pilots that arrived during this period were first pilot qualified. Most of the mission training for the UH-1F was accomplished at Ban Me Thuot, RVN. New pilots flew a two week orientation tour, one week in gunships and one week in slicks. Therefore, they had a better understanding of the mission and pilot requirements. Before a new crewmember became mission qualified he rode with a mission qualified crewmember for two weeks, or approximately forty hours. Before he becomes fully combat qualified, he must ride with an Instructor Pilot for one week on the mission. (1) (2)

[redacted]

[redacted] [redacted] EYES

28. (Ø) One of the biggest concerns during this period is that the unit cannot put more than seven (UH-1F gunships into service until additional mounting yokes can be obtained. The yokes are mounting platforms that fit under the fuselage of the helicopter and are necessary to attach rocket pods to the aircraft. It is desirable that at least ten additional yokes be obtained as soon as possible so that a total of seventeen gunships could be put into service if necessary. (2)

29. (U) The UH-1F parking area at Nha Trang is very congested. A work order was submitted to extend the parking area and to stabilize the sand adjacent to the parking ramp. When this work is completed it will give additional maneuvering space and should greatly reduce the possibility of foreign object damage in the future.

30. (U) The construction of a new maintenance facility for the 20th Special Operations Squadron at Nha Trang has been approved. However, no date has been set to start construction. Therefore, the 20th continues to conduct phase inspections and other maintenance, exposed to nature's elements. (6)

31. (Ø) A great improvement was experienced in UH-1F logistic support during this period. All parts were ordered through Demand Processing and approximately 15% of the supply items were procured from the Army by use of the interservice agreement. As a result of this system, for the first time since the UH-1F's have been in Vietnam, no aircraft were out of commission for NORS items. However, the 20th did experience difficulty in obtaining 622A FM radios as replacements for defective radios. This problem is the result of a large number of fixed wing aircraft being equipped with this radio, [redacted] thus depleting the replacement stock. [redacted] Unless a sufficient supply of FM radios are received in the near future, a mission degradation will be experienced. (6)

32. (U) On 8 July a UH-1F helicopter incident occurred on a logistic support mission to Hon Tre Island, RVN. The pilots, Major Davenport and Lieutenant Colonel Wickwire flew from Cam Rahn Bay to Hon Tre Island and a visual reconnaissance of the landing site was accomplished upon their arrival. During the reconnaissance no apparent obstructions or interferences were noted and the pilot Major Davenport initiated a normal approach to the landing pad. He made a slight flare at altitude to slow the helicopter and at the termination of the flare, collective pitch control was increased to further slow the helicopter and bring it to a hover for landing. As the collective pitch control was increased, the nose of the helicopter turned slightly to the right causing the tail boom to swing to the left. The slight turn caused the tip of the tail rotor to

[redacted] T

[redacted] EYES ONLY

[redacted]

[redacted]

strike a 10 inch diameter aluminum light fixture attached to a seven foot wooden pole, which was located near the landing pad. The abrupt impact caused the tail rotor and gear box to separate from the helicopter. Major Davenport immediately recognized the loss of tail rotor control and initiated the correct emergency procedure. His prompt action minimized the damage to the helicopter and it came to rest on the landing pad. As a result of this incident the landing pad at Hon Tre was improved and the aluminum lights surrounding the pad were removed. Pictures were taken of all the helicopter pads being used by the squadron and all pilots were briefed on all obstacles and hazardous conditions at each helicopter landing site. (16)

33. (U) On 22 August Lieutenant Colonel DiFiglia and Major Pool departed Nha Trang on a routine UH-1F flight to Ban Me Thuot, RVN. After approximately thirty minutes of flight they experienced a complete engine flame out as a result of failure of the accessory drive shaft. Major Pool made an emergency radio call as Lieutenant Colonel DiFiglia accomplished a straight ahead autorotation to highway 21 near Ban Me Drack, RVN. The immediate response of the crew saved the aircraft from damage and/or possible destruction, and there were no injuries to any of the eight persons on board. Four UH-1F helicopters from the 20th were launched at Ban Me Thuot and came to the aid of the downed "Huey". Through rapid coordination with the U. S. Army the UH-1F was recovered by a CH-47 helicopter and returned to Nha Trang. The successful recovery of the aircraft demonstrated the highest spirit of cooperation between the USAF and the U. S. Army. (2)

34. (U) A third UH-1F incident occurred on 27 August during a functional check flight for engine and speed decreaser gearbox change. After seven minutes of hover checking the controls, Captain Dyer climbed the aircraft to 500 feet. At sixty knots a 2-4 vertical vibration occurred and at forty knots the vibration increased to an uncomfortable level, but disappeared at twenty knots. Captain Dyer discontinued the functional check flight and started to return to Nha Trang. While at fifty feet and thirty knots, he felt a heavy jar accompanied by an audible "boom". The engine and rotor RPM decreased rapidly and Captain Dyer landed in a rice paddy, without damage to the helicopter. The engine was shut down and the aircraft was airlifted to the base by a CH-47 helicopter. It was discovered that unknown material (probably metal) was ingested into the engine resulting in major damage to the compressor blades and first two stages of stator vanes. (17)

35. (S) During this period the UH-1F's at Nha Trang were fragged for special missions to help develop a detection and interception capability for low altitude, slow flying aircraft. On the 11th and 12th of July, Captain Skidmore and Major Ackfeld flew day and night calibration and penetration missions against Port Call Radar and the Hawk Missile Detach-

[redacted]

[redacted]

ment on Hon Tre Island, under the code name "Find Em." A-37 fighters with "starlight scopes" were used as interceptors. In support of the "Find Em" mission twelve sorties were flown for 6.6 hours and twenty-one passengers were carried. On 18 August one aircraft and crew deployed to Dong Ha, RVN, as directed by 7th Air Force. The crew consisted of Major Turner, Captain Miller and Staff Sergeant Adams. The mission was in support of operations "Have Fear" and "Swamp Gas." The flying involved ferrying of personnel and cargo from Dong Ha to Con Thien, RVN, plus other flights necessary for developing detection and intercept capabilities. During the period 18 August to 4 September, a total of 117 sorties and 41.9 hours were flown. A total of 204 passengers and 1500 pounds of cargo were carried in support of these missions. (19)

36. (C) Nha Trang local area mission requirements were placed on the UH-1F's during this quarter. 14th ACW OI 55-25 required local area visual reconnaissance flights to support the "Joint Defense Mission" of Nha Trang. The 20th was also required to maintain a UH-1F gunship and crew on gunship alert from 1900 to 0600 hours nightly during this period. (12)

37. (C) Ten UH-1F's are located at Ban Me Thuot, RVN. Two aircraft are used as spares, one as a slick and the other as a gunship. (2)

38. (C) From the beginning of the quarter the "Green Hornets" continued to operate from the Special Forces Camp at Ban Me Thuot (East). The work on aircraft revetments and facilities proceeded slowly, but by the end of the quarter all facilities were complete in the new camp. However, as a result of frequent enemy attacks on the camp, more work must be accomplished on base defense, warning devices, guard posts, a communications net and defense coordination with nearby Army units. (2)

39. (S) The UH-1F primary operation in support of "Daniel Boone" remains highly classified. However, only approximately one-half of the period was spent in support of the "Daniel Boone" operation. During the remaining time the "Green Hornets" in conjection with the 5th Special Forces, Detachment B-50, under operational control of First Field Forces Vietnam, conducted intensive reconnaissance, reaction, search and destroy operations in the Ban Me Thuot, Duc Lap and Song Be areas of the Republic of Vietnam. Using a revised concept of inserting reconnaissance patrols and "Hornet Forces", which are composed of thirty-four men, serving as reaction forces, the UH-1F's made forty-one emergency exfils. Two enemy POW's were captured and twenty-five battle field wounded were evacuated by the "Green Hornets." The "Huey" aircraft sustained forty hits from enemy fire, five aircrew members were wounded and were credited with one hundred twenty three enemy kills. (4) (5) (18)

[redacted]

[redacted]

40. (S) The men and machines of the 20th Special Operations Squadron at Ban Me Thuot were called upon time and time again, despite twelve attacks on the camp and extremely poor flying weather. On 2 July the "Green Hornet" gunships assisted a reconnaissance team from Duc Lap Special Forces Camp in breaking contact with a large enemy force, and were credited with 7 confirmed KBA. On 25 July the "Green Hornets" were launched to come to the aid of a Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol that had made contact with an enemy force of at least two platoons and had retreated into a small depression surrounded by high jungle growth. Realizing that the team could be overrun at anytime, Captain Nupen, as gunship lead and Major Klung his wingman directed mini-gun fire in the team's support. Their firing passes succeeded in slowing the enemy advance, but both aircraft had malfunctions of their mini-gun systems. Instead of pulling off target they continued to make passes to draw as much ground fire away from the team as possible. At this time, the beleagured team reported that the enemy was massing his force in an area 50-100 meters north of the team's location. A rocket pass was made into the enemy position. The team leader confirmed that the rockets were on target by the cries heard after each rocket run. Despite the fact that replacement gunships were still several minutes away, Major Hoover immediately descended into the area. Due to the positioning of the enemy, only one corridor of approach was available. His approach required a difficult descent under crosswind conditions into a very confined landing zone. Sporadic ground fire was encountered during the entire descent, approach, and landing. Sergeants Schwartz and Miller assisted the team members into the helicopter and Major Hoover departed the landing zone without receiving any hits from hostile fire. On 29 and 30 July UH-1F gunships assisted local teams from Ban Don Special Forces Camp to breakup enemy ambush positions, enabling them to continue with their missions. On 31 July Captain Godowski, Major Turner and crews launched to aid a search and destroy force from Duc Lap Special Forces Camp. The force had been surrounded by an estimated NVA regiment and had no avenue of escape. Despite a 100 ft ceiling and NVA soldiers within 30 meters of the friendly force, the UH-1F gunships provided 360° mini-gun fire around the team, for 30 minutes, and cleared a path of escape to the north. The weather started breaking and fighter aircraft were called in. After approximately twenty minutes of bombing the ground force requested that the fighters break off target and the "Green Hornets" be called in, as the bombing was forcing the NVA closer to the friendly position. Captain Godowski located the rear elements of the friendly force and the two gunships made mini-gun and rocket passes until they were no longer receiving ground fire. The ground force commander stated that he thought their situation was hopeless until he saw the two gunships break through the overcast. He credited the gunships with 45 KBA. On 2 September the UH-1F's were launched on an emergency extraction of a Long Range Reconnaissance patrol 3 miles west of Duc Lap Special Forces Camp. When the forward air controller arrived he located their position and directed them eastward, toward a landing zone. After cresting a hill and

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starting down slope the team made contact with hostile forces in a trench and bunker complex. After exchanging fire with the enemy, the team retreated to the west. Captain Godowski, Major Gonzales and crews arrived and protected the team with mini-gun and rocket fire. The FAC directed the team toward a bomb crater approximately 75 yards north, the team met hostile fire after moving approximately 35 yards, and had to retreat to their previous position. The gunships continued to deliver ordnance on known enemy positions and were drawing automatic weapons fire from the North, East and South of the team. The two gunships were getting low on fuel and, prior to being relieved by guns 3 and 4, they continued to suppress the fire in the bomb crater area. The FAC directed the team into the bomb crater. Major Henjum and crew made a descent to come in at tree top level, and to a hover above the bomb crater. The crater was too small to permit landing, so a rope ladder pick up was made. As the team climbed the rope ladder, Gunships 3 and 4 made repeated mini-gun passes overhead to suppress the automatic weapons from the North, East and South. During the last five minutes of the pick up, the FAC received fire from heavy automatic weapons to the south. Immediately after Major Henjum departed the landing zone, several hostile troops were spotted in the bomb crater that was used for extraction of the team. On 10 September the "Green Hornets" rescued three six man reconnaissance teams from the same landing zone, twenty miles northeast of Song Be, RVN. The reconnaissance teams had hostile forces on three sides and had spotted two men with weapons on the landing zone. It was decided that the gunship would not fire unless fired upon and all three slicks went in at the same time. The three slicks followed the two gunships at tree-top level. The teams released smoke and the flight came in on the smoke. The slicks hovered at 4 feet as there was secondary growth, stumps and a camouflaged bunker complex in the landing zone. The M-60 door-gunners pulled the team members into the helicopters. Captain Skidmore was the first to depart the landing zone and received ground fire as soon as he crossed the tree-line, to the north. Sergeant Williams returned the fire with his M-60 machine gun and the gunships covered the exits of the other two slicks with mini-gun fire. (4) (5) (18)

41. (U) When the "A" Camp and Subsection Headquarters at Duc Lap, RVN came under attack by an estimated force of two enemy battalions early in the morning of 23 August, the "Green Hornets" were advised of the attack and sent two UH-1F gunships in support. Captain Ciemniecki, Major Gonzales and crews were the first two gunships to reach the Duc Lap Special Forces Camp. When they arrived the "A" Camp was receiving motar, rocket and small arms fire from the West, North and East. They made their mini-gun and rocket passes from north to south working from the camp perimeter out and encountered heavy automatic weapons fire from the tree-lines. They continued to make firing passes on the tree-lines until their ammunition was expended. Upon their departure bodies were observed laying in the clearing around the camp. Two more gunships piloted by Captains Douglas and Crabb arrived on station at 0830 hours, but were held off target until a flight of F-100's and a flight of Army gunships had expended. When

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cleared in they expended their mini-gun and rockets on various automatic weapons positions surrounding the camp. After expending they departed for Ban Me Thuot, but the forward air controller notified them that an F-100 pilot bailed out and requested their aid. Captain Douglas spotted the parachute and made a approach to pick up the pilot, while Captain Crabb and crew flew cover. Prior to landing, Captain Douglas noticed "7 or 8 ground troops running around the chute." The ground fire was too heavy to warrant a pickup and Major Massey, who was flying in the cover ship with Captain Crabb, received a wound in his left arm. The downed pilot was rescued by a ground party from the "A" Camp and the gunships returned to Ban Me Thuot. Captain Ciemneicki and Captain Edwards returned to Duc Lap at 0945 hours and proceeded to work the area with rockets and mini-gun fire, as heavy automatic weapons and small arms fire was encountered from areas west, north, and south of the camp. Before expending their remaining ammunition, they gave fire support to a "Dustoff" helicopter evacuating wounded from the camp, and then returned to Ban Me Thuot. At 0700 hours on the morning of the 24th, Captains Douglas and Crabb again returned to Duc Lap as the enemy forces had penetrated the outer perimeter of the camp and were requested to direct their fire between the inter and outer perimeter fences, as that area was occupied by enemy forces. They placed their fire as requested and remained on station until ammunition and fuel was exhausted. They were relieved on station by Captain Ciemniecki and Major Gonzales. They orbited for one hour and thirty minutes while tactical air was working the area. The Duc Lap Controller called and said he could see enemy troops leaving the plantation area, southwest of the camp. The gunships worked the area with mini-gun and rocket fire and no more fire was received from that area. Then they received word that an Army team was pinned down by fire coming from the northeast side of the camp. Rockets and mini-gun fire were directed on the area, despite intense ground fire. The team leader expressed his appreciation and they returned to Ban Me Thuot. Guns 3 and 4 relieved them on station and orbited while several flights of fighter aircraft worked the areas surrounding the camp. When the gunships were cleared they expended on the enemy bunkers inside the camp. At 0900 hours the "Green Hornet" slicks conducted an armed assault with a relief force of 64 Special Forces and CIDG troops. The operation was a success and the troops joined the defenders at Duc Lap. At 2300 hours on 24 August two UH-1F slicks and two gunships launched on an urgent med evac mission to the Duc Lap Camp. Three U. S. wounded has been waiting evacuation since 1400 hours. Six attempts had been made by "Dustoff" helicopters, but in each instance they were driven off by heavy ground fire. Major Hoover and crew made two attempts to land inside the "A" camp, but in his words "the whole valley opened up," and the mission had to be aborted. On 25 August the "Green Hornets" inserted a reconnaissance team 2 miles southwest of Duc Lap to check on the possibility of enemy armor in the area. After insuring that the team had been inserted successfully, Captains Douglas and Crabb returned to give fire support to the camp. A-1E's were dropping napalm around the base of the hill. The camp commander requested that the A-1E's pull off target and the "Green Hornets"

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put close fire inside the camp, as they were being overrun. The mini-gunners put the fire within five meters of the friendly positions, despite encountering heavy ground fire. At 1700 hours, Captains Ceimniecki and Edwards were launched to provide armed escort for a med evac of wounded from the Duc Lap Camp. While the "Dustoff" helicopter was getting into position, the Army unit which had recaptured the small hill to the north-east, came under heavy fire. The flight was directed to suppress the fire and contain the enemy while the "dustoff" helicopter made the pickup. Captain Ceimniecki put his mini-gun fire on the trench line and Captain Edwards scored direct hits, with twelve rockets, in the bunker the enemy fire was coming from. The mini-gun fire was so accurate that the enemy forces ran out of the trenches into the woodline and were killed. Both of the UH-1F gunships received hits and Lt Cross was wounded in the arm. Captain Tremble, Commander of the ground unit, credited this action for breaking the enemy spirit. He stated that "the action of the gunships caused no less than eight and possibly fifteen KBA. However, the runs were so beautifully timed and executed that they broke the spirit of the enemy unit. The enemy ran out of the bunkers directly into the fire of my company." The company had been pinned down and the "Green Hornets" gave them the break they needed. Captain Tremble's force made a direct assault immediately following the air support and destroyed the remaining enemy forces. (4) (5) (18)

42. (U) On 29 August a flight of four UH-1F's from the 20th Special Operations Squadron were on a combination strike/training mission about 14 miles southeast of Ban Me Thuot. An emergency call was received from Rage 31, an O-2B Psy War aircraft from Nha Trang, to pickup a downed pilot 40 miles south of Ban Me Thuot. The aircraft diverted to the area and received additional information from Captain Westover, the O-2B pilot, and Ban Me Thuot Radar. Captain Westover had spotted the downed pilot's signal flare approximately 2 miles east of the abandoned airstrip at Phey Shrunk, and had directed an Air America UH-1 into the area. The Air America "Huey" had attempted to land in a clearing approximately 74 meters NW of the downed pilot's smoke, but was unable to get close to the ground because of small trees and very thick elephant grass. While circling smoke the 20th flight spotted the downed pilot. The gunships circled the location providing the downed pilot with air cover while the slick, piloted by Major Davenport and Major Henjum, with Staff Sergeant Cook and Sergeant Schwartz standing by their door guns, came in immediately for the pickup. By descending into the clearing and using the main rotor to chop away the foilage and small branches on the left and right, the helicopter was able to get close enough for a rope ladder to reach the survivor below. The survivor climbed the rope ladder and as he was within reach, the door gunners assisted him into the cabin. The helicopter then returned the survivor to the 8th Field Hospital at Nha Trang. The survivor Captain Mark L. Bellamy, U. S. Army, from the 131st Surveillance Airplane Company, Phu Bai, RVN, had been piloting an OV-1 Mohawk on the night of 27 August when his aircraft was struck by lightning and all electrical power and lighting was lost. For a short time he used his flashlight to fly "needle and ball" but he soon had severe spatial disorientation and was forced to eject.

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43. (S) The following is a recap of UH-1F missions 1 July through 30 September 1968.

UH-1F hours flown - 3,085.7

Missions fragged - 1,397

Sorties flown - 6,594

Passengers - 8,359

Cargo in tons - 167.8

Rounds 7.62 expended - 627,320

2.75 rockets expended - 1,518

Alert hours - 18,540

Type Sorties: Armed Helicopter

Infils - 171

Exfils-- 147

Visual Recon - 19

Army Base Defense - 5

TAC movement - 1,380

Type Sorties: Unarmed Helicopter

Infils - 420

Exfils - 298

Visual Recon - 6

Army Support - 287

TAC Movement - 1,622

AF Support - 1,718

Med Evac - 16

One aircraft and crew at Nha Trang was used for base defense alert and aircraft and aircrews at Ban Me Thuot are on 24 hour ground alert, 15 minute response. Approximate ground alert under these conditions is 18,540 hours. (9) (10)

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44. (U) The Silver Star Medal was presented to Major Carl B. Crews by Major General Louis J. Seth, Deputy Commander of 7/13th Air Force on 10 September. Major Crews earned the award for gallantry on 4 and 5 February 1968 when he rescued 16 members of an indigenous assault team surrounded by hostile forces. (3)

45. (U) Personnel of the 20th Special Operations Squadron were awarded 3 Silver Stars, 31 Distinguished Flying Crosses, 1 Bronze Star, 64 Air Medals, 5 Air Force Commendation Medals and 5 Purple Hearts during this period of the report. (3) (8)

46. (U) A new Civic Action project was initiated during July, and is now nearing completion. A school house, located in the city of Nha Trang, required extensive repairs to the structure and interior. The men of the 20th Special Operations Squadron gave over 1000 hours of labor, donated 3000 feet of lumber, plus cement and paint. This project enjoyed the support of the parents of some of the 1500 students that attend this school. The participation of the Vietnamese and the nearness to Nha Trang AB makes this project very popular with the men of the 20th Special Operations Squadron. (20)

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(S) The squadron continued to lose skilled manpower during the period, and no improvement was seen for the future. The replacements had a low skill level and little, if any, experience in the field. This problem existed in the 14th FMS as well.

(U) A change in the supply and support functions was made during the period. Field Maintenance Materiel Control assumed the responsibility of ordering all NORS-G supply items in support of unit aircraft.

(U) Also changed was the control of weapons in the barracks. The first sergeant was given control of the weapons on a custody receipt.

MORALE AND FACILITIES

(U) The morale of squadron personnel was rated high and the unit possessed a remarkable esprit de corps. Three reasons contributed to this attitude. The first was the superior leadership provided by the commander and his staff. Second was the pride of the men in knowing that they were contributing to the war effort. Third was superior facilities enjoyed by squadron personnel, and the recognition of their accomplishments in all areas of endeavor.

(S) The loss of part of their primary mission understandably had a demoralizing effect on the unit. But it was effectively countered by increased involvement in self-help and facility improvement projects.

20TH SPECIAL OPERATIONS SQUADRON

(U) Another unit with a special air mission was the 20th Special Operations Squadron. The squadron's seven flights operated

from Nha Trang and Tan Son Nhut Air Bases in South Vietnam, and Udorn RTAFB, Thailand.

(Ø) A, B, and C Flights, located at Udorn RTAFB, flew missions in support of controlled American sources (CAS) personnel, counter-insurgency and utility transportation. D, E, F and G flights at Nha Trang and Tan Son Nhut flew missions supporting unconventional warfare, reconnaissance, film courier, base defense, special air warfare training, and provide logistical support of USAF units and U.S. sponsored activities and psychological warfare.

PERSONNEL

(U) Lieutenant Colonel William B. Skinner was squadron commander until his return to the United States Nov. 14. He was succeeded by Lieutenant Colonel James A. McMullen, who acted as commander until Dec. 1, when he too returned to the States. At the quarter's end, Lieutenant Colonel Frank A. DiFiglia was serving as squadron commander.

(U) At Udorn, Lieutenant Colonel Shirrel G. Martin turned over command of the flights there to Lieutenant Colonel Wilbur C. Huff Nov. 20.

(U) Personnel records and 538s were transferred from Nha Trang to Udorn. The move relieved some of the administrative workload of the Nha Trang personnel office and provided more timely service for Udorn personnel. The position of administrative officer at Nha Trang was deleted in October. No major problems were encountered transitioning this position to an extra duty for squadron personnel. (51)

(U) Lieutenant Colonel John M. Steen was squadron commander from October, 1967, to April, 1968, and then assumed duties as Assistant Deputy Commander for Special Air Operations with the 14th SOW, until October 1968. A summary of his end of tour report follows. (52)

(S) The decision to pull all USAF helicopters out of Thailand in January, 1968, created management problems by making the 20th a "split squadron." Prior to that time the entire squadron was stationed at Udorn except for a detachment at Tan Son Nhut and the headquarters at Nha Trang. The action resulted in moving the AF UH-1s, then part of another squadron, from Thailand to the 20th. The CH-3s were left there in TDY status, under operational control of 7/13 Air Force until May, 1968, when the CH-3 status changed to PCS. The problems posed by fragmenting a unit in this manner were essentially in management and control. In effect, the detached unit is forced to set up a new squadron, but without the necessary personnel. This is particularly so in administration and maintenance areas.

(S) Problems in the area of facilities, logistics and manpower structure plagued the squadron at FOLs located at Ban Me Thout, Tan Son Nhut and Udorn. The squadron as organized, manned and logistically supported was apparently envisioned to operate out of a fixed base, returning most of the time to the base at completion of a day's mission or short TDY. Facilities, manpower and logistics were expected but were not available. The problem fell into the hands of the squadron, with the Army providing only messing

facilities and quarters. The squadron was responsible for procuring its own supplies and parts for the FOLs by its own means. All the paper work dealing with maintenance was handled by 20th personnel. The proper solution for the problem required that either the supported unit provide facilities or the AF provide adequate table equipment.

(U) That concludes Lieutenant Colonel Steen's comments.

CHECO REPORT

(S) A Contemporary Historical Evaluation of Combat Operations (CHECO) report was published Dec. 4, 1968, and covered USAF helicopter activities in Southeast Asia. (53)

(S) The report that the armed helicopter is vital to USAF participation in special operations, and the Air Force must continue to develop tactics and maintain its mission in supporting these and other MACV Operations. It was proved that armed helicopters can provide direct fire support for slick helicopters which transport personnel involved in special operations activities.

(S) Helicopter pilots with prior experience in fixed and rotary wing aircraft proved to be effective in the operation. The report then said the pilots who have no rotary wing experience nevertheless add valuable contributions to the tactics and maneuvers of the helicopter squadrons.

UDORN OPERATIONS

(S) With the exception of personnel assignment authority, the 20th's detachment at Udorn is administratively independent

of the headquarters at Nha Trang. Udorn still receives its UH-1F parts from Nha Trang, but alternate supply channels are being used to a greater extent.

(Ø) To alleviate some of the supply handling problems at Udorn, Captain Robert G. Zuchetti, Nha Trang base supplies officer, visited Captain Louis S. Bodony, Udorn's maintenance officer, in November. A 100 percent improvement in supply of bench stock and major parts was realized because of the meeting. The only problem still existing at the quarter's end was a minor one dealing with the repair and replacement of major parts, such as main rotor blades and speed decreaser gear boxes. (54)

(Ø) Because of the lack of parts, the repair rate of the helicopters suffered. The problem was solved when Captain Zuchetti and the Udorn supply officer agreed on proper supply levels and proper forecasting of requirements for critical items. The resolution of the problem reduced the NORS rate from 16 to 8.3 percent in the three month period. (55)

(U) A major accomplishment was the reorganization of the maintenance section into three flights. Each flight included a specialist backup and the permanent assignment of crew chiefs. Along with this new program, a recovery phase program was begun to provide more flying time per aircraft.

(U) The official call sign of the Udorn based helicopters is "Pony Express." The popular name and call sign is "Pony." Similarly, the UH-1F's in Vietnam carry the call sign of "Green Hornet," and in the forward operating areas are normally referred to as "Hornets."

(U) During November and December, the Pony Express flew over 80 hours in support of aircraft crash assistance and investigation, and received letters of appreciation for their efforts. (56)

(U) During November, a team of Royal Malayan Air Force officers and advisors visited the 20th's operations and maintenance activity. The purpose of their visit was to gain knowledge of U.S. operations in order to improve on similar Malayan operations.

(U) During the quarter the flights at Udorn flew 1,271.2 hours, logging 121 missions and 1,393 sorties. The Udorn flights also carried 3,611 passengers and 108.9 tons of cargo. There were no search and rescue alerts. (57)

TAN SON NHUT OPERATIONS

(U) With a primary mission of transferring reconnaissance film to Army field commanders and a secondary mission of VIP support, the 20th has carried over 30 tons of cargo and delivered 3,000 passengers in UH-1F assigned craft. (58)

(U) The Tan Son Nhut choppers were fragged through strike plans, 7th Air Force, as required. An average of two flights per day were sent to practically every major Army installation within a radius of 50 miles of Saigon.

(U) During this reporting period, the Tan Son Nhut detachment supported the ARVN Special Forces by supplying helicopters two days a month to acquaint Special Forces troops with the use of McGuire Rigs and the capabilities of the UH-1F helicopter.

NHA TRANG OPERATIONS

(U) With only part of its operations at home, 20th provides all heavy maintenance and phase inspections for Air Force UH-1F helicop-

ters in Vietnam. Its flying activities include pilot upgrading, gunship and slick training, and local visual reconnaissance flights. When additional aircraft are available they are used to support the 14th SOW and other approved agencies in the Nha Trang area.

(Ø) Telephone and radio contact with Ban Me Thout continued to be a problem. Only one phone circuit was available and was insufficient to handle the workload. Because of the bad weather conditions the single band radio was subject to adverse atmosphere conditions, jamming and maintenance difficulties. Requests for better communication systems were submitted but no answer was received.

(U) With only two vehicles the squadron suffered from lack of ground transportation, especially when one vehicle was in the shop for repairs. The lack of communications and transportation reduced the effectiveness of the mission somewhat. (59)

(U) During Air Force Chief of Staff General John P. McConnell's visit to Southeast Asia, the 20th provided part of his transportation. He was flown from Cam Rahn Bay to Phan Rang, to Nha Trang and returned to Cam Rahn Bay.

(U) During the quarter the 20th continued flying local area visual reconnaissance flights to support the Joint Defense Mission of Nha Trang. One helicopter and crew was on alert daily from 7 p.m. until 6 a.m.

WEAPONS

(Ø) The squadron had sufficient miniguns but was short of external rocket supports due to combat losses. Base supply could

not give a definite date on delivery of more mounts.

(C) During December, tests were conducted on rocket warheads of the 10 and 17 pound size. The larger weapon proved to be far superior than the one presently used, but the additional load for the aircraft would cause the helicopter to sacrifice either fuel or minigun ammunition.

(C) The month of December saw an increase in rockets used. An average of 73 rockets were fired during October and November, while 290 rockets were expended in December. The increased use of the rockets enhanced the "Green Hornet" ability to recover teams in the field with a minimum of enemy resistance, according to the pilots of the slicks and gunships. The gunship pilots fired the rockets from positions within the normal minigun patterns instead of the long rocket approach. (60)

MAINTENANCE

(U) The foundation and frame was completed for the squadron maintenance shop. The building will provide office space for operations and maintenance. The maintenance officer, Captain Walter Booth, mentioned that the building will protect two UH-1Fs and the deletion of a heavy hoist will delay engine changes.

(C) The not operationally ready supply rate climbed during the quarter. The increase was due to the high flying time built up on the craft and the increased attention of the inspection program. Operating under adverse climatic conditions and intense hostile ground fire caused a drain on parts. A recommendation to increase replacement items in the supply pipeline was made.

In an effort to alleviate the problem, the chief of maintenance gave "cannibalization initiation authority" to the 20th. This eased the parts supply problem because there were usually several helicopters in maintenance phase inspections for periods up to four days. (61)

(U) After November all mechanics/aerial gunners were qualified in miniguns and M-60 machine guns. This eliminated the problem of a new crew chief maintaining a gunship and flying on a slick. Both pilots and crew chiefs were pleased with the results of the change. (62)

EFFECTIVE HEADGEAR

(U) The value of the ballistic helmets worn by chopper crew members was dramatically demonstrated twice during the quarter when two gunners were hit in the head by AK-47 rifle fire and suffered only minor injuries. One gunner, Sergeant Ronald C. Winkles, took two hits in the head while sustaining only a superficial scalp wound. Crew members' faith in their protective equipment reached an all time high as a result. (63)

BAN ME THOUT OPERATIONS

(U) Completion of new facilities for pilots and a new club room were the major changes at Ban Me Thout. Work on the perimeter defense was also completed.

(C) The highly classified Daniel Boone operation received increased emphasis, resulting in almost daily contact with the enemy. Despite the outstanding professionalism displayed by aircrews and the use of proven low level tactics, two helicop-

ters were lost to enemy action during the period. Details of the aircraft losses follow.

(∅) On Nov. 26, a flight of two gunships and three slicks was launched in response to a call from an Army Special Forces team. The team had been surrounded by superior enemy forces and they were in danger of being overrun. The two gunships were the first to arrive at the battle scene, and as they descended to a low level, crew members observed enemy tracer rounds whipping past the choppers. Despite intense enemy ground fire, the aircraft expended rockets and thousands of minigun rounds into the enemy from treetop level. (64)

(∅) After several passes, Captain David Miller, aircraft commander, and Major Russel Simonetta, pilot of gunship 2, noticed warning lights on both engine and transmission oil temperature. Realizing that engine failure was only a minute or two away, Captain Miller made one more firing pass before heading away from the area. About 45 seconds later the engine seized. The pilot successfully landed the craft in a jungle clearing, and rescue of the crew was accomplished by a 20th slick within three minutes. Enemy forces set fire to the chopper only 25 minutes after the crew had been rescued. Later Captain Miller surmised that the oil cooler had been hit by a .50 caliber slug. (65)

(∅) The next day, a second UH-1F was lost while attempting to infiltrate a Special Forces team into an enemy bivouac area. Captain William Dyer and crew were flying the team members in

a slick. The landing zone was in a heavy secondary growth area at the bottom of a ravine, and was surrounded by a 150-foot multilayered jungle, which forced Captain Dyer into a high steep approach. As he approached the ground, an enemy bullet apparently ripped into his controls, causing him to lose fore and aft cycle control. The helicopter hit the ground, rolled over on its side, and a few minutes later, burst into flames. Of the 10 persons on board, five survived. Both pilots and one door gunner escaped, but SSgt. Gene P. Stuifbergen was trapped in the wreckage. The survivors were rescued by the backup slicks despite the enemy ground fire. (66)

(Ø) The 20th SOS conducted one night infiltration and one night exfiltration, details of which are highly classified. The crew members concluded after the missions that night missions were so hazardous that unless a dire emergency existed, operations of this nature were not worth the potential loss of men and machines. The infiltration mission was unsuccessful, largely due to a lack of light. The exfiltration was conducted with the assistance of two "Moonlight" flare ships and was successful. (67)

(Ø) However, lighted missions are particularly dangerous. Operations conducted under flares can be observed by the enemy several kilometers away, eliminating the element of surprise and subjecting the operation to ground fire. (68)

CIVIC ACTION PROJECTS

(U) The squadron participared in civic action projects but because of its dispersed FOLs, the projects were limited.

(U) Previously a school house was renovated and a group of men went back and reactivated the project to touch up minor mistakes. Three men from squadron headquarters assisted the Catholic Orphanage in Nha Trang. The men taught English classes two nights a week.

(U) During Christmas the squadron collected a large amount of clothing.

(U) The Udorn units helped the community orphanage by constructing sewage disposal lines, donating gifts of food and clothing, and providing hours of companionship to the orphans.

SUMMARY

(U) A total of 4,210.7 hours were flown by the 20th SOS with 1,244 missions fragged and 1,408 missions and 8,023 sorties flown. The helicopters transported 9,606 passengers and 208.4 tons of cargo. During the quarter the squadron expended 626,050 rounds of minigun and M-60 machine gunfire and 1,378 rockets in support of their operations. (69)

STANDARDIZATION/EVALUATION DIVISION

(U) During the quarter, the 14th Special Operations Wing Stan/Eval Division continued to maintain and monitor the level of experience of wing combat flight crews.

(U) From Oct 1. through Dec. 31, 1968, crew members were upgraded to instructor or flight examiner and there were 26 "no-notice" flight checks performed. Of the flight checks administered, all crew members evaluated were rated qualified. (70)

(U) Two examiners of the division, Technical Sergeants Al Moe and Edgar Pickett, designed, developed and manufactured a flare

(Security Classification - if classified) [redacted] RCS: 5500

HISTORICAL DATA RECORD

REPORTING PERIOD		REPORTS CONTROL SYMBOL
FROM: 1 Oct 68	TO: 31 Dec 68	AU-DS

FROM: (NAME AND LOCATION OF UNIT SUBMITTING THIS REPORT)
20th Special Operations Squadron
14th Special Operations Wing (PACAF)
APO San Francisco 96205

TO:
14th Special Operations Wing (DXI)
APO San Francisco 96205

IF MORE SPACE IS NEEDED FOR ANY ITEM, ATTACH ADDITIONAL SHEETS INDICATING APPLICABLE ITEM NUMBER.

SECTION I — ASSIGNMENT

MAJOR AIR COMMAND	NUMBERED AIR FORCE	AIR DIVISION	WING	GROUP
PACAF	7th Air Force		14th Special Operations Wing	

SECTION II — SUBORDINATE UNITS

There are seven flights located at three operating locations. "A", "B", "C" flights are located at Udorn RTAFB, Thailand. "D", "E", "F" and "G" flights are located at Nha Trang AB, RVN and Tan Son Nhut AB, RVN.

SECTION III — MISSIONS

A. PRIMARY "A", "B", and "C" Flights - Support of controlled American Sources (CAS) personnel, counter-insurgency, and utility transportation. "D", "E", "F" and "G" Flights - Unconvential warfare, reconnaissance, film courier, base defense, SAW training, logistical support of USAF units and US sponsored activities, psychological warfare.

B. SECONDARY (OR OTHER)
"A" "B" and "C" Flights - Rescue, utility and civic action.
"D", "E", and "F" Flights - Rescue, VIP courier, and utility.

SECTION IV — PERSONNEL

STATUS	OFFICERS	AIRMEN	CIVILIANS	TOTAL
ASSIGNED	71	199	2	272
AUTHORIZED	88	214	0	302
ATTACHED				

SECTION V — EQUIPMENT

A. AIRCRAFT
UH-1F - 22
CH-3C - 10

B. WEAPONS (INCLUDING MISSILES)
20 - 7.62 miniguns
12 - 2.75 Rocket launchers
13 - M-60 Machine guns

C. ELECTRONICS

D. OTHER

GROUP 4
Downgraded at 3 year intervals, declassified after 12 years
DOD 5200.10

(Security Classification - if classified)

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ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. Interview of Lt Colonel Frank A. Di Figlia, Commander 20th Special Operations Squadron by Captain Theodore C. Sharpe, Historian, 11 Jan 1969	1. Interview covered organization structure changes, recommendations, and an overview of squadron activities.
2. Interview of Major Ezra D. Coons, 14th SOW, Operations Staff Officer by Historian, 20th SOS, 9 Jan 1969	2. Interview covered squadron administrative function, changes and manning.
3. Historical Reports, 20th Special Operations Squadron, Udorn RTAFB, Thailand, October, November and December 1968 compiled by Major Paul T. McIntyre	3. Reports are classified Secret. Location: 20th SOS Squadron Safe, Historical File.
4. Interview of Captain Louis S. Bodony, Maintenance Officer, 20th Special Operations Squadron, Udorn RTAFB, Thailand by Captain Theodore C. Sharpe.	4. Interview covered all aspects of maintenance at Udorn RTAFB.
5. Historical Reports, 20th Special Operations Squadron, Tan Son Nhut AB, RVN; October, November and December 1968.	5. These reports are unclassified and on file at the 20th Special Operations Squadron, Nha Trang AB, Historical File.
6. 20th Special Operations Squadron Special Operating Instructions	6. These instructions set forth in detail all operations conducted by the 20th. On file at the 20th Special Operations Squadron, Nha Trang, RVN.
7. 20th Special Operations Squadron Supervisor of Flying Log Book.	7 Log Book maintained by Supervisor of Flying, Nha Trang. Includes all aircraft movements and significant events.
8. 14th Special Operations Wing Operating Instruction 55-25, Nha Trang AB, RVN, 27 June 1968.	W. This WOI covers Nha Trang Local Area Visual Reconnaissance flight procedures.
9. Interview of Major Robert D. Guyton, Mission Commander, Ban Me Thuot operations, on 3 Jan 1969 by Historian.	9. Interview covered all phases of Ban Me Thuot operations, problems, possible solutions and discussion of classified information.

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10. Interview of Major William P. Boyd, 20th Special Operations Squadron, Armament Officer by Historian on 5 January 1969.	10. Interview covered problem areas of UH-1F armament system and testing of new weapons.
11. Interview of Captain Walter C. Booth, 20th Special Operations Squadron Maintenance Officer by Historian, on 9 January 1969	11. Interview covered Maintenance facilities, training, problems, and possible solutions at Nha Trang
12. Pacific Stars & Stripes newspaper, Saturday, 28 Dec 68, page 7, "Lucky Helmet Saves NCO"	12. Article describes incident wherein a 20th SOS gunner is struck by bullet and lives. Attached.
13. Awards and Decorations Book, UH-1F missions	13. Book lists awards and decorations of the 20th Special Operations Squadron. Location: Awards and Decorations desk, Nha Trang
14. Management Status and Trends Reports, dated October, November and December 1968	14. Reports provide statistics for months of October, November and December. Unclassified. Location: 20th Special Operations Administrative files
15. Air Force New, Hq 7th AF, newspaper, 6 November 1968. "Helmet Saves Life of NCO"	15. Attached
16. Interview of Major Rand, Civic Action Officer, 20th Special Operations Squadron by Historian, 9 Jan 1969	16. Interview covers the 20th's civic action projects during the reporting period
17. End of Tour Report, Lt Colonel John M. Steen, Commander, 20th Special Operations Squadron during period October 1967 - April 1968, and Assistant Deputy Commander for Special Air Operations, 14th SOW, April 1968 - October 1968	17. Report is classified Secret. Location: 20th Special Operations Squadron Safe, General Correspondence File. Report covers Colonel Steen's observations of problems hampering the squadron's effectiveness
18. Hornet Log Book, dated 18 October - 31 December 1968	18. This log is classified Confidential covers day to day operations at Ban Me Thuot. Location: Mission Commander's desk, Ban Me Thuot
19. Air Force Times, Pacific Edition 8 Jan 1968, Page 15, Helmet Saves Gunner	19. 20th SOS Gunner hit in head by bullet. Attached.

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20. UH-1F Awards and Decorations Book.	20. Book lists awards and decorations of the 20th SOS. Location: Awards and Decorations Desk, 20th SOS, Nha Trang.
21. Interview of Captain David W. Miller by Historian, Subject: UH-1F Crash, 26 Nov 68.	21. Interview covered Captain Miller's mission on 26 Nov 1968.
22. Project CHECO Report, 22, dated 4 Dec 1968 compiled by Captain Donald W. Nelson, Project CHECO, 7th Air Force, DOAC, for Directorate, Tactical Division, DCS/Operations Hq PACAF. (Permission for use of this report obtained from the office of origin.)	22. Classified Top Secret. This comprehensive report covers all phases of USAF helicopter operations in Southeast Asia. It gives detailed descriptions, tactics, problems and suggested solutions. Location: Wing Intelligence Office.

1. (U) There were no major changes to the organizational structure of the 20th Special Operations Squadron (SOS during the period of this report. However, on 14 November 1968, Lt Colonel William B. Skinner, Commander, was reassigned to the CONUS. Lt Colonel James A. McMullen, Assistant to the Commander, acted as Commander until 1 December 1968, when his tour was cut short due to a family emergency. Lt Colonel Frank A. Di Figlia is currently the Commander. On 20 November 1968, Lt Colonel Shirrel G. Martin, 20th SOS Commander, Udorn RTAFB relinquished command to Lt Colonel Wilbur C. Huff. (1)

2. (U) During the reporting period, all personnel records and Form 538's for officers and men assigned to the 20th SOS, Udorn RTAFB, Thailand were transferred from Nha Trang to Udorn. This move helped to alleviate administrative workload at Nha Trang, andprovided timely service for Udorn based personnel. The position of Administrative Officer at Nha Trang was deleted in October. No major problems were encountered transitioning this position to an extra duty for squadron personnel.

3. (U) Lt Colonel John M. Steen was the Commander of the 20th Special Operations Squadron from October 1967 to April 1968. From April 1968 to October 1968 he was closely associated with the 20th in his position as Assistant Deputy Commander for Special Air Operations, 14th Special Operations Wing. Colonel Steen has concisely summed up his experiences with the 20th in a comprehensive end of tour report. The sections of his report regarding command and control, UH-1F Operations, concept of deployment, roles and missions, doctrine for employment and employment as an Air Force unit are set forth verbatim below. (17)

"a. I. General:

A. (Ø) Command and Control: The long existing separation of the squadron into two major parts create significant problems in management. The original reason for the split was brought about by a political decision to "pull all USAF helicopters out of Thailand" in Jan 1968. At the time the entire 20th Heli Sq except for a detachment at Tan Son Nhut was located in Thailand, although Sq headquarters was at Nha Trang. The decision resulted in the AF UH-1s (then part of another squadron) being removed from Thailand and assigned to the 20th Heli Sq, while the CH-3s were left there in a "TDY" status (in an attempt to live up to the "letter" of the decision while still keeping helicopters at Udorn). This resulted in having a squadron headquarters and UH-1 sectionat Nha Trang, under operational control of 14 ACW, a substantial unit of CH-3s PCS at Tan Son Nhut (under operational control of 7AF hq) and a large unit of CH-3s "TDY" at Udorn under operational control of 7/13 AF. This condition persisted until Nov 1967 when the remaining Ch-3s at Tan Son Nhut were replaced by a UH-1F on TDY status. In May 1968 the CH-3s were put on a PCS status at Udorn, the political and bureaucratic winds having changed. The problems posed by fragmenting a unit in this fashion are essentially in management and control. The indefinite assignment of a major segment at another base under other operation control effectively removes it from management by the squadron commander. While a "temporary" detachment of a large unit can be expected to continue operating under estab-

lished policies or procedures, the indefinite assignment requires the OIC (actually, the new "squadron" commander" to formulate amended policies and procedures to more closely fit his new command. So it soon evolves into what is actually a new unit, with some assistance and support to a lesser or greater extent from his old squadron and wing. The problem is that the detached unit is forced to in effect set up a new squadron, but without the numbers and kinds of people necessary. Particularly this is so in administration and maintenance areas and the manpower (officer supervisor) is bled from the operations area. The result is likely to be inadequate admin and maintenance supervision along with decreased opeaational effectiveness. At the same time although the "commander" has all the responsibility of a commander (particularly because of the distance and inadequate communication involved) he doesn't have the authority or prestige of a commander. In sum the fragmentation results in at least two or (before Nov 1967) three "squadrons" while attempting to continue to manage them as one, charging the original squadron commander with responsibilities he cannot fully accomplish. The pending proposal to consolidate CH-3 assets in Thailand should partially relieve this problem.

"A. (U) Effectiveness: The UH-1F, either employed as armed aircraft or as slicks has been highly effectively employed in RVN. The comparison, of course is made with the UH-1s as employed by the US Army. The UH-1Fs have been operated in accordance with established AF policy on crew duty time, monthly flying time, and maintenance practices. These in general, contrast sharply with US Army practices as I have observed them. The UH-1Fs have not experienced a combat loss since April 1967 nor an accident since July 1967, although they have been in constant combat action since. The action has been comparable to that in which the Army UH-1s are employed yet the loss rate is believed to be far below the US Army's. At the same time, the unit 20 SOS supports has been outspoken in their praise of 20SOS support during the entire period, particularly as compared with their support from US Army units. In part the working relationship has been enhanced by the fact that we have been able to continue our activity for a long period with the same unit.

"B. (S) Concept of deployment: The deployment of operating elements of UH-1s at FOBs (Ban Me Thuot, Tan Son Nhut, and Udorn) has caused considerable problems. These are primarily in the area of facilities, logistics, and manpower structure. The squadron as organized, manned, and logistically supported is apparently envisioned to be operated out a fixed base, returning most of the time to the base at completion of the day's missions or a short TDY. Facilities are expected to be those provided by the base, logistics those provided by the AF supply system at the Main Support Base, and manpower that required to operate in that fashion. Instead the UH-1 section since inception has operated continuously out of FOB (major maintenance to be done at MSB). The main responsibility to provide maintenance facilities has fallen to the squadron (the Army has provided "messing" and "quarters") because the AF has not provided (or doesn't have?) portable buildings or trailers, etc. So most of the work had to be done out of tents or makeshift shacks that were procured and erected at great effort by the squadron. The logistics support for 20 SOS is the same as provided for all AF units - it stops at the supply point on Nha Trang Air Base. The 80 - 500 miles remaining to the FOB is the responsibility of the 20 SOS and the significant manpower required comes out

of their hide week in and week out. The workload is significant and to be done effectively requires the services of an officer and a couple of NCOs full time. The officer to monitor progress, document failures by the base support, initiate expedients to overcome them, and to line up transportation support. The airmen are needed to do the supply leg work and overcome the supply unit inertia. So long as the FOBs remain relatively fixed, the makeshift facilities are finally upgraded and do the job. The proper solution to this problem requires that either the supported unit provide the facilities or the AF provide adequate table equipment. The logistics support cannot be solved but the added manpower requirement should be recognized and provided.

"C. (S) Roles and Missions: The employment of the UH-1F as we use them is believed to be outside of the scope of the agreement between CSA and CSAF. The approved employment of USAF SAW rotary wing aircraft (including armed helicopters) includes training of foreign air Forces, support to USAF forces, and other government agencies and indigenous forces but only when operating without US Army advisors or not under US Army control. The operation with 5th Special Forces Group units for SOG is clearly Army advised and Army controlled. While not advocating we attempt to terminate our support to SOG, it is worthwhile to consider what the USAF objectives are in continuing to expend significantly large quantities of personnel and equipment on a mission that is only questionably within the terms of the agreement. Undoubtedly, so long as the US Army doesn't object, it is for the purpose of; one, retaining a "foothold" on helicopter operations in uncoventional warfare and; two, acquiring the equipment and knowledge necessary to conduct such operations. Yet, while we now have substantially a completely equipped force, we have not made much effort nor devoted much thought to improved weapons. Even more of a problem, to my mind, is the lack of assurance we have that the tactics we have developed are being analyzed for effectiveness and improvements. The squadron and the wing do not have the resources for this. I would think, however, that TAWC would have the duty and the resources to do so. But it is something that requires "on the spot" observation. That is, I don't believe that a review of tactics in a simulated environment such as the Hurlburt could produce the results that the same review of the real thing could accomplish. I recommend periodic visits by TAWC analysts to observe and discuss our operation and make a record of the kinds of tactics found effective.

"D. (S) Doctrine of employment: The concept that USAF has for employment of helicopters in unconventional war is not clearly expressed. While it is stated that USAF may use helicopters and gunships, if required, in unconventional warfare, the term "unconventional warfare" is not defined. In the operation we are engaged in there is a continuum of violence, level of forces and openess of action, from at one end, the small 4 - 6 man recon team, intent on information and concealment, to, at the other extreme, large teams of "hornet" forces (36 men) or larger, intending to engage the enemy. The latter of course become indistinguishable from Army air assault operations. It is generally agreed that USAF doesn't intend that the term "unconventional warfare" include air assault operations, except possibly in connection with training of foreign air forces. The objective, of course, aside from staying away from the Army's mission, is to avoid the loss of sizeable numbers of aircraft that often accompanies air assault operations. The answer to this problem is to attempt to obtain, at an appropriate time, a clearer definition from higher headquarters of the kinds of operation.

included or excluded from unconventional warfare. An appropriate time must wait for a suitable test case or the mement when it becomes clear that the operation is becoming predominantly an air assault operation, with the recon operations only incidental to it.

"E. (S) Employment as an AF unit: Considerable evidence indicates that SOG management intends to press for use of the AF UH-1s as gunships for escort of Army (or other FWMAF) slicks when we are fully equipped with rocket launchers. This has concerned me for some time because, intuitively, I prefer an "Air Force" operation and because such a use would require deployment of UH-1s at four or five FOBs with an attendant greatly increased cost in support. While 7AF has not yet indicated their position on this subject authoritatively, I have found that a staff officer, Lt Col Ashbrook, in plans, has a definite position on this, which coincides with my own. He in summary, argues that while 7AF does want equipment sufficient to equip all aircraft as gunbirds, this is purely for the purpose of flexibility and the intent continues to be that they will operate as a complete AF flight. That is, both guns and slicks will be AF UH-1s. I suggest that, when this problem arises, that contact with that office should serve to insure that 7AF will take a position on it."

4. (S) A report on all United States Air Force helicopter activities in southeast Asia was published on 4 December 1968. This report was prepared by Project CHECO (Contemporary Evaluation of Combat Operations) personnel, 7th Air Force, Tan Son Nhut AB, RVN under the direction of Captain Donald W. Nelson for Directorate, Tactical Division, DCS/Operations, Headquarters Pacific Air Forces. Portions of the conclusions and lessons learned chapters are set forth verbatim below. (22)

a. "(S) The armed helicopter is vital to USAF participation in Special Operations. Air Force must continue to develop tactics and maintain its mission in supporting USAF Special and MACV Operations. It was proved that armed helicopters can provide the direct close in fire support for the slick helicopters which transport the personnel involved with Special Operations activities." (22)

b. "(S) The present USAF personnel policy of manning the helicopter units in SE Asia with pilots who have had varied fixed and rotary wing background has proved to be effective. Those pilots who come to operational units with no prior rotary wing experience add valuable contributions to the tacts and maneuvers of the helicopter squadrons." (22)

5. The 20TH SOS - Udorn RTAFB, Thailand.

a. (C) With the exception of personnel assignment authority, the 20th Special Operations Squadron at Udorn is not administratively dependent upon the parent organization at Nha Trang. A weekly flight from Udorn to Nha Trang by a Thailand based C-47 continues to operate. Udorn still gets UH-1F parts from Nha Trang, however alternate supply channels are being used to a greater extent. (3) (4)

b. (C) Difficulty was experienced in the support of Udorn's UH-1F's from the home base at Nha Trang. On 6 November 1968, Captain Robert G. Zuchetti, Base Supplies Management Officer, Nha Trang, visited Udorn. Captain Zuchetti and Captain Louis S. Bodony (Supra), maintenance officer at Udorn, established an improved method of supply handling procedures for UH-1F parts and also decided on the most expeditious means of communication between Nha Trang and Udorn. The result of this meeting was that a 100% improvement in supply of bench stock items and major parts was realized. A minor problem area still existing is the necessity of having to return major UH-1F components such as main rotor blades and speed decreaser gear boxes to Nha Trang for proper documentation clearance. (4)

c. (C) Parts supply for the CH-3E helicopters has suffered during this quarter due to many critical item failures and the failure to maintain proper supply levels as established. Pipeline status of items from the depot also contributed to poor supply levels. Agreement between, and action taken by the Base Supply Officer at Udorn and Captain Bodony has since alleviated much of the pipeline problem by establishing proper supply levels and by proper forecasting of requirements for critical items. Since this action was taken the NORS rate has declined from 16% in October to 8.3% in December. (4)

d. (U) The modification of the CH-3E helicopter station 290 bulkhead is nearing completion. All 1962, 63 and 65 models to be accomplished at the time the main transmission is removed for time change. (4)

e. (U) A major accomplishment at Udorn this quarter was the reorganization of the Maintenance Section. Three flights have been formed with a specialist backup and the permament assignment of a crew chief to each aircraft. With the assignment of permament crew chiefs, a recovery phase program was instituted to provide more available aircraft flying time and preclude two and three down days per aircraft at every 50 hour phase. (3)(4)

f. (U) On 1 October 1968, Udorn Operations and Administrative Sections were moved to building 1833. The new facilities are large, air conditioned, and furnished with all necessary equipment. The Personal Equipment Section is also housed in this building as it is adjacent to the flight line and helicopter parking area. Construction work in the immediate area of Bldg 1833 has not hampered squadron activities and when completed will provide outstanding facilities for the 20th. (3)

g. (U) The official call sign of Udorn based helicopters is "Pony Express". The popular name and call sign is "Pony." Similarly the UH-1F's in Vietnam carry the call sign of "Green Hornet", and in the forward operating areas are normally referred to as "Hornets." (6)

h. (U) During November and December 1968, the Pony Express flew over 80 hours in support of aircraft crash assistance and investigation. Letters of appreciation were received from the Commanders of the 388th Tactical Fighter Wing (PACAF) and the 56th Special Operations Wing. (3)

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i. (U) During November, a team of Royal Malaysian Air Force Officers and Advisors observed our Udorn CH-3 operations and maintenance programs for a week. The purpose of their visit was to gain knowledge of our procedures in order to improve on similar Malaysian Air Force operations. (3)

j. (S) On 7 October 1968, a CH-3, commanded by Lt Colonel S. Martin, came under fire. Approaching a landing zone in Southern Laos, the aircraft had just attained a hover, when automatic weapons fire was encountered from the tree line. The approach was discontinued and a successful infiltration was accomplished minutes later at an alternate landing zone. Examination of the aircraft disclosed one bullet hole and light damage to the aircraft. (3)

k. (U) During this reporting period CH-3 helicopter (Udorn only) accomplishments were as follows:

	October	November	December
Hours Flown	424.6	394.7	451.9
Missions Fragged	49	51	46
Missions Flown	27	49	45
Sorties Flown	428	447	518
Passengers	940	1219	1452
Cargo (Tons)	28.5	40.2	40.2
SAR Alert	0	0	0

6. The 20TH SOS - Tan Son Nhut AB, RVN Operations

a. (U) During this reporting period, the primary mission of the Tan Son Nhut Detachment continued to be the transfer of reconnaissance film to the using Army field commanders, with a secondary mission of VIP support for the Commander, 7th Air Force. Over 30 tons of cargo were delivered, 3,000 passengers hitched rides with use, and practically every general grade officer (plus a US Senator) in Southeast Asia was speeded on his way by the two UH-1Fs assigned to Tan Son Nhut.

b. (U) Tan Son Nhut aircraft are fragged through Strike Plans, 7th Air Force, as required. Normally two flights per day are ordered to practically every major Army installation within 50 miles of Saigon. These Army bases include, but are not limited to: Phu Loi, Lai Ke, Dau Treng, Chu Chi, Duc Hoa, Xuan Loc, Blackhorse, Luscombe, Vung Tau, Bear Cat, Long Bien, and Vien Hoa AB. (5)

c. (U) During this reporting period, the Tan Son Nhut detachment supported the ARVN Special Forces by supplying helicopters two days per month to acquaint Special Forces troops with the use of McGuire Rigs and the capabilities of the UH-1F helicopter. (5)

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7. The 20TH SOS - Nha Trang AB, RVN Operations

a. (U) Nha Trang AB, RVN is the home of the 20th Special Operations Squadron, however, only a small fraction of the 20th's total operations are conducted here. All heavy maintenance and phase inspections for UH-1F helicopters in Vietnam is accomplished here. Flying activities include pilot upgrading flights, gunship and slick training, and local visual reconnaissance flights. When additional aircraft are available, they are used to support the 14th SOW and other approved agencies in the Nha Trang area. (1)

b. (C) Again this quarter, the 20th at Nha Trang experienced communications difficulty with Ban Me Thuot, RVN. Only one phone circuit is available and difficult to obtain during normal working hours. Further the single side band radio link is subject to adverse atmospheric conditions, jamming, and maintenance difficulties. Requests for improved facilities have been submitted, however no date has been set for installation of new equipment. At Nha Trang AB, transportation and communications problems continue to exist. These problem areas have been brought to the attention of higher authority, however, the problems are not of such magnitude to receive priority, nor do they degrade our mission capability to the extent that they require immediate action. Squadron operations has only two vehicles available for crew transportation and general use on the base. Most aircrews reside in the city of Nha Trang. While scheduled transportation is available, and the base is compact, much time is wasted waiting or walking further, routine maintenance on one vehicle reduces the "Fleet" by 50%. (1)

c. (U) On 3 November 1968, the Green Hornets provided transportation for General John P. McConnell, Chief of Staff, United States Air Force. General McConnell was flown from Cam Rahn Bay to Phan Rang AB, thence to Nha Trang AB and then returned to Cam Rahn Bay. General McConnell stopped briefly at each base to present awards and inspect facilities. Our maintenance men did an outstanding job of preparing the four Hueys used. The fact that the entire operation was accomplished without a hitch attests to the professionalism of the officers and men of the 20th. (7)

d. Nha Trang local area mission requirements were placed on the UH-1Fx again during this quarter. The 14th SOW OI 55-25 required the 20th to fly local area visual reconnaissance flights to support the "Joint Defense Mission" of Nha Trang. The 20th was further required to maintain one UH-1F gunship and crew on alert from 1900 to 0600 during this period. (8)

e. (C) Major William Boyd, Squadron Armament Officer was interviewed. Major Boyd stated that there were several armament problems encountered during this reporting period. We have sufficient miniguns (40) on hand for our mission requirements, however external rocket supports are in short supply due to combat losses; and base supply can not give a firm date on delivery of additional mounts. (10)

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f. (C) During December 1968 several tests were conducted on rockets armed with 17 lb warheads, as opposed to the 10 lb warhead currently in use. The 17 lb warhead was found to be a far superior weapon for our mission than the smaller charge; however, the additional 100 lb load for aircraft could not be accepted without reducing the fuel or minigun ammunition load. (10)

g. Druing the month of December 1968, use of rockets increased drastically. During October and November an average of 73 rockets were fired against hostile forces. In December 290 rockets were expended. On several occasions Army ground forces have reported that rockets caused the enemy to panic and run from their offensive positions thus exposing themselves to subsequent minigun passes and our sniper fire. Both gunships and slick pilots feel that the increased use of rockets has enhanced the "Green Hornet" ability to recover teams in the field with a minimum of enemy resistance. Gunship pilots have found that they need not make long rocket approaches, for excellent accuracy, but may fire rockets from positions within the normal minigun patterns. (10) (21)

h. The construction of a new Maintenance facility for the 20th SOS in in progress. The foundation and frame have been completed and the building is progressing at a rapid rate. Estimated completion is scheduled for early April. This building will provide office space for operations and maintenance. Captain Walter Booth, Maintenance Officer, states that the building will accomodate two UH-1Fs. Captain Booth further stated that a hoist originally planned for the building has been deleted. Captain Booth feels that the lack of a heavy hoist will cause delays during engine changes. (11)

i. (C) An increase in the NORS (Not Operational Ready Supply) rate was increased during the reporting period at Nha Trang. This was due to the high flying time being built up on UH-1Fs and closer more thorough maintenance inspection program. Operating under adverse climatic conditions and intense hostile ground fire caused a drain on parts. A recommendation to increase replacement items in the supply pipeline has been suggested. In an effort to temporarily alleviate this problem, the Chief of Maintenance, Nha Trang, has given "cannibalization initiation authority" to the 20th. This has eased the parts supply problem because there are usually several helicopters in maintenance phase inspections for periods up to four days. (11)

j. (U) Until November 1968, helicopter mechanics/aerial gunners were qualified only in miniguns or M-60 machine guns. This caused a problem at the Ban Me Thuot forward operating base. Crew chiefs of gunships who were not qualified minigunners would crew a gunship but fly on a slick crew. This resulted in a decrease in the quality of maintenance. Under a new concept instituted by Captain Booth, all men are dual qualified in miniguns and M-60's. This allows the crew chief to fly on and maintain only one helicopter. Both pilots and crew chiefs are pleased with the results of this change. (11)

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k. (U) During the reporting period Staff Sergeant Robert B. Williams and Sergeant Ronald C. Winkles, both M-60 door gunners, had similar unique experiences. Both gunners were hit in the head by Communist AK-47 rifle fire and both suffered only minor injuries. The ballistic helmet used by all crew members made the difference. Sergeant Williams was hit over the left eye. He received 11 stitches and a bottle of aspirin from the Flight Surgeon. Sergeant Winkles took two bullets in the forehead, yet sustained only a superficial scalp wound. Crew members faith in their protective equipment and body armor hit an all time high. (12)(15)(19)

8. Ban Me Thuot Operations

a. (C) The overall operation at Ban Me Thuot has not changed significantly during the reporting period. All work on revetments and facilities is complete. Facilities now include private rooms for all pilots and a new club. The work on the perimeter defense has been completed. Compared to the previous reporting period, few attacks against the camp have been initiated by the enemy. (9) (18)

b. (S) During the reporting period, incceased emphasis was placed on the highly classified "Daniel Boone" operations. The expanded operations and heavy concentration of enemy troops in our area of operations resulted in almost daily contact with the enemy. Despite outstanding professionalism displayed by aircrews and use of proven low level tactics, the 20th lost two helicopters to enemy ground fire during this period. The details of these aircraft losses are set forth below. (9) (18)

c. (C) On 26 November 1968, a flight of two gunships and three slicks were launched in response to a call from one of the Army Special Forces teams that the 20th was supporting. The team had been surrounded by enemy forces, their position had been compromised, and they were in immediate danger of being overrun by superior enemy forces. The two gunships were first to arrive over the beleaguered team and upon descent to low level, all crew members observed enemy tracer rounds whipping past the choppers Despite intense ground fire both gunships expended rockets and thousands of minigun rounds into the enemy from treetop level. After several passes Captain David Miller, Aircraft Commander, and Major Russell Simonetta, Pilot of Gunship #2 observed caution lights on both engine and transmission oil temperature, with full knowledge that engine failure was only a minute or so away. Captain Miller made one more firing pass before heading away from the area. About 45 seconds after pulling off target the engine siezed. A successful autorotation to a jungle clearing was accomplished. Rescue of the crew was accomplished by a 20th slick within three minutes as the helicopter had landed a mere 2000 meters from the encircled Special Forces team. Enemy forces set fire to the helicopter only 25 minutes after the crew had been rescued. Although confirmation was not possible, Captain Miller believes that his aircraft was hit in the oil cooler by a .50 caliber slug. (21)

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d. (C) On 27 November 1968, the day after Captain Miller and crew were [illegible]ned, the 20th Special Operations Squadron experienced the loss of second UH-1F. The mission was to infiltrate a Special Forces team into an enemy bivouac area. Captain William Dyer and crew were flying the team members in their slick. The landing zone was in a heavy secondary growth area at the bottom of a ravine. Further, the landing zone was surrounded by 150 foot multilayered jungle, forcing Captain Dyer into a high steep approach. As he approached the ground it is suspected that an enemy bullet ripped into his controls, causing him to loose fore and aft cyclic control. The helicopter contacted the ground, rolled over on its side and a few minutes later, burst into flames. Of the ten souls on board, five survived. Both pilots and one door gunner escaped, but Staff Sergeant Gene P. Stuifbergen was trapped in the wreckage. The backup slicks landed in the landing zone a few minutes after the crash and despite the threat of enemy fire, successfully rescued the survivors. (20)

e. (C) During the reporting period, the 20th Special Operations Squadron conducted one night infiltration and one night exfiltration. All details of these emergency operations are highly classified. Any helicopter operations in close proximity to the ground at night, are at best dangerous. These missions were no exception. It was felt by all participating crew members that these night missions were so hazardous that unless a dire emergency existed, operations of this nature were not worth the potential loss of men and machines. The infiltration was unsuccessful. The lesson learned: artificial lighting is an absolute must. The exfiltration was conducted with the assistance of two "Moonlight" flare ships and was successful. Obviously operations conducted under flares or using aircraft lighting systems can be observed by the enemy several kilometer distant and any advantage of surprise is lost. Further the enemy can pin point the operation, bring fire to bear upon the operation, or deploy ground troops to neutralize our ground teams. (18) (13) (9)

f. (U) Personnel of the 20th Special Operations Squadron were awarded three Silver Stars, 10 Distinguished Flying Crosses, two Bronze Stars, 67 Air Medals, six Air Force Commendation Medals, and six Purple Hearts during the period of this report.

9. (U) Civic action projects undertaken by the 20th during this period are varied. The constant rotation of men to and from Ban Me Thuot hamper scheduling of extensive projects. The school house renovation project, completed the past summer, was reactivated to touch up minor faults in the original work. Three men are assisting the Catholic Orphanage in Nha Trang. These men devote two nights a week to the orphanage teaching formal lessons in the English language to all interested indigenous personnel. Therr classes are very popular. Further the 20th has obtained and distributed large amounts of adult and children's clothing to the Vietnamese. Christmas for the children at the Protestant orphanage of Nha Trang came as Santa arrived on a 20th Huey to distribute gifts. A Christmas party for the children was sponsored by the 20th. The 20th at Udorn has responded to the needs of the Udorn community orphanage by constructing sewage disposal lines, donating gifts of food and clothing, and providing hours of compansioship to the children. (3) (16)

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10. (C) During this reporting period extracts of the Management Status and Trends Reports for Nha Trang, Udorn and Tan Son Nhut UH-1F operations were as follows:

	October	November	December
Hrs Flown	1407.6	1482.8	1320.3
Missions Fragged	530	471	443
Missions Flown	486	480	442
Sorties Flown	2581	2856	2586
Passengers	3056	3483	3067
Cargo (Tons)	66.1	72.5	69.8
Rounds Expended	164350/471	211000/351	250700/556

He lmet Saves Gunner

NHA TR. NG AB — "It was like no other feeling I've ever had," commented Sgt. Ronald . Winkles. Which can be believed, since t isn't every day a man is shot in the l ad twice and lives.

Winkles is : M-60 machine gunner with the 20th Special Op rations Sq., that flies missions in the UH-1F heli opter. It was on one of the missions that two 7 2mm armor-piercing bullets from a Communist A K-47 smashed into his helmet.

The 210-pou d gunner was knocked down in the chopper w en the bullets impacted. But to the surprise o the enemy soldiers and his own crew members like, Winkles got right back up and kept on fir ng.

The reactio was made possible by the tough ceramic helmet Winkles was wearing. It was the second time in a month that the ballistic helmet had saved a "reen Hornet" of the 20th. Sgt. Robert B. Wil ms had been shot above the left eye without serious injury just a month earlier.

"I felt the bullets hit," said Winkles, "but when I realized that I wasn't hurt, I got right back up. The way I saw it, we had been in the LZ (landing zone) for only 45 seconds then, and feeling sorry for yourself wouldn't do any good if you were going to end up dead anyway."

So he grabbed his M-60 and started firing. His fellow crew members figured that his actions helped save their lives, since they were under heavy fire from an enemy base camp just 100 meters away.



CERAMIC helmet and one of the bullets it stopped are held by Sgt. Ronald C. Winkles, who was shot twice in the head and escaped uninjured.

17 AF News
Nov 6, 1968
Page 20

Helmet Saves Life of NCO

By SGT. JIM WHITE

NHA TRANG -- There may somewhere be man luckier than Sgt. Robert B. Williams, but they would have a hard time making him believe it.

Sergeant Williams, Williston, N.D., is an aerial gunner in the 20th Special Operations Squadron here. On a recent mission, an enemy sniper fixed his sights on him and squeezed the trigger just as the UH-1F Huey in which he was riding lifted off the ground.

The bullet slammed into Sergeant Williams' flight helmet just above his left eye. It penetrated, but the helmet, of reinforced fiberglas-and-plastic construction, deflected the bullet downward. Striking him a glancing blow on the forehead, the slug flew out between the helmet and the gunner's face.

Knocked unconscious by the blow, he was flown to a nearby hospital. Four hours after the sniper pulled the trigger, Sergeant Williams walked out of the hospital with a headache and several stitches in his forehead; otherwise, he was none the worse for the incident.

"All the crew members of the 20th wear those helmets," he grinned, "and personally, I'd recommend them to anyone. My helmet did just what it was designed to do, and as soon as I get another one and a bottle of aspirins, I'll be ready to fly again."

Lucky Helmet Saves NCO

NHA TRANG, Vietnam (Special)—"It was like no other feeling I've ever had," said Sgt. Ronald C. Winkles, 22, Morristown, Tenn.

And indeed it was, since it isn't every day you are shot twice in the head.

Winkles is an H60 machine gunner with the Air Force's 20th Special Operations Squadron, that flies missions in the UH-1F helicopter. It was on one of the missions that two 7.62mm armor-piercing bullets from a Communist AK47 smashed into his helmet.

The 210-pound gunner was knocked down in the chopper when the bullets impacted. But to the surprise of the enemy soldiers and his own crew members alike, Winkles got right back up and kept on firing.

Pacific Stars & Stripes Dec. 28, 1960

MEDCAP MISSION AIDS
WOUNDED ELEPHANT

NT- 10 - 68 - 7
By Sgt James N. White
United States Air Force

NHA TRANG (7AF) - When anything as ponderous as a pair of pachyderms wqnders into the area of a firefight, something has to give. And that's how Air Force Captain Richard P. Peipgras, 25, Minneapolis, happened to treat the two most unusual patients of his medical career.

Two elephants recently wandered into a crossfire between communist and allied forces outside a Montagnard village near Ban Me Thout. Realizing their perdicament, the pachyderms turned and lumbered away from the danger area, but not before both of them were wounded.

Army officials in the area contacted the 20th Special Operations Squadron detachment in Ban Me Thout and requested medical help for the Montagnards' elephants. Air Force Colonel William B. Skinner, 45, Pittsburgh, relayed the request to the 14th USAF Dispensary at Nha Trang and Dr. Piepgras, base Veterinarian, flew to the scene in a 20 SOS helicopter.

NO PHOTO

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"The larger of the elephants, an animal which weighed about four tons, had been hit in the front shoulder and in the hindquarters," Piepgras said, "and the second elephant, about half the size of the first, had half his tail shot off. I took some tranquilizing drugs along, but they were designed for sentry dogs and weren't strong enough to have much effect on the elephants."

Helped by the Montagnard handler who quieted the animals as he worked, Piepgras cleaned his patients' wounds, which had become infected, and gave them antibiotics.

"I think the prognosis is good," Piepgras smiled after his return to Nha Trang. "They should recover nicely."

-30-

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON

23 June 1970

SPECIAL ORDER
GB-477

By direction of the President, CAPT JAMES P FLEMING, [redacted], is awarded the Medal of Honor for conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity in action at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty on 26 Nov 1968:

On 26 November 1968, Captain Fleming (then First Lieutenant) distinguished himself as the Aircraft Commander of a UH-1F Transport Helicopter near Duc Co, Republic of Vietnam. On that date, Captain Fleming went to the aid of a six-man Special Forces Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol that was in danger of being overrun by a large, heavily armed hostile force. Despite the knowledge that one helicopter had been downed by intense hostile fire, Captain Fleming descended, and balanced his helicopter on a river bank with the tail boom hanging over open water. The patrol could not penetrate to the landing site and he was forced to withdraw. Dangerously low on fuel, Captain Fleming repeated his original landing maneuver. Disregarding his own safety, he remained in this exposed position. Hostile fire crashed through his windscreen as the patrol boarded his helicopter. Captain Fleming made a successful takeoff through a barrage of hostile fire and recovered safely at a forward base. Captain Fleming's conspicuous gallantry, his profound concern for his fellowmen, and his intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty are in keeping with the highest traditions of the United States Air Force and reflect great credit upon himself and the Armed Forces of his Country.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE · OFFICIAL · HEADQUARTERS U.S. AIR FORCE

JOHN D. RYAN, General, USAF
Chief of Staff

JOHN F. RASH, Colonel, USAF
Director of Administration

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The President of the United States

in the name of

The Congress

takes pleasure in presenting the

Medal of Honor

to

FLEMING, JAMES P.

Rank and organization: Captain, U.S. Air Force, 20th Special Operations Squadron. *Place and date:* Near Duc Co, Republic of Vietnam, 26 November 1968. *Entered service at:* Pullman, Wash. *Born:* 12 March 1943, Sedalia, Mo. *Citation:* For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity in action at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty. Capt. Fleming (then 1st Lt.) distinguished himself as the Aircraft Commander of a UH-IF transport Helicopter. Capt. Fleming went to the aid of a 6-man special forces long range reconnaissance patrol that was in danger of being overrun by a large, heavily armed hostile force. Despite the knowledge that 1 helicopter had been downed by intense hostile fire, Capt. Fleming descended, and balanced his helicopter on a river bank with the tail boom hanging over open water. The patrol could not penetrate to the landing site and he was forced to withdraw. Dangerously low on fuel, Capt. Fleming repeated his original landing maneuver. Disregarding his own safety, he remained in this exposed position. Hostile fire crashed through his windscreen as the patrol boarded his helicopter. Capt. Fleming made a successful takeoff through a barrage of hostile fire and recovered safely at a forward base. Capt. Fleming's profound concern for his fellowmen, and at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty are in keeping with the highest traditions of the U.S. Air Force and reflect great credit upon himself and the Armed Forces of his country.

Biography

United States Air Force

COLONEL JAMES P. FLEMING

Colonel James P. Fleming is the Commander of the U.S. Air Force-Civil Air Patrol Southwest Liaison Region, with headquarters located at the U.S. Naval Air Station in Dallas, Texas.

In this position, he is the chief point of contact between the U.S. Air Force and the Civil Air Patrol, the civilian auxiliary of the Air Force, for his six state region. The region is comprised of Arizona, Arkansas, Louisiana, New Mexico, Oklahoma, and Texas. His responsibilities include the supervision and management of active duty Air Force personnel and DOD civilians, plus Air Force Reserve Officers who provide assistance and support to Civil Air Patrol members throughout the region.

Colonel Fleming was born on March 12, 1943 in Sedalia, Missouri. He is a 1961 graduate of Moses Lake High School, Moses Lake, Washington, and a 1966 graduate of Washington State University where he earned a Bachelor of Science degree in police science. While attending Washington State, Colonel Fleming joined the Air Force Reserve Officer Training Corps and received his commission as a second lieutenant upon graduation.

Colonel Fleming's military education includes completion of Squadron Officer School in 1971, Air Command and Staff College in 1976, and Air War College in 1986.

His first assignment upon entering the Air Force was to Laredo AFB, Texas, for pilot training. In December 1966, he attended helicopter pilot training at Sheppard AFB, Texas. Upon graduation in May 1967, Colonel Fleming was assigned to Minot AFB, N.D., as a UH-1F helicopter pilot.

In June 1968, Colonel Fleming was assigned to the 20th Special Operations Squadron, Republic of Vietnam, where he served until April 1969. Upon his return from Southeast Asia in April 1969, he was assigned to the 12th Flying Training Wing at Randolph AFB, Texas, for T-38 training. A year later, he became a C-141 Starlifter pilot at McChord AFB, Wash. In August 1971, Colonel Fleming became an instructor at the Air Force Academy at Colorado Springs, Colo.

In June 1975, Colonel Fleming attended Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell AFB, Ala. Upon graduation in July 1975, he became a HH-53 helicopter pilot assigned to the 67th Air Rescue and Recovery Squadron, Royal AFS, Woodbridge, England. He returned to Randolph AFB, Texas, in August 1979, where he assumed command of Detachment 2, 1400th

(Current as of September 1991)

-more-

Military Airlift Squadron, Airlift Command, in March 1981. He was assigned to Officer Training School in January 1984 as Deputy Commander for Military Training. In October 1984 he became Vice Commander of Officer Training School. From August 1985 to May 1986, Colonel Fleming was a student at the Air War College, and in May 1986 he was assigned to Squadron Officer School. In June 1989 he was assigned as Commander, U.S. Air Force-Civil Air Patrol Northeast Region Liaison Region, until July 1991 when he assumed his present position as Commander, U.S. Air Force-Civil Air Patrol Southwest Region.

Colonel Fleming is a command pilot with more than 5,000 flying hours and 810 combat missions in Southeast Asia.

His awards and decorations include the Medal of Honor, Silver Star, Distinguished Flying Cross, Air Medal with seven oak leaf clusters, Legion of Merit, and the Meritorious Service Medal with one oak leaf cluster.

Colonel Fleming is married to the former Jennifer L. Hansen of Kelso, Wash. They are the parents of three children: Amy, Rebecca, and John.

-30-

PERSONNEL NEWSLETTER

14TH COMBAT SUPPORT GROUP

14TH AIR COMMANDO WING (PACAF)

NHA TRANG AIR BASE, REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM



The Mission First

DECLASSIFIED
SEA Declassification & Review Team

RETURN TO:
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Aerospace Studies Inst
ATTN: Archives Branch
Maxwell AFB, Alabama
8 OCT 1991

K-WG-14-HZ
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14TH SPECIAL OPERATIONS WING

1 Oct - 31 Dec 68
(Unclassified Title)

Volume II

OCT-DEC 68

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No. 0208054

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14th Air Commando Wing

VOLUMN II APPENDIX

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Apr-Jun 68

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HISTORY

14th Air Commando Wing

1 April - 30 June 1968

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14th Air Commando Wing

1 January - 31 March 1968

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14th Air Commando Wing

1 January - 31 March 1968

Volumn II Appendix

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Sam J. Smith
24 NOV 1968
20th SFS
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